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Abstract
Many firms and organizations with already-optimized business functions are under market
pressure to protect their narrow profit margins. Their need for supplemental and reliable
revenues calls for performance optimization beyond the core business functions. Motivated
by applications from online social media and the airline industry, in my dissertation, I focus
on the revenue management and pricing decisions of customer-based plans and programs.
More formally, the research question addressed in this study is: How can firms effectively
use customer-based pricing strategies to boost revenues?
My dissertation consists of three essays. In the first essay, I analyze the ongoing competition
among online social media (OSMs) to attract users. Concentrating on the importance of
community retention and expansion to OSMs in preserving financially sustainable business
models, I investigate whether OSMs should develop revenue sharing programs and reward
their contributing users from their limited revenue streams. I present a duopoly OSM game
(with a less favourable and a more favourable OSM) in which heterogeneous users choose
their levels of contribution with respect to each OSM based on their preferences. In this
chapter, I explore how online users’ actions and perspectives impact the outcome of the
competition among OSMs. Furthermore, I investigate how small social media firms can
compete with a dominant firm in the market.
In the second essay, I study the role of ancillary revenue and its significance for industries
such as airlines. These firms can barely survive without ancillary fees, even when their
capacities are almost fully utilized. I consider the case in which customers-changing rates
between flights are stochastic but decreasing with reference to the change fees. In this essay,
I examine how firms should design change fees to manage customers’ switching behaviour.
Specifically, I incorporate change fee revenues as a portion of total revenue structure and
investigate how firms should update their markdown pricing strategies when they face pricetracking customers.
In the third essay, I focus on the dynamics between a firm and customers who are uncertain
about their future travel plans. While the firm maximizes its revenue by imposing optimal
change fees, customers consider their travel plan uncertainties and maximize their utilities by
ii

responding strategically to these fares. In this study, I seek to answer two important policy
questions: Although imposing a change fee could increase total revenue, does it burden the
firm with a lower customer demand? How should the optimal monopolistic price be set with
the presence of a change fee? Without imposing any distributional assumptions, I analytically
derive each market player’s best reaction to the other to prescribe the characteristics of the
firm/customer interaction equilibrium.

Keywords
Ancillary Revenue, Airline Industry, Change Fee, Customer Relationship, Revenue Sharing,
Online Social Media, Game Theory, Revenue Management, Marketing
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

For most categories of products and services, global market competition is continuously
on the rise, which leads to lower prices. Profit margins are being squeezed even when the
prices are high because the costs of raw material and energy often peak at the same time.
The dynamic costs of resources make it difficult to consistently meet profit targets. For
example, according to Brian Pearce, the Chief Economist at International Air Transport
Association (IATA), airlines’ revenue exceeded their costs by just 1% in 2012.1 This
trend drives companies to devise new strategies to generate additional and reliable
revenues.
Seeking supplementary revenues is critical for another reason. For many firms, the core
business process is not the main driver of the financial stream. For example, according to
Reid and Sanders (2013), most of General Motors’ monetary returns apparently do not
come from their core business functions –manufacturing and selling cars – but rather
from post sales parts and services. For movie theatres, while the concession revenue rose
8.8% in 2013, theatres are allegedly not making any more money on movies.2 The
generation of higher revenues from ancillary products and services explains why, from a
movie theatre owner’s perspective, customers are not at the movies to be entertained.
Instead, they are there to buy soda and snacks at marked-up prices.3
Firms develop customer-based pricing strategies to ensure a financially healthy and
sustainable business model. In this thesis, I focus on two types of customer-based pricing
strategies. First, firms reward customers for acting in ways beneficial to the firms. For

1

URL: http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Aviation-Advocacy-Economics-2013July.pdf; accessed: 2015–8–8.
2

URL: http://business.time.com/2009/12/07/movie-theaters-make-85-profit-at-concession-stands;
accessed: 2014–7–10.
3

URL: http://business.time.com/2009/12/07/movie-theaters-make-85-profit-at-concession-stands;
accessed: 2014–7–10.
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example, YouTube Partner Program incentivizes online users to post videos and provides
monetary rewards if their videos generate millions of views. Rewarding video creators
ultimately makes YouTube a more popular online social media platform and so it is more
appealing for advertisers. Although paying active customers is costly for firms, the
benefits it produces may exceed the costs.
Second, firms follow an opposite pricing strategy and charge customers when they need a
complementary service. For instance, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, in
2011, ancillary revenue collected from change and cancellation fees accounted for more
than 3% of U.S. airlines’ revenue. Higher ancillary fees can generate more revenues for
firms, but they may significantly reduce customer demand. In this thesis, I will
investigate how firms should optimize the design of these fees. Despite the emerging
importance of ancillary revenue, its significance for firms’ dynamic pricing has not yet
been fully addressed in operations management and management science literature.
Many revenue management models are addressing the performance optimality by solely
focusing on the core business function of a firm. Chase and Prentis (1987) call the
problem of sub-optimization one of the major issues in the management science field,
where the performance measure for a part of a system is optimized, but at the expense of
total system performance. When a firm designs its core business function without
considering the customer-based pricing strategies discussed above, it faces the same
challenge. For instance, the introduction of a change fee affects how a firm should update
its optimal service price. Therefore, considering customer-based pricing strategies along
with the main business process pricing strategies is essential for the firm to prevent the
risk of sub-optimization. Unless we optimize the design of all of these strategies together,
our prescriptions based on sophisticated revenue management systems may not be
beneficial for firms, and may even be misleading and harmful.
The purpose of this thesis is to focus on the revenue management and pricing decisions of
customer-based strategies. The results generated from this thesis lead to optimizing the
performance beyond the core business functions. Moreover, I provide managerial insights
for firms on how to generate supplemental revenues. Higher revenues provide
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opportunities for firms to be competitive under the market pressure and to access more
financial resources for future business investments.
My dissertation consists of three essays examining how organizations can effectively use
customer-based pricing strategies to boost revenues. Essay 1 is motivated by applications
in online social media and focuses on the first type of customer-based strategies. In this
essay, I investigate how a firm should share its advertising revenue with active users. The
results from this essay present new insights on how optimal customer reward programs
shape the market dynamics in online social media. Essays 2 and 3 are motivated by
applications of ancillary fees in the airline industry and focus on the second type of
customer-based pricing strategies. In Essay 2, I study customers’ monetary incentives to
switch between resources and assess how firm can benefit from these incentives by
offering lower service prices. In Essay 3, I study customers’ uncertainty with respect to
their future travel plans and investigate how firms should consider this uncertainty in
their pricing policy. Furthermore, I present that how the optimal service prices should be
modified jointly with the change fees.
In conclusion, I would like to highlight that I have selected online social media and the
airline industry as the focus of this study because both industries have narrow profit
margins. Furthermore, both industries are highly dependent on customer-based strategies
to generate extra revenues. This thesis extends application to other industries. For
example, in Chapter 3, I will discuss how banks and cellphone providers experience an
identical problem when dealing with their clients, and in Chapter 4 I show that travel
industries, such as auto rental, can benefit from our results.

1.1 Overview of Thesis and Specific Essays
Essay 1 analyzes the ongoing competition among online social media (OSMs) to attract
users. Given the importance of community retention and expansion to OSMs in
preserving financially sustainable business models, I investigate how OSMs should
develop revenue sharing programs and reward their contributing users from their slender
revenue streams. In this study, firms share a portion of their advertising revenue with
active online contributors and motivate them to generate more content. I present a
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duopoly OSM game where heterogeneous users choose their levels of contribution with
respect to each OSM. I investigate the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and derive
structural properties of the equilibrium reward solution. Moreover, I investigate the
behaviour of online users and their interaction with firms at equilibrium.
In the second essay, I study the role of ancillary revenue and its significance for firms,
such as airlines. More specifically, I consider an uncertain changing rate between two
resources offered by a firm. The customers’ changing rate between two resources is
decreasing in terms of change fees. With reference to the change fees, I examine how
firms should update its markdown pricing strategies and manage switching behaviour
between two resources. Moreover, I investigate whether it is optimal to prevent
customers from changing between two resources in any case, and determine how this
decision depends on the customers’ population structure in the market.
The third essay focuses on the dynamics between a firm and its customers. The firm
maximizes revenue by setting the optimal change fee. In contrast to the situation in the
second essay, I isolate time uncertainty as the different motivation behind switching fee.
Customers are uncertain about their future travel plans and maximize their utilities by
purchasing their tickets either earlier or later (In Essay 2 the model captures those
customers who change regardless of switching fee, but in Essay 3, customers only change
due to plan change). Furthermore, they are heterogeneous with respect to their
willingness-to-pay for the service. I analytically derive each player’s best reaction to the
other to prescribe the characteristics of the firm/customer interaction equilibrium. In this
study, I seek to answer the following important questions: while charging customers for
changing their travel plans might generate higher revenue per changing customer, does it
ultimately burden the firm with lower revenue? How do customers with time uncertainty
react to change fees? And finally, how should the firm update its pricing policies with
change fees to maximize its revenue?
In the final chapter, I present an overview of the main results from the analysis of the
customer-based pricing strategies discussed in the thesis and highlight the managerial
implications of their implementations.

5

Chapter 2

2

User Reward Programs in Online Social Media

Online social media (OSMs) have become a popular and growing Internet phenomenon,
as exemplified by the millions of followers of websites like YouTube, Twitter, and
Facebook. Given the Internet’s ease of access and the high degree of competition to
attract users to these sites, a question arises as to whether OSMs should develop revenuesharing programs as a way to reward their contributing users. I present an ex ante
asymmetric duopoly OSM game, where heterogeneous users are either active or passive
with respect to each OSM. The game includes two steps: First, the OSMs simultaneously
announce their rewards for active users; and second, based on their preference, users
choose their level of contribution with respect to each OSM. I show that this game has a
unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and identify the conditions under which a
symmetric equilibrium exists, despite the asymmetry between the OSMs. Moreover, at
equilibrium, no user chooses to contribute content exclusively to the less favourable
OSM, even when the more favourable firm shares a lower reward than the less favourable
firm. Furthermore, in some circumstances, a higher asymmetry can diminish the net
revenue of the more favourable firm and vice versa.

2.1 Introduction
During the last decade, online social media (OSMs) have become a popular and growing
Internet phenomenon. Hundreds of millions of users from all over the world visit and
contribute to these websites on a daily basis. As of October 10, 2014, LinkedIn, Twitter,
YouTube, and Facebook had around 300 million, 950 million, 1 billion, and 1.28 billion
unique users, respectively.4 In this paper, I define an online social medium as any website
providing a platform that allows online users to join and post user-created content (UCC).
This definition includes social news websites, such as Digg and Reddit; video- and photo-

4

URLs: press.linkedin.com/News-Releases/333/LinkedIn-reaches-300-million-members-worldwide;
businessinsid-er.com/number-of-users-who-abandon-twitter-2014-2#!JxoTo;
youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html; news-room.fb.com/company-info/; accessed 2014-10-10
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sharing websites like YouTube, Flickr, and Metacafe; social network websites, such as
MySpace, Facebook, Google+, Tencent QQ, and Twitter; and portal sites such as Yahoo
Groups. The key benefit for users comes from the pre-dominantly free service that allows
them to stay connected with their communities and friends, sharing knowledge and usercreated content like photos, videos, files, software, bookmarks, and blogs. These features
contribute to OSMs’ appeal for advertisers.
Although some OSMs generate revenue through membership fees, affiliate programs,
donations, and merchandise sales, the most common source of revenue is through
advertising. Advertisements are displayed to users, and revenue is generated (to an OSM)
based on the amount of time the advertisement is displayed and/or the number of times it
has been clicked. Based on Deane and Agarwal [8], in the United States alone, annual
revenues from ads on social media sites were estimated at over $26 billion in 2010. Hu
(2015) argues that advertisers have started to realize that the Internet is a much more
accountable and measurable medium compared to other forms of traditional media like
television. Therefore, the larger the online community, the more lucrative the site is for
advertisers to post their ads, and the greater the opportunity for higher revenue.
Consequently, community retention and expansion stand out as key issues for OSMs.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of OSM users: active and passive. Active users
post content and observe other active users’ contributions, while passive users simply
review content generated by active users. Within each category, there is, of course, a
continuum. For example, the active category is likely to contain very active users who
contribute on a daily or even hourly basis, as well as minimally active users who
infrequently post a contribution. Likewise for passive users: some may be “active
passive” in that they visit the site frequently, while others visit the site so infrequently
that they may not even be considered a user. For the purpose of this pa-per, I restrict the
discussion to consider only two categories. More details are provided in Section 3.
Since users visit OSMs because of UCCs created by active users, some OSMs provide
active users with monetary incentives through revenue-sharing programs. Under these
relatively new practices, OSMs share a portion of their revenue as rewards to their active
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users. The main purpose of these programs is to increase the traffic and popularity of
OSMs, which ultimately drive higher revenue. Table 1 categorizes OSMs with user
reward programs. For example, YouTube, although not explicitly declared, pays video
developers of original content approximately $2 to $5 per 1,000 views of their posted
video. In addition, popular users often may receive additional payment from their own
advertisement sales, sponsorships and product placements. For instance, Michael
Buckley, famous for his YouTube video blog “What the Buck?!”, reportedly earns
$20,000 a month. 5
I consider two online social media sites that compete simultaneously by rewarding active
users (e.g., YouTube and Metacafe). The firms are assumed to be asymmetric in that
online users have a general preference for one of the sites. I label one as “more
favourable” and the other as “less favourable” and investigate ways for the less
favourable firm to compete with the more favourable firm. Both firms decide on the
amount of reward they will offer as their strategy. I demonstrate how to derive the
optimal reward levels and show that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. At equilibrium, some users may be indifferent with respect to making a choice
between two firms, but I show that the possibility of this case is zero and corresponding
firms’ market size based on users’ choices are unique.

5

URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/business/media/11youtube.html; accessed: 2014–5–10.
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Table 1: Categories of Revenue sharing in OSMs (accessed October 10, 2014)
Category

Examples

Written Content

Helium

Earnings range from $10 to $200 per article plus a $3 bonus.

Oondi

Writer gets 100% of the advertisement profits.

YouTube
Video Sharing,
Podcasting,
Audio and Music About

Photography

Professional and
Reviewing
Community

Answer Services

Miscellaneous

Structure of Payment

YouTube pays video developers between $2 and $5 per 1,000 plays.
Video producers are paid a flat fee of $250 per video.

Blip.tv

On a 50/50 basis, Blip.tv shares its advertising revenue with
producers.

Shutterfly

A Shutterfly Affiliate earns $9 per new customer.

PhotoWorks

Users earn money from photos, illustrations, vectors, and footage.

RateItAll

It shares 50% of the Google Adsense revenue generated by the
pages users create.

Newsvine

Users receive 90% of revenue from advertisements.

Ether

Users earn money over e-mail.

Mahalo

The most helpful users receive payment from those who submit the
question.

RedBubble

An online art community that allows users to sell their works.

Kongregate

A large community of independent game developers with weekly
prizes.

9

This paper makes the following contributions. First, I find that, for any level of
asymmetry, there exists a revenue structure such that the game has a symmetric
equilibrium [i.e., the two OSMs provide the same level of reward to their active users].
Consequently, although a symmetric allocation of users signals a symmetric game, a
symmetric equilibrium does not necessarily imply a symmetric game. Second, when
users have economy of scale for contribution to both firms, at equilibrium, no one
chooses to contribute content exclusively to the less favourable firm, even when this firm
shares a higher reward. This result may seem counterintuitive, but it is anecdotally
consistent with what is observed, both with regard to OSMs that provide reward programs (e.g., YouTube versus Metacafe), as well as those that are based merely on users’
perceptions (e.g., Facebook versus Google+). Third, although one may expect that, as the
asymmetry between the OSMs increases, the more favourable firm would decrease its
reward amount, I show that both websites end up sharing higher rewards. Finally, I
demonstrate the conditions under which the probability of users being active in the less
favourable firm increases when the asymmetry increases between the OSMs (and vice
versa). Interestingly, although the less favourable firm never sees an advantage in a
higher asymmetry, under certain conditions, a higher level of asymmetry can also
diminish the more favourable firm’s net revenue.

2.2 Literature Review
Different perspectives of OSMs have been studied in literature. For a general review of
topics related to OSMs, see Bainbridge (2007), Clemons (2009), Messinger et al. (2009),
and Kim, Jeong, and Lee (2010). These authors agree that OSMs face unique business
challenges, such as selection of a financially sustainable business model and managing
the customer relationship, and more research needs to be done to address these
challenges. The need for further studies about OSMs also has been identified in the
operations management and management science literature, although the primary focus
of the studies in these fields has been mainly on online retailing, advertising, and network
science. (See Ahmed and Kwon (2014), Alderson (2008), Basua, Chakrabortyb, and
Sharmac (2015), Fridgeirsdottir and Najafi-asadolahi (2014) and Perdikaki, Kesavan, and
Swaminathan (2012) and the papers referenced therein.)
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A stream of research that relates – though somewhat orthogonally – to this study is online
consumer behaviour, which has been empirically studied by social psychology and
marketing science; see Schau and Gilly (2003), Benabou and Tirole (2006), Johnson et al.
(2004) and Teo and Yu (2005). This field highlights the crucial role and characteristics of
content contributors on the success of any user-generated content website (See Zhang et
al. (2012) and Grewal, Lilien, and Mallapragada (2012)). Moreover, some studies, such
as Tirunillai and Tellis (2012) and Luo, Zhang, and Duan (2013), investigate the
relationship between social media and the market performance of the firm. This study
focuses on the effects of monetary incentives and revenue-sharing programs on the
dynamics that exist between users and the OSMs on the Internet. This paper contributes
to the call for further research in this field, such as OSM profitability and revenue
generation.
The subject of competition between media sites has been studied in the literature (see
Gal-Or and Dukes (2003), Godes, Ofek, and Sarvary (2009), Zhang and Sarvary (2014),
and Zhu and Dukes (2015)), with a focus on different dynamics based on price and other
factors of service quality, such as product variety and advertising intensities. Shin and
Sudhir (2010) present a related paper that focuses on rewarding customers within
symmetric competition. These authors adopt a Hotelling model with two retailers
geographically located on the two ends of a unit line. Similar to my setup, they assume
there are two types of consumers in the market with value heterogeneity and unstable
preference. They present the conditions in which it is optimal for a firm to offer a lower
price as reward only to its own customers rather than to the competitor’s customers and
vice versa. In this paper, however, customers select one retail service.
A recent study, and one that is more closely related, is Zhang and Zubcsek (2010). These
authors consider a monopoly setting wherein an OSM provides online users both
monetary and non-monetary incentives for their online contributions. Similar to the setup
in this paper and in Shin and Sudhir (2010), they also consider two types of customers.
They find that when the OSM offers monetary incentives, it is more effective to offer
payments exclusively to top contributors instead of to all users. Moreover, their results
indicate that one equilibrium strategy involves building a contributor community based
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solely on monetary incentives rather than on non-monetary incentives, such as intrinsic
fun. This study complements their results by providing insights for the duopoly setting.
Moreover, while Zhang and Zubcsek (2010) and Shin and Sudhir (2010) consider two
types of contributors – that is, a high and low type contributor – I capture customers’
heterogeneity through two independent effort levels.

2.3 Online Social Media Duopoly Competition
I assume there are two OSM firms offering the same service and competing
simultaneously for online users through their revenue-sharing programs. I index the OSM
firms by i, i = 1, 2 and define users to be either active (A) or passive (P) with respect to
each firm. Therefore, there are four different states per user. For notational convenience, I
use the first and second letters to denote the state of a user in firm 1 and firm 2,
respectively: AP, AA, PA, and PP. For example, AP denotes that the user is active in firm
1 and passive in firm 2. Although I consider two types of customers, the ensuing model
setting and analysis can be extended to include additional customer contribution levels;
however, to keep the model parsimonious, I choose not to include more states.
Furthermore, in many cases, OSMs, such as YouTube, impose a threshold on the level of
contribution and deal with a continuous spectrum of online users’ contributions in a
discrete fashion. In such a case, online users whose contributions are below (above) the
threshold are considered passive (active).
I consider a market that consists of a large online user population, a place where the
decision of one user does not affect how other users behave, and there is no peer pressure
in this market (consistent with the setup in, for example, Nasiry and Popescu (2012),
Gallego and Sahin (2010), and references in Shen and Su (2007)). Both OSMs have the
same pool of online users, since reaching all websites is guaranteed on the Internet. The
income per user comes from advertising, and the size of that income depends on the
shopping behaviour of the users since revenue is a function of clicks or purchases per
advertisement. Urstadt (2008) and Kim, and Jeong and Lee (2010) mention that a fixed
portion of online users regularly click on ads (e.g., 0.04 percent on Facebook). As a
result, OSMs generate revenue constantly, per user, from advertising. Facebook charges
only 14 cents per thousand times that an advertisement is served.
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I assume firms receive different benefits from active and passive users’ contributions. I
define wA and wP as the fixed exogenous parameters that represent firms’ revenue per
active and passive user, respectively. These parameters signify the impact of many
factors, which monetize the contribution of different classes of users as revenue for the
firms, such as the different levels of online dedication, influence, or rates of purchase for
active and passive users. (Venkatesh and Agarwal (2006), Kim, Jeong, and Lee (2010)
and Grewal, Lilien, and Mallapragada (2012)) According to the information presented in
Table 1, in most cases, OSMs, such as About and Shutterfly, reward active users based
on a fixed rate, or they share a fixed percentage of revenue, as, for example, in Oondi,
Blip.tv, and Newsvine.
Although advertising revenue may be different for the same type of contribution, in this
paper, I consider wA and wP as the “average revenues” from active and passive users. For
a large market of users, it would seem reasonable to define an average contribution level
for active users and maximise the expected firm revenue over an average reward. I
assume that, for firms, active users generate higher revenue than do passive users (i.e., wA
> wP). If wA ≤ wP, then the problem becomes pathological since there is no incentive for
firms to pay active users a reward. Consequently, all users decide to be passive and no
content is generated. Note that, although each firm sets its own reward, its net revenue
depends on its competitor’s reward too.
The sequence of events is as follows: In the first stage, firms simultaneously announce
the amount of their rewards ri, i = 1, 2. I denote the vector of rewards by r = [r1, r2]. The
second stage accounts for the users’ reactions to the reward programs as follows: After
observing r, each online user selects among AP, AA, PA, and PP. Each website’s
expected net revenue per user is, for i = 1, 2:
𝜋𝑖 (𝒓) = 𝜑𝑖 (𝒓)(𝑤𝐴 − 𝑟𝑖 ) + (1 − 𝜑𝑖 (𝒓)) 𝑤𝑃

where 𝜑𝑖 is the probability of being active for an online user in firm i, i = 1, 2. Increasing
this probability is an indication of operational success of the firm’s service and the users’
contribution willingness. These probabilities depend on the vector of rewards. Note that I
could have 𝜑1 + 𝜑2 ≤ 1 or even 𝜑1 + 𝜑2 > 1, since a user may decide to be active or
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passive in both firms or in neither firm. To simplify the analysis, I define w = wA − wP,
the incremental revenue generated by an active user. Firm i aims to find optimal ri to
maximize its expected net revenue; that is:
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋𝑖 (𝒓) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜑𝑖 (𝒓)(𝑤 − 𝑟𝑖 ) + 𝑤𝑃
𝑟𝑖

𝑟𝑖

(1)

Next, I use backward induction to solve this game. Given the firms’ reward decisions
(r1,r2), I consider the users’ best responses that impact each firm’s demand, 𝜑𝑖 ∗ (𝒓). I
discuss how online users choose to be active or passive with respect to an OSM. I assume
that being active at an OSM requires effort or is “costly” for online users, and this cost
reflects the time or effort spent on participating in a firm’s activities (i.e., generating
content for an OSM). Also, being passive is effortless and therefore incurs no cost for the
users. Although an online user pays a cost for an online contribution, he or she could
have a specific motivation for being active. Studies, including Koufaris (2002) and Hsu,
Lu, and Hsu (2007), indicate that the ease of use, the level of enjoyment, and the
usefulness of the online service constitute the users’ main motivations with respect to
Internet contribution. I capture the impact of these incentives as the general perception of
the OSM of online users. In the duopoly setting, I assume that one firm enjoys better
recognition from online users compared to the other firm (i.e., firms are ex ante
asymmetric in this regard), and this asymmetry could reflect differences in the overall
preference, technologies, instructions, fees, or designs that are implemented by each firm.
The social media industry is characterised by a trend towards winner-take-all markets and
is increasingly dominated by websites such as Facebook or YouTube. However, a large
number of niche websites now co-exist with these dominant firms, and I thus model
asymmetric competition to investigate how smaller players can compete with major
players.
I label the firm with the better perception as “the more favourable firm” and the other
firm as “the less favourable firm.” For active users, the better the general perception, the
lower the cost of contribution; that is, contribution to the more favourable firm is less
costly than contribution to the less favourable firm. Therefore, in general, online users are
more willing to contribute to the more favourable firm. I denote the asymmetry
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(distinction) between the firms by the fixed (finite) discount parameter a, where a ≥ 1.
Note that in the special case of a = 1, the firms are symmetric. Later, in Chapter 6, I study
the case where online users have different perspectives with respect to the asymmetry
between two firms (i.e., a is a random variable). The taste preferences of the customers
are heterogeneous, and I capture this heterogeneity through two independent effort levels.
First, the consumers’ effort, or “cost,” of being active in a firm is captured by the random
variable C, where C is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1; 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤ 𝑐} = 𝐹𝐶 (𝑐) = 𝑐, for
0 ≤ c ≤ 1. From now on, I refer to C as the consumers’ cost. Without loss of generality, I
label firm 2 as the “less favourable” firm and, therefore, the consumers’ cost of being
active with respect to firm 1 and firm 2 is C and aC, respectively. Second, the consumers’
cost of being active in both firms simultaneously is represented by C(a+K), where K is
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 and independent of C; 𝑃𝑟{𝐾 ≤ 𝑘} = 𝐹𝐾 (𝑘) = 𝑘, for
0 ≤ k ≤ 1. A small K represents economy of scale in being active in both firms, reflecting
a case in which a user has better skills, knowledge, or tools in handling two distinct
activities at the same time. In Chapter 6, I extend my analysis to the case where 1 ≤ k, in
which users have diseconomy of scale for joint participation in both firms, a situation that
is common in many manufacturing and service industries.
Online users with higher cost are less willing to be active. The rewards, however, have
the opposite effect on the behaviour of online users and compensate for the costs of these
contributions. Online users consider both rewards and costs in their decision-making, and
I define a utility function for online users accordingly. After firms have announced their
rewards and users have observed those rewards, the users compare their utility of being in
any of the four defined states and choose the state with the highest utility:
u(c,k) = max{r1 – c, r2 – ac, r1 + r2 – c(a+k), 0}

(2)

where r1 – c, r2 – ac, and r1 + r2 – c(a+k) are the utilities of a user with realized cost
variables c and k, of being in states AP, PA and AA, respectively, and 0 is the utility of
being passive in both firms.
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2.4 Analysis of Firms’ and Consumers’ Interaction
In this section, I analyze the outcome of interactions between firms and consumers. First,
I characterize the best response function for the users. According to the rational reaction
of online users, firms maximize their net revenue. Next, I derive the corresponding Nash
equilibrium(s) for the simultaneous game between the two firms.

2.4.1 Users’ Reaction to Firms’ Rewards
A rational user is active with the following probabilities:
𝜑1 (𝒓) = 𝑃𝑟{𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 1} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶, 0)}
𝜑2 (𝒓) = 𝑃𝑟{𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 2} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 – 𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 − 𝐶, 0)}

Then, I have the following results:
1

1

1

1

𝜑𝑖 ∗ (𝒓) = ∫ ∫ 𝑔𝑖 (𝒓, 𝑐, 𝑘) 𝑓𝐶 (𝑐) 𝑓𝐾 (𝑘) 𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐 = ∫ ∫ 𝑔𝑖 (𝒓, 𝑐, 𝑘) 𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐
0

0

0

0

where
𝑔1 (𝒓, 𝑐, 𝑘) = {

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝑐, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝑐(𝑎 + 𝑘) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 – 𝑎. 𝑐, 0)
0
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

𝑔2 (𝒓, 𝑐, 𝑘) = {

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 – 𝑎𝑐, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝑐(𝑎 + 𝑘) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝑐, 0)
0
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

and fC(c) and fK(k) are the pdf of FC(c) and FK(k), respectively.
The probability functions φi are continuous but not differentiable in ri. Depending on the
particular rewards r1 and r2, there are, in total, nine different cases for φ1 and φ2. Note that
the probabilities also depend on a, but a is a parameter of the model and not a decision
variable for the firms. For the ensuing firms’ duopoly analysis, only three cases are of
interest, and these are summarized as follows. (For completeness, the remaining six cases
are summarized in Appendix.)
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Lemma 1 The probability of being active in firms 1 and 2 is as follows:
𝑎

-

Case I: if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 <(a−1)r1, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑟1 and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎−1).

-

Case II: if (a−1) r1 ≤ r2 ≤ ar1, and r1 + r2 ≤ a, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 1𝑎𝑟 2) +

𝑟 +𝑟
1

𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 and
𝑟1 +𝑟2
) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ).
𝑎𝑟1

𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

-

Case III: if (a−1)r1 ≤ r2 ≤ ar1, r1 + r2 > a, and r1 ≤ 1, then
𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑟1 + 𝑎(𝑟1 − 1) − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) and

𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ).

Lemma 1 shows how a market of rational online users responds to firms’ reward
decisions r. In Case I, φi depends only on ri and not on rj, for i, j = 1, 2, and i ≠ j. In Cases
II and III, φ1 and φ2 depend on r1 and r2. For all of the above cases, firms pay less than the
maximum of their active users’ cost (i.e., r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ a). Depending on which case the
user chooses, different dynamics occur. For instance, in Case I, the probabilities of being
active for two firms increase linearly with corresponding rewards; firms can increase
their market shares linearly by increasing their rewards. In contrast, for Cases II and III,
the probabilities are nonlinear with respect to the rewards. Notice that r1+r2 ≤ a for Cases
I and II, and r1+r2 > a for Case III.
I might expect that the probabilities of being in state AP and PA are decreasing in r2 and
r1, respectively. In other words, by increasing its reward, a firm can diminish the
likelihood of users being active exclusively with a competitor. However, I see from (2)
that, if the reward of an OSM compensates the cost of a user, then the competing OSM’s
reward cannot diminish this state. Instead, adding that reward can convince the user to
choose to be active in both. Proposition 1 shows that φi are monotonic functions with
respect to r1, r2 and a.
Proposition 1 The probability of being active in firm i, φi, is non-decreasing in r1 and r2,
and non-increasing in a, for i =1,2.
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Notice that φ1 and φ2 are aggregative probabilities; that is, φ1 is the sum of the probability
of being in states AA and AP, and φ2 is the sum of the probability of being in states AA
and PA. Proposition 1 indicates that these aggregative probabilities are a non-decreasing
function of r1 and r2, and a non-increasing function of a. However, their components –
the probability of being active in states AA, AP, and PA – do not necessarily follow the
results in Proposition 1. For example, it can be shown that the probability of being in
state AP is decreasing in r2, and the probability of being in state PA is decreasing in r1.
Counterintuitively, the probability of being active in firm 1, φ1, can be increasing in r2 as
one of its two components (i.e., the probability of being in state AA) is increasing in r2 at
a greater rate in absolute value than the decreasing rate of its other component (i.e., the
probability of being in state AP). For a similar reason, φ1 is decreasing in a.
Now, knowing the users’ best responses about which firm to contribute to, and hence
knowing each firm’s demand 𝜑𝑖 ∗ (𝒓), I solve for the two firms’ reward decisions at
equilibrium (r1*, r2*). Next, I study the firms’ competition problem.

2.4.2 Firms’ Equilibrium Reward Decisions Under the General Case
of a
Firms could anticipate the reactions of online users by calculating 𝜑𝑖 ∗ (𝒓) and then
maximizing their net revenue accordingly. To analyze the simultaneous game between
two firms, I start by examining the firms’ net revenue functions given in equation (1). As
mentioned in 4.1, firm 1 chooses r1 ≤ 1 and firm 2 chooses r2 ≤ a; that is, the firms never
reward beyond their users’ maximum cost of being active. This is because, by paying r1 >
1, φ1 = 1 and firm 1’s payoff is w − r1, which is dominated by paying r1 = 1. By the same
logic, firm 2 never pays r2 > a. Note that website i also never chooses ri higher than w
because any reward higher than this level generates a negative revenue in equation (1).
Next, I analyze the equilibrium of the simultaneous game between two firms, denoted by
(r1*, r2*). Theorem 1 demonstrates that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium. This
equilibrium exists in only one of the three cases discussed in Lemma 1.
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Theorem 1 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for firms’ reward
structures such that:
-

If a ≤ 2, then r1* ≤ 1 and (a −1)r1* ≤ r2* ≤ ar1*, i.e., the equilibrium exists in Cases II
and III only.

-

If a >2, then r1* ≤ 1 and r2* <(a −1)r1*, or (a−1)r1* ≤ r2* ≤ ar1* and r1* + r2* > a,
i.e., the equilibrium exists in Cases I and III only.

Theorem 1 states that firms’ equilibrium is in one of Cases I, II, or III in Figure 1. The
structure of the equilibrium depends on a and results in two possibilities: (1) when a ≤ 2,
the equilibrium is in a convex set that includes only Case II and Case III (Panel A, Figure
1); (2) when a > 2, the equilibrium is in a non-convex set, which is composed of Case I
and Case III (Panel A, Figure 1).
Theorem 1 also states that the firms’ game has a unique, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
of reward decisions. This implies that the users’ (equilibrium) probability of being active
with regard to each firm, 𝜑1 and 𝜑2 , is also unique. In other words, Theorem 1 extends
the equilibrium to include the firms’ interaction with the users. At equilibrium, however,
some users with specific cost levels (c, k) may be indifferent about their status within two
firms (see equation 2). Nevertheless, since users are spread over continuous C and K
spaces, the possibility of this case is zero. Hence, these “boundary” users do not affect the
uniqueness of firms’ market sizes and reward decisions at equilibrium.
Next, I consider how to specifically derive the equilibrium solution (r1*, r2*). First, for a
given a, I define a unique threshold, ŵa, which is used to determine which feasible case
contains the equilibrium. Specifically, if w > ŵa, the equilibrium is in Case III. If w ≤ ŵa,
the equilibrium depends on a. That is, if a ≤ 2, the equilibrium is in Case II; otherwise,
the equilibrium is in Case I. The threshold ŵa can be calculated as follows.

19

ŵa

3

Case III
2.5

C

a

r2

w
B

Case I

III
1.5

II

a-1

2

Case II

A
I

0 O

1

0

1

1

1.25

1.5

1.75

2

r1

a

(A)

(B)

2.25

2.5

2.75

Figure 1: Cases of Lemma 1 (Panel A), and Threshold for wa based on a (Panel B)
Lemma 2 For a given a, there is a unique threshold ŵa, such that if w ≤ ŵa, then r1* +
r2* ≤ a, and if w > ŵa, then r1* + r2* > a. ŵa is derived as follows:


For a ≤ 2, ŵa is solved from the following system of equations:
𝑤
̂𝑎 = 2𝑟2 +
𝑤
̂𝑎 = 2𝑟1 +
{



𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 )−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎)
𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
𝑎𝑟1 −𝑟2 −𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )

(3)

𝑟1 + 𝑟2 = 𝑎

For a > 2, 𝑤
̂𝑎 = 2(𝑎 − 1)

(4)

The solid line in Panel B, Figure 1, illustrates the general shape of ŵa as a function of a.
Note that ŵa ≥ 1.5 and is increasing in a. This finding implies that, as the asymmetry
increases between two firms, for a fixed w, the equilibrium moves from Case III toward
Cases I or II. Moreover, by increasing the w, the sum of rewards increases at equilibrium.

3
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Note that, when a ≤ 2, no closed-form solution exists for ŵa from the system of equations
(3), and it has to be solved numerically.6
The special cases when w = ŵa are as follows: If a ≤ 2, then the unique equilibrium
solution should satisfy r1* + r2* = a. In this case, the equilibrium is on the boundary of
Cases II and III. When a > 2, then r1* = 1 and r2* = a − 1, the equilibrium is a unique
boundary point between Cases I and III. Next, I present the conditions to derive the
equilibrium for each case by solving the corresponding systems of equations. Lemmas 3
to 5 give the form of equilibrium solution in Cases I to III, respectively.
𝑤

𝑤

Lemma 3 If a > 2 and w ≤ ŵa (Case I), then 𝑟1∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ( 2 , 1) and 𝑟2∗ = 2 .
When a > 2 and w ≤ ŵa, the equilibrium is in Case I, and the firms’ net revenues are as
follows:
𝜋1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1 ) 𝑟1
𝑎
𝜋2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2 ) 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(
)
𝑎−1
𝑤

In this case, when w ≤ 2, 𝑟1∗ = 𝑟2∗ = 2 ; both rewards increase linearly with respect to w
and the equilibrium is symmetric, despite the asymmetry between two firms. In Section 5,
I discuss why the less favourable firm pays the same as the more favourable firm, even
when it has a smaller market share. When 2 ≤ w ≤ ŵa, the symmetric equilibrium no
longer holds, whereas the more favourable firm shares the unit of cost only, the reward
for the less favourable firm increases linearly with respect to w, and this firm pays an
even higher reward than its competitor.
Now, assume a ≤ 2 and, w ≤ ŵa. The equilibrium can be derived based on Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 If a ≤ 2 and w ≤ ŵa (Case II), then r1* and r2* are the feasible solutions to the
following system of equations:

6

When a ≤ 2, a close approximation of ŵa is 𝑤
̃𝑎 = 1.5 𝑎 √2−1 .
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{

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑟 +𝑟
) − 𝑟2 + 𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 1 2 )
𝑎𝑟1
𝑎𝑟1
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑟1 +𝑟2
2𝑟2 ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 𝑟 ) − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 𝑎𝑟 ) = 0
2
1

(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 ) (𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
(𝑤 −

=0

(5)

where the ŵa is the unique solution of the system of equations (3) in Lemma 2.

The system of equations (5) cannot be solved in closed form in general. In this case, the
equilibrium is in Case II, and the net revenue functions of firms are as follows:
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝜋1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1 ) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
) + 𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 )
𝑎𝑟1
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝜋2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2 ) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ))
𝑎𝑟1

As I discussed, in Case II, the sum of rewards at equilibrium is less than a. In Section 6, I
numerically show that the sum of rewards at equilibrium increases linearly with respect
to w when w is less than ŵa. In other words, for a low w, the reimbursement of users in
state AA increases linearly with respect to w when w is low. However, this is not the case
when w is high. In Case III, the sum of rewards at equilibrium increases concavely with
respect to w, as firms cannot continue increasing their rewards linearly. (See Section 6 for
more details.)
Notice that, together, firms never pay beyond a + 1, no matter how large the w is, since
the firms never reward beyond their users’ maximum cost. Also, by decreasing a, the
intensity of the competition increases, and r1* and r2* transfer from Case I to Case II.
Next, I have the following result, when w > ŵa.
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Lemma 5 If w > ŵa (Case III), then r1* and r2* are found through a two-step process:
(1) Determine 𝑟̂1 and 𝑟̂2 as the solution to the following system of equations:
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 )(𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟2 − 𝑎𝑟1 ) + 𝑟1 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )) = 0
𝑎
{
(𝑤 − 2𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( ) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 + 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) = 0
𝑟

(6)

2

𝑟̂1
1

(2) Let 𝑟1∗ = {

𝑖𝑓 𝑟̂2 ≤ 𝑎𝑟̂1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎 − 𝑟̂2 ≤ 𝑟̂1 ≤ 1
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(7-1)

and r2* is found by solving for r2 in:
𝑎

(𝑤 − 2𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( ) − 𝑟1∗ − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 + 𝑟1∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1∗ ) = 0.
𝑟
2

(7-2)

Lemma 5 demonstrates that, when w > ŵa, the equilibrium can be calculated through a
two-step process. First, I derive the solution of the system of equations (6); I label the
solution of this system by 𝑟̂1 and 𝑟̂2 . If this solution is feasible – as it is in Case III – the
solution is the equilibrium of the game. However, the solution of system (6) can be
outside Case III. I show that this can happen only if the equilibrium of the game is on line
AC in Figure 1; that is, when r1* = 1. In this case, r1* is calculated based on Equation (71), and r2* is derived through solving Equation (7-2) in the second step. In Case III, the
net revenue functions of firms are as follows:
𝜋1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1 ) (𝑟1 + 𝑎(𝑟1 − 1) − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ))
𝜋2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2 ) (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ))

Analogous to Case II (Lemma 4), I am unable to find the closed-form solution for r1* and
r2*, based on w and a, in Case III (Lemma 5) as well. In general, the closed-form solution
for equilibrium can be derived in Case I (Lemma 3) only. However, I illustrate that, in the
symmetric game, it is possible to find a closed-form solution for the equilibrium under
Case II (Proposition 2). Moreover, in Section 7, I provide numerical results for the
asymmetric game and show the condition under which the equilibrium is symmetric
despite the asymmetry between the two firms. When a > 2 and w > ŵa, Lemma 5 can be
simplified as follows:
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Corollary 1 If a > 2 and w > ŵa, then r1* = 1, and r2* is found by solving for:
𝑎

(𝑤 − 2𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( ) − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 − 1 = 0.
𝑟

(8)

2

Corollary 1 indicates that, when a > 2 and w > ŵa, firm 1 always shares the amount equal
to the unit cost. In this case, the equilibrium is on line AC at Panel (A) in Figure 1. I have
already proven the existence of equilibrium in Theorem 1. All equilibrium cases are
summarized in Table 2. Next, I study the outcome of equilibrium when either the
asymmetry (a) or incremental revenue (w) increases to the highest point.
Corollary 2A The asymptotic limit of the equilibrium reward solution with respect to a
𝑤

𝑤

is given by 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑟1∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ( 2 , 1) and 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑟2∗ = 2 .
𝑎→∞

𝑎→∞

Corollary 2B The asymptotic limit of the equilibrium reward solution with respect to w
is given by, 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑟1∗ = 1 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑟2∗ = 𝑎.
𝑤→∞

𝑤→∞

Corollaries 2A and 2B simplify the previous results for the extreme cases of a and w.
Notice that when a goes to infinity, as I might expect, no user contributes to the less
favourable firm, and the duopolistic setting converts to a monopolistic setting. In this
𝑤

case, 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜋1∗ = (𝑤 − 1) 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ( 2 , 1) and 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜋2∗ = 0. These results also suggest that
𝑎→∞

𝑎→∞

when a increases significantly, the less favourable firm may completely shut down its
rewards program due to a lack of demonstrable profitability. This finding is consistent
with what has been observed between YouTube and Metacafe (or even Facebook and
MySpace). Also, notice that Corollary 2A and 2B are in conformity with Corollary 1.
When w goes to infinity, φ1* and φ2* limit to 1, and both firms share the highest cost
incurred by their users. Hence, 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜋𝑖∗ = ∞, for i =1,2.
𝑤→∞

Regarding the equilibrium, some questions may arise. For example, I have already
mentioned that r1 and r2 are less than or equal to w. I might wonder whether the firms
will be generous in their payments; that is, will they share a higher portion of w with their
active users or keep (save) the major amount of it for themselves? Moreover, is it
possible that, by sharing a higher payment, the less favourable firm gains a higher market
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share or revenue than the more favourable firm? I summarize these finding in Corollary
3.
Table 2: Different cases of equilibrium

a≤2

a>2

w ≤ ŵa

w > ŵa

Case II

Case III

r1* and r2* are solved by (5)

r1* and r2* are solved by (7.1) and (7.2)

Case I

Case II

𝑤

r1* = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ( 2 , 1) and r2* =

𝑤
2

r1* = 1 and r2* are solved by (8)

Corollary 3 At equilibrium:


The proportion of active users in the more favourable firm is higher than or equal to
the proportion of active users in the less favourable firm, i.e., φ1* ≥ φ2*.



The reward payments are less than or equal to half the incremental revenue
generated by active users, i.e., ri* ≤ w/2, for i = 1, 2.



The set of active users in the less favourable firm is a subset of the set of active users
in the more favourable firm.

First, Corollary 3 asserts that, at equilibrium, the probability of being active is higher for
the more favourable firm than for the less favourable firm. This finding holds, even when
the more favourable firm shares a lower reward than the less favourable firm.
Second, at equilibrium, firms keep at least half of w for themselves and never pay back
more than half of this incremental revenue with their active users. In most cases, firms
keep for themselves more than w/2. The only case where firms share w/2 is when a ≥ 2
and w ≤ ŵa.
Third, Corollary 3 states that the set of active users in the more favourable firm includes
the set of active users in the less favourable firm; that is, no users will be passive with
respect to firm 1 and active with respect to firm 2. This finding reflects the example of
online users, such as Kip Kedersha, who anecdotally decided not to work exclusively for
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their original community (Metacafe). In doing so, they expanded their activities to an
appealing competitor website (YouTube) and found that the competitor’s platform was
more popular and more convenient to work with.

2.5 Analysis of Asymmetry Between Firms
Due to the complexity of the model, obtaining closed-form equilibrium solutions is
challenging. Therefore, to gain further insight regarding the impact of the asymmetry, I
analyze certain instances and conduct numerical analyses. More specifically, I first
analytically compare two special cases of a. Second, using a thorough numerical analysis,
I study the firms’ equilibrium reward decisions. Finally, I relax my assumption on the
fixed a, and I investigate the case where customers are heterogeneous with respect to the
asymmetry between two firms.

2.5.1

Impact of Asymmetry in Cost: Comparison of Special Cases
of a

In the following section, I study two special cases when a = 1 and a = 2 in order to
achieve some insights on how the asymmetry in firms’ costs affects their reward
decisions and revenues. When a = 1, the game is symmetric. The case with a = 2
represents another special situation since, as I see in section 4, this point is a threshold for
two different cases of a < 2 and a > 2, in which the firms’ reward decisions at equilibrium
are significantly different. Recall that, when a < 2 and w ≤ ŵa, the equilibrium is in Case
II, but when a > 2 and w ≤ ŵa, the equilibrium is in Case I. Moreover, in the case of a <
2, the game is more “intensive” than in the case of a > 2; as a result of asymmetry, when
a > 2, there is lower chance for the more favourable firm to have a better position in the
competition.
Symmetric Duopoly Case (a = 1). A question arises regarding how Lemmas 4 and 5 can
be simplified when firms are symmetric. Moreover, I would like to examine whether the
equilibrium is symmetric (i.e., if r1* = r2*) and study the arrangement of users’ states at
equilibrium. For example, which portion of users selects states AA, AP, PA or PP? For
the symmetric case, ŵa = 1.5. I summarize the result in Proposition 2.
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Proposition 2

The symmetric game (a = 1) has a unique and symmetric Nash

equilibrium, which can be calculated as follows:
(a) If w ≤ 1.5, then r1* = r2* = w/3.
(b) If w > 1.5, then r1* = r2* = r*, where r* is the feasible unique solution to the
following equation:
(𝑤 − 3𝑟)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟) + 2𝑟 − 1 = 0.

(8)

Proposition 2 presents a simplified form of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 for the symmetric
game, which has a symmetric equilibrium and fixed threshold ŵa = 1.5. When w ≤ 1.5,
both firms share one-third of w with their active users. (The equilibrium is on line OB in
Panel A, Figure 1.) This result represents a case in which the revenue contribution of an
active user is less than 1.5 times of the cost of a user with the highest effort (unit of cost).
When w > 1.5, the equilibrium is derived based on equation (8), i.e., the equilibrium is on
line BC in Panel A, Figure 1.
Note that, for a symmetric game, users decide whether to contribute or not to contribute
to both firms; that is, users never choose states AP and PA. For example, if w = 1.5, at
equilibrium, nearly 70 (30) percent of users decide to be active (passive) in both firms,
and the total rewards they receive from firms equal the unit of cost (i.e., r1* = r2* = 0.5).
Each firms share one-third of w and keeps two-thirds. Although the equal probabilities of
being in states AP and PA seem natural because of the symmetric setting, selection of
neither of these states may seem counterintuitive.
Asymmetric Duopoly Case (a = 2). When a = 2, one would presume an asymmetric
equilibrium since the users’ cost of contribution to the less favourable firm is twice the
cost of contribution to the more favourable firm. In this case, ŵa = 2 and the equilibrium
solution is given in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 When a = 2, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which can be
calculated as follows:
(a) If 𝑤 ≤ 2, then r1* = r2* = w/2.
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(b) If 𝑤 > 2, then r1* = 1 and r2* is the feasible unique solution to this equation:
2

(𝑤 − 2𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( ) − 𝑟2 + 1 = 0.
𝑟
2

(9)

An interesting result is that, when w ≤ ŵa = 2, the equilibrium is symmetric for the
asymmetric game. Both firms share half of w with their active users. When w > 2, the less
favourable firm gives a higher reward than the more favourable firm; however, the less
favourable firm always has a lower market share and revenue, even when it pays more
than its competitor. For example, when a = 2 and w = 3, at equilibrium, nearly 83 percent
of users decide to be active in both firms, and the remaining users exclusively contribute
to the more favourable firm. Note that, when a = 2, the equilibrium is on line OA of
Panel A in Figure 1 if w ≤ 2, and it is on line AB if w > 2.
Next, I compare the outcomes of the symmetric (a = 1) and asymmetric (a = 2) games,
and I observe that, for both firms, payments in the asymmetric game are higher than those
in the symmetric game. Also, the proportion of active users in the asymmetric game is
greater (less) than the proportion of active users in the symmetric game for the more
(less) favourable firm. Define πi a* as the revenue of firm i at equilibrium for a specific a.
Corollary 4 compares the above cases.
Corollary 4 The net revenue in the symmetric game is higher than the net revenue in the
asymmetric game for both firms, i.e., πi1* > πi2*, for i = 1, 2.
Corollary 4 demonstrates that increasing asymmetry results in shrinkage of net revenues
for both firms. Revenue shrinkage for the less favourable firm is not surprising due to the
higher reward paid out and the loss in customers. However, the diminishing revenue for
the more favourable firm is counterintuitive. This result can be explained by the fact that,
as a increases, while φ1 increases, the more favourable firm has to share a higher reward
in order to better compete with its rival, which also increases its rewards. The negative
impact of the higher reward is greater than the positive impact of the higher market share
on the firm’s revenue. Therefore, the more favourable firm ultimately loses revenue.
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Since the above results come from the comparison of just two special cases for a = 1 and
2, the question arises as to whether these results still hold for other general cases of a. In
the next section, I aim to answer this question through a numerical study. I will
demonstrate whether increasing asymmetry always increases (reduces) the proportion of
active users for the more (less) favourable firm and whether it shrinks the revenue for the
more favourable firm. I further explore this effect in subsection 5.2.

2.5.2

Numerical Analysis for the General Cases of a

In Lemmas 3, 4, and 5, I presented the Nash equilibrium. In this section, I expand my
findings about the revenue-sharing equilibrium through solving the game numerically for
specific values of w and a. The following analysis reports on a subset of 64 parameter
combinations, spanned by
𝑎 𝜖 {1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2, 3, 5, 20},

𝑤 𝜖 {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, 20, 100}.

I find this selection of parameter combinations to be sufficient for analysing the firms’
equilibrium reward decisions. I start this discussion with the symmetric case (a = 1) and
then review the results of the asymmetric case (a > 1). In the symmetric case, when a = 1,
as prescribed by Proposition 2, r1* = r2*. See the dashed line at a = 1 in Figure 2 for the
first symmetric region. Furthermore, if w ≤ 1.5, then r1* = r2* = w/3. When w > 1.5, then
r1* and r2* are monotonically increasing in w and converge to 1. I also see that the
probability of being active φi and net revenues πi are monotonically increasing in w and
converge to 1 and w − 1, respectively. In the asymmetric case, when a > 1, I observe
some interesting and counterintuitive results:
Existence of symmetric equilibrium for the asymmetric game. First, when w is “low”
and 1 < a < 2, r1* and r2* are very close, since with low w, there is little room to share
rewards, and both firms pay approximately the same amount for the asymmetric game.
Figure 2 presents the first asymmetric region, where the more favourable firm pays
slightly more. In this region, the difference between payments of rewards starts
increasing when a increases; however, after a certain level of a, the gap starts to diminish,
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so that, at a = 2 for w ≤ 2, both firms pay exactly the same amount. See Figure 2 for the
second symmetric region.
It may seem counterintuitive that the symmetric equilibrium is at a ≥ 2 when w is not
very “high.” The reason for this result is that, in this case, the market competitiveness of
the second firm is weakened to the utmost, and thus, active users prefer to join the more
favourable firm. However, to increase their surplus, they also decide whether they may
work for the less favourable firm in addition to the more favourable firm or not.
To attract active users, at this point, the less favourable firm should pay them at least the
same as the more favourable firm pays in an effort to convince them to join. Note that,
when a is smaller, active users can be convinced to join by the less favourable firm with a
slightly lower payment compared to the payment of the more favourable firm. I also find
that, for small w, w/3 ≤ ri* ≤ w/2 where w/3 and w/2 are the solutions of Propositions 2
and 3, respectively.
Second, when w is high, the more favourable firm shares a higher reward when a is not
too high. Nevertheless, when w increases, after a certain level, both firms pay the same
amount. This finding indicates an extension of the situation discussed above, in which an
asymmetric game leads to a symmetric equilibrium where both firms pay ri* = 1 (Figure
2); the dashed line represents this case (1 < a < 2). When w increases, the less favourable
firm pays a higher reward than the more favourable firm.
Figure 2 illustrates the second asymmetric region. In this case, firm 1 receives more
benefits than firm 2 because firm 1 pays less than its competitor at equilibrium, while it
attracts more users (Corollary 3). Conversely, when w is low, firm 1 still receives higher
net revenue through paying a higher reward, although the difference between the revenue
of the two firms increases since the second firm shares higher rewards without attracting
more active users. Figure 3 displays the equilibrium reward level as well as the firm
surplus, w − ri, and shows how firms share the marginal revenues between themselves
and their active users. As the asymmetry between two firms, a, increases, both firms
share higher revenues and keep less revenue for themselves. Notice that they never share
beyond w/2 (i.e., half of the marginal revenues) with users.
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Figure 2: Comparison of equilibrium reward payments
Non-monotonic relationship between φi* and a. First, when a increases, firms’ rewards
increase monotonically. The dynamics of the game explain why this happens. As a
increases, the less favourable firm pays a higher reward, which provides a trade-off for its
higher cost to keep its users. However, this scenario pushes the more favourable firm to
increase its payment at the same time in order to avoid becoming non-competitive by
failing to share a stimulating reward, as its competitor has done.
Second, for both firms, the probability of being active monotonically increases in w
(Figure 4). As I demonstrate in Corollary 3, compared to the less favourable firm, the
more favourable firm has a higher probability of gaining active users. While φ2 does not
decrease monotonically in a when w > ŵa, φ1 does not increase monotonically in a when
w ≤ ŵa; the decreasing φ1 and increasing φ2 with respect to a occur when a is small. This
exceptional effect is an extension of this finding in Corollary 4 in Section 5.1.
Furthermore, an increase in φ1 with respect to a at equilibrium may seem to conflict with
Proposition 1, which suggests decreasing φ1 with respect to a. Notice that Proposition 1
analyzes the game in a static setting with fixed r1 and r2, while, at equilibrium, both firms
increase their rewards, and the game ends up with an increasing φ1 with respect to a.
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Figure 3: The equilibrium reward level, ri*, (white region) as well as firms' surplus,
w – ri*, (grey region) for case of w = 5
Decreasing the net revenue of the more favourable firm in a < 2. Increasing w leads to
an increase in the net revenue for both firms, while increasing a leads to a decrease in the
net revenue for less favourable firms and in the more favourable firm when a < 2 (Figure
4). Decreasing the net revenue of the less favourable firm by increasing a is intuitive.
Surprisingly, the more favourable firm also loses net revenue, but it is less affected.
As I see from Corollary 4, it may seem counterintuitive to decrease the net revenue for
the more favourable firm when a < 2. Recall that, as a increases, while φ1 increases, the
more favourable firm must share a higher reward and keeps a lower saving at
equilibrium. Since the negative impact of the higher r1 is greater than the positive impact
of φ1 on revenue of the more favourable firm (equation 1), this firm ultimately loses
revenue. When a > 2, the net revenue of the more favourable firm is independent of a;
that is, it is equal to w2/4 when w ≤ 2 and to w − 1 when w > 2. Next, I investigate the
case where customers are heterogeneous with respect to a (i.e., where a is a random
variable).
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Figure 4: Proportion of active users, φi* (left) and net revenues of firms πi* (right) at
equilibrium

2.5.3

Heterogeneous Users with Respect to a

In the previous sections, I have assumed that an asymmetry exists in users’ preferences
between the two firms. In other words, for all users, one firm is a more favourable firm,
and the asymmetry factor between two firms, a, is the same for all users. Next, I consider
the case where customers are heterogeneous about references of two firms. The
heterogeneous case contains two scenarios: First, customers still believe that firm 1 is the
more favourable firm, but they may have different level of asymmetry factor, a. I refer to
this scenario as a compatible market. Second, some customers may regard firm 2 as more
favourable. I refer to this scenario as a dissident market.
To analyze the case where users have different preferences with respect to firms, I solve
the game numerically when the asymmetric factor, a, follows a three-point distribution
with mean aM. Specifically, a takes three values – aL, aM, and aH – with equal probability,
where aH ≥ aM = a ≥ aL ≥ 0. As an extension of the two-point distribution, a three-point
distribution is widely used in literature since it can be used effectively to approximate
many well-known and practical distributions, such as normal, lognormal, and beta
distribution; see Desai, Koenigsberg, and Purohit (2007), and Yang and Schrage (2009).
Notice that, for a dissident market, aL < 1, and for a compatible market, aL ≥ 1. I say that
a becomes more divergent when aL and aH are farther from aM. Notice that 𝜑𝑖 (𝒓, 𝐴) =

3
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1
(𝜑𝑖 (𝒓, 𝑎𝐿 ) + 𝜑𝑖 (𝒓, 𝑎𝑀 ) +
3

𝜑𝑖 (𝒓, 𝑎𝐻 )), where 𝜑𝑖 (𝒓, 𝐴) is the probability of being active in

firm i, for i =1,2, when a is a random variable with cumulative distribution function A(a).
Also, 𝜑𝑖 (𝒓, 𝐴) ≤ 𝜑𝑖 (𝒓), since 𝜑𝑖 (𝒓) is concave in r for a compatible market. (See the proof
for Proposition 1.) This result implies that, for a compatible market, as a diverges, fewer
users choose to be active in each firm for the same reward level. This result does not
necessarily hold for a dissident market.
I numerically solve the game for the case where the joint contribution factor is fixed, K =
0.7. (I analyze the fixed K case in Section 6 and derive the probabilities of being active in
Lemma 6A.) I compare the equilibrium solutions between the case where a is constant
and the cases where a follows different three-point distributions. The results are
summarized in Table 3. The three sections of Table 3 correspond to cases in which half–
width of the distribution are 0, 0.5, 0.75 (for aM = 1) and 0, 1, 1.5 (for aM = 2) and 0, 4
and 4.5 (for aM = 5).
Table 3: Equilibrium reward payments for different three-point distribution of a
(r1*,
r2*)
k = 0.7

w

[aL, aM, aH]
[1, 1, 1]

[0.5, 1, 1.5] [0.25, 1, 1.75]

[2, 2, 2]

[1, 2, 3]

[0.5, 2, 3.5] [5, 5, 5]

[1, 5, 9] [0.5, 5, 9.5]

1

(0.33, 0.33)

(0.44, 0.44)

(0.44, 0.44)

(0.5, 0.5)

(0.45, 0.41)

(0.5, 0.5)

(0.5, 0.5)

No Eq.

(0.5, 0.5)

3

(0.85, 0.85)*

(1.1, 1.1)*

(1.22, 1.22)*

(1, 1.5)

(1, 1.31)

(1.5, 1.5)

(1, 1.5)

(1, 1.18)

(1, 1.5)

5

(0.85, 0.85)*

(1.1, 1.1)*

(1.22, 1.22)*

(1, 1.7)*

(1, 1.33)

(2, 2.55)*

(1, 2.5)

(1, 1.32)

(2, 1.5)

* The equilibrium is not unique.

Table 3 demonstrates the firms’ rewards at equilibrium under different marginal revenue
(w) and different distributions of a (with different mean and variance). Comparing the
deterministic a case with the stochastic a case, I observed that at least one equilibrium
exists for the deterministic case, but the stochastic case may not have an equilibrium. In
spite of this difference between the two cases, for some scenarios of w and a, the
equilibrium is not unique for both cases. When the equilibrium is not unique, in these
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scenarios, the sum of rewards at equilibrium is constant for both cases. For example, for
deterministic cases, when w = 3, k = 0.7 and aL = aM = aH = 1, at equilibrium r1* + r2* =
1.7, where 0.7 ≤ r1* ≤ 1. In this case, φ1 and φ2 are equal and depend on the sum of r1 and
r2. (I derive the probabilities of being active in both firms in section 6; please refer to
Case II in Lemma 6A for this scenario.) Therefore, any combination of r1 and r2 with
fixed summation generates the same proportion of active and passive users, and each
firm’s best reaction to a competitor’s action is to pay the remaining share of the fixed
total rewards.
I also investigate the difference between the deterministic and stochastic a cases in terms
of the amount of rewards. In the deterministic case, I observe the following result:
Corollary 5 For the deterministic a case, if a ≥ 2, r1* ≤ r2*.
Corollary 5 asserts that, when a ≥ 2 for the deterministic a case, the more favourable firm
always pays a lower reward level than the less favourable firm. I find, however, that the
less favourable firm may have a lower reward when a is stochastic, more specifically,
when w and aM are very high and aL < 1. In this special scenario of a stochastic a case,
the market is in an extremely dissident state, and the more favourable firm should pay a
higher reward to accommodate all users with conflicting tastes. Theretofore, the less
favourable firm may have a higher reward when a is stochastic, while, when a is
deterministic, the more favourable firm’s reward is always lower.
Based on the results presented in Table 3, for a given value of w, as a diverges, both
firms could pay higher or lower rewards, depending on whether the market is compatible
or dissident and whether competition is symmetric or asymmetric. Specifically, for an
asymmetric competition (aM > 1), when a diverges, both firms pay lower rewards in a
compatible market, but as a diverges further, they both pay higher rewards in a dissident
market. For a symmetric completion (aM = 1), when a diverges, both firms pay lower
rewards.
As previously discussed, for the same reward levels, the probability of being active for
the stochastic a case is lower than the probability of being active for the deterministic a
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case. In equilibrium, however, firms may receive a higher or lower revenue in the
stochastic case since they pay lower or higher rewards in this case. Comparing firms’
revenues under deterministic and stochastic cases, I observe that, in most situations,
firms’ revenues for both more favourable and less favourable firms are lower under the
stochastic case. The only exception occurs when the market is in an extremely dissident
state and the incremental revenue, w, is high. In this scenario, the less favourable firm
receives a higher revenue under the stochastic case since it benefits from a higher
payment from the more favourable firm.

2.6 Analysis of Users’ Cost for Simultaneous Contribution
In the previous sections, I assumed that K (i.e., the parameter that associates with the cost
of being active in both firms simultaneously) is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
This represents a case, for example, in social media and digital markets, where users have
economy of scale in being active in both firms since the cost of simultaneous
participation in both firms is lower than the sum of separate participation cost in each
firm. In this section, I also consider the case where K > 1, where the users have
diseconomy of scale for joint contribution to both firms. This case is very popular in
manufacturing and service industries since it is very costly for a user (employee) of a
firm to work for another firm simultaneously. To focus on the comparison of the two
cases where K ≤ 1 and K > 1, I assume that K is a constant and I derive the equilibrium
rewards.
Similar to Lemma 1, the following lemmas describe only those cases of interest. (The
remaining cases are summarized in the Appendix.)
Lemma 6A For K ≤ 1, the probability of being active in firms 1 and 2 is as follows:
𝑟

-

2
Case I: if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ (a+K−1)r1, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑟1 and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑎+𝐾−1
.

-

Case II: if (a+K−1) r1 < r2 ≤ (𝐾)r1, and r1 + r2 ≤ a+K, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) =

𝑎

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

.

Lemma 6A presents the way a market of online users responds to firms’ reward decisions
r when all users incur the same cost of joint involvement in both firms. In Case I, φi
depends only on ri and not on rj, for i, j = 1, 2, and i ≠ j. In Case II, φ1 and φ2 depend on
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both r1 and r2. Similar to the stochastic K case, firms pay less than the maximum of their
active users’ cost (i.e., r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ a). It can be shown that, for a fixed K ≤ 1, the same
properties regarding φi hold as in the stochastic K case; that is, the probability of being
active in firm i, φi, is non-decreasing in ri and non-decreasing in rj. In other words, a firm
enjoys a higher demand when its ‘competitor’ offers higher rewards to lure away users.
This result stems from the economies of scale that are important in industries such as
online social media. Since digital content can be duplicated without a high cost,
consumers can generate content for two competitors – for example YouTube and
Dailymotion – and receive a reward for their contribution from both firms (multi-home).
Therefore, when YouTube increases its reward, online users become more willing to
generate content on Dailymotion as well. As a result, more videos will be created on
YouTube, but Dailymotion also benefits since those videos can be uploaded onto its
website as well. In this way, economies of scale fundamentally change the competitive
dynamics between the social media firms. Finally, the probability of being active in firm
i, φi, is non-increasing in a and non-increasing in K.
Next, I formally present the equilibrium rewards for the case of a fixed K > 1.
Lemma 6B For K >1, the probability of being active in firms 1 and 2 is as follows:
𝑎+𝑘−1

-

Case III: if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ (

-

Case IV: if (

𝐾

𝑎+𝐾−1

and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) =

𝐾
𝑟2 −𝑟1
𝑎−1

𝑟

2
)r1, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑟1 and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑎+𝐾−1
.

𝑟

)r1 < r2 ≤ r1 +a − 1, and 1 < r1 ≤ K, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 1 + 𝐾1 −

𝑟2 −𝑟1
𝑎−1

.

Lemma 6B also studies Cases III and IV, in which K > 1. In Case IV, φi depends only on
ri and not on rj, for i, j = 1, 2, and i ≠ j. In Case IV, φ1 and φ2 depend on both r1 and r2.
The K > 1 case is different than K ≤ 1 case in two ways. First, in K > 1 case, firms may
decide to pay more than the maximum of their active users’ cost (i.e., r1 > 1 and r2 > a).
When there is no economy of scale, K > 1, users should pay a high cost for generating
content for both firms. As a result, firms should pay higher rewards and compete harder
to encourage active users to join them. Second, the probability of users being active for
two firms (as before) increases linearly with their own rewards; however, it is nonincreasing with the competitor reward for the K > 1 case.
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When K > 1, the consumers face diseconomies of scale when they participate in multiple
firms; as firm i’s competitor offers a higher reward, fewer users join firm i. This is the
case for many traditional manufacturing and service industries, in which users cannot
participate freely in both firms. When K is sufficiently large, the users may prefer a single
home in one community rather than joining multiple communities. When consumers can
select only one firm (single-home), both firms have to compete harder to gain their
usership. I highlight the fact that the equilibrium solution can be simplified by fixing K
under some cases.
I conclude this section with a note on parameter K, the cost of being active
simultaneously in both firms. It has been stated that, for online social media, users have
economy of scale for joint participation. For example, in most cases, users encounter
economies of scale for posting videos to different sites, since the major cost of videosharing comes from the cost of video creation. Therefore, once a video is created, it is
relatively inexpensive to upload it on different websites. However, for certain types of
websites with user-generated content, online users may also face a diseconomy of scale
for joint participation. This can occur, for example, when active users keep track of all
activities and post in online networks and generate many feedbacks to online comments,
which can be a very time-consuming and costly task. Other factors that contribute to a
high online users’ cost are the large size of the network, peer pressure, and copyright and
contract regulations.
The high cost of contribution in user-generated content has been addressed in the
literature. For example, Godes, Ofek, and Sarvary (2009) ﬁnd evidence that the declining
online trend for already highly rated books is linked to the high cost of rating. Kumar,
Sun, and Srinivasan (2010) ﬁnd that contribution status or positional utility play an
important role in level of contribution. These authors found that older consumers are
more sensitive to the cost of contribution, but interestingly, consumers with higher
centrality are less sensitive to contribution cost. Thus, online users of social networks
may face either economy of scale (i.e., K ≤ 1) or diseconomy of scale (i.e., K >1),
depending on whether joint participation indeed reduces users’ cost by considering all the
factors mentioned above.
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2.7 Conclusion
This study investigates revenue-sharing strategies of online social media and shows how
these strategies shape the contribution levels of online users. While the two opposite
strategies of saving and sharing revenue have their pros and cons for the firms, the
proposed model aims to provide insights for firms to consider the trade-off between these
strategies within a state of asymmetric competition. The game consists of two steps: first,
the OSMs announce their rewards for active users; and second, users choose their level of
contribution with respect to each OSM, based on their preferences. I derived the revenue
function for the firms by assuming they seek to maximize net revenue. The existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium was shown for this duopoly game.
My results indicate that users always select the more favourable firm whenever they
decide to work exclusively for one firm. Anecdotally, these results are consistent with
observed online evidence. For example, within the emergence of YouTube, all online
celebrities opened a channel with this medium. Some of these results are even observable
for OSMs who do not compete based on revenue-sharing programs. An example includes
the ongoing challenge of Google+ to compete with Facebook.7 Many social media
connoisseurs were highly optimistic about Google+ when it first emerged (and even used
it exclusively at that point), but over time, they reopened their Facebook accounts.8 When
a firm decides to enter an online competition, it should investigate how online users
position it relative to a competitor. My results indicate that, even for a huge asymmetry
between two firms, a market share still exists for the less favourable firm (or niche
player), which explains why a large number of small websites now co-exist with
dominant websites such as Facebook and YouTube.

7

URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204653604577249341403742390.html; accessed:
2014–5–10.
8

URL: http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2012/04/16/six-months-later-google-plus-still-doesnt-addup/; accessed: 2014–7–10.
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A less favourable firm can better position itself in an online competition if it continuously
improves the users’ perspective of its online community. For example, while the
popularity of iTunes makes it a favourable service for artists, downloads from iTunes are
easily accessible on an iPod or other device as well, which makes music more readily
accessible for fans. These results suggest that small social media firms can compete with
a dominant firm in the market by providing users with a service that has a higher utility.
The revenue generated by users’ contributions also plays a significant role with respect to
the outcome of the competition. If users’ contributions easily generate revenue, then both
firms share high rewards and earn high net revenues as well. However, the more
favourable firm can better exploit its advantage in this case by sharing a lower reward.
On the other hand, when the monetary impact of contributions is too small, both firms
follow a parsimonious strategy in sharing rewards. These results imply a bilateral
relationship between the monetary values of users’ contributions and the rewards they
receive; if users demand high rewards, they should deliver rewarding contributions. For
example, some media-streaming websites pay substantial payments since the type or level
of contributions delivered by their users help to promote the website and thus is in the
interest of the website as well as the advertising business.
For many types of online social media, the monetary impact of the contributions is too
small. As previously discussed, the less favourable firm can compete with a dominant
firm in the market by improving users’ perspective of it within the market. When the
monetary rewards are insignificant, this strategy is even more beneficial for the less
favourable firm. My results suggest that, in this case, the less favourable firm can
generate higher revenues, and as a result, the firm can share higher rewards with active
users. This trend has been observed recently in the ongoing competition between a
dominant firm, such as YouTube, and a smaller online music service, such as Spotify. As
Spotify’s user base continues to grow, the firm pays increasingly higher reward levels to
the artists who use its platform.
Some results regarding properties of equilibrium reward are worth our attention. For
example, in order for firms to be successful, it is critical for them to find the right balance
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between saving and sharing their revenues with active users. I observe that, at
equilibrium, firms keep at least half of the marginal revenues for themselves and never
share more than half of this incremental revenue with their active users. Moreover, when
the asymmetry between two firms increases considerably, it may be optimal for the less
favourable firm to completely shut down its rewards program. A higher level of
asymmetry not only adversely affects the less favourable firm, but it can also generate
monetary challenges for the more favourable firm, especially when the difference
between two firms is insignificant originally.
Online user behaviour and online competition are complex issues. In order to make this
discussion tractable, I made a few simplifying assumptions in this study. For example, I
assumed that users are uniformly distributed with respect to their cost structure. A more
general setting would be interesting, but also more challenging, as the probabilities and
equilibrium are already non-trivial. Another extension would be to consider more than
two OSMs. My main motivation for analyzing a duopoly came from observing the
competition between YouTube and Metacafe (or between Spotify and We7), and making
note of the particular behaviours of the online users. Further studies can also extend the
analysis of users’ behaviour by considering both the level and quality of the contributions
as a continuum and by endogenously modelling the OSMs’ revenue as a function of the
level and quality of user-created content. Finally, it might be argued that the size of the
OSM should be explicitly modelled. In this setting, the initial size (that is, before
announcing r) can be considered as part of the parameter a, but the subsequent size (that
is, after announcing r) is reflected by φi. For instance, note that, in this setting, the
revenue (πi) is increasing in size (φi). I leave all further enrichments as opportunities for
future research.
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2.8 Appendix to Chapter 1
PROOF OF LEMMA 1.
𝑎

Case I. I show that if r2 ≤ (a-1)r1, and r1 ≤ 1, then φ1 = r1 and φ2 = 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎−1). In this
case no one choose to be active in the second firm and passive in the first firm as follows:
When c ≤ r2 / a (i.e. r2-ac ≥ 0), state PA is preferable than being passive at both firms.
Also state PA is preferable than being active at both firms when c ≥ r1/k (r2-ac ≥ r1 + r2 ac - c). As r2/a ≤ r2/(a-1) ≤ r1 ≤ r1/k, there is no c exists which satisfies above conditions.
Note that state PA is never chosen whenever r2/a ≤ r1. For the same logic state AP is
never chosen whenever r2/a ≥ r1. Then I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 +
𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶, 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0}.
Note for any A, B, C and D, if max(B,D) > C, then Pr{max(A,B) > max(C,D)} =
Pr{max(A,B) > D}. Therefore, I have: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{(r1 – C ≥ 0) 𝑜𝑟 (r1 + r2 – C(𝑎 + K) ≥
0)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤ r1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

r1 +r2
𝑎+K

)}. As r1(a + k) ≥ r1a ≥ r1(a-1) + r1 ≥ r1 + r2,

therefore r1 ≥ (r1 + r2)/(a + k). Then I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 } = 𝑟1 .

Now take website 2’s perspective. 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 +
𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟1 – 𝐶) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
r2

) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤

𝑎+K−1

r1 +r2
𝑎+K

r

2
)}. Since ar1 ≥ r1 + r2, therefore 𝑎+K−1
≤

Now I have the following: 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤
𝑟2

𝑟

𝑎+K

.

𝑟

} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤ 𝑎2 ) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤

𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑟

𝑟

2
2
2
)} + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝑎−1
≥ 𝐶 ≥ 𝑎2 ) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤ 𝑎+𝐾−1
)} + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≥ 𝑎−1
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤

𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑟2

𝑟

𝑟2

r1 +r2

)}

𝑎+𝐾−1
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= 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤

𝑟2
𝑟2
𝑟2
𝑟2
} + 𝑃𝑟 {(
≥ 𝐶 ≥ ) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐾 ≤
+ 1 − 𝑎)} + 0
𝑎
𝑎−1
𝑎
𝐶
=

𝑟2
+1−𝑎
𝑟2 𝐶
𝑎−1

𝑟2
+ ∫
𝑟2
𝑎
𝑎

∫

𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐

0

𝑟2

𝑟2
𝑎−1 𝑟2
𝑟2
𝑟2
𝑎
= +∫
( + 1 − 𝑎) 𝑑𝑐 = + [𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶) + (1 − 𝑎)𝐶]𝑎−1
= 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
).
𝑟
2
𝑟2
𝑎
𝐶
𝑎
𝑎−1
𝑎
𝑎

Case II. In previous cases, it was shown that state PA is never chosen whenever r2/a ≤ r1.
Now I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −
𝑎. 𝐶, 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0}
= 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 – 𝐶 ≥ 0) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

= 𝑃𝑟 {((𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
)}
𝑎+𝐾

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
)) 𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎+𝐾

+ 𝑃𝑟 {((𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
)) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
≥ 𝐶 ≥ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎+𝐾
𝑎

+ 𝑃𝑟 {((𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
)) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≥
)}
𝑎+𝐾
𝑎

= 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 } + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
≥ 𝐶 ≥ 𝑟1 )} + 0
𝑎+𝐾
𝑎

= 𝑟1 + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
− 𝑎) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
≥ 𝐶 ≥ 𝑟1 )}
𝐶
𝑎
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= 𝑟1 + ∫

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎

∫

𝑟1

𝑟1 +𝑟2
−𝑎
𝑐

𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐 = 𝑟1 + ∫

0

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎

(

𝑟1

= 𝑟1 + [(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐) −

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎𝑐]𝑟1 𝑎

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
− 𝑎) 𝑑𝑐
𝑐

= (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
) + 𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 .
𝑎𝑟1

Now take website 2’s perspective. 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟1 – 𝐶) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤

= 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤

𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
)}
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑎+𝐾
𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟2
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤ )}
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑎+𝐾
𝑎
𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑎+𝐾
𝑎
𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤ 𝐶
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑎+𝐾
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
≤
)}
𝑎
𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
≤ 𝐶 )}
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑎+𝐾
𝑎

Note that as (𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ), then 𝐶 ≤
𝑟2

), then
𝑎+𝐾−1

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

is an irrelevant condition. Since (𝑟1 ≤ 𝐶 ≤

𝑟

2
≤ 𝑎+𝐾−1
. Therefore I have:

𝑟2
𝑟2
𝑟2
} + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑎
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 { (𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤ 𝐶 ≤
)} + 0
𝑎+𝐾
𝑎

𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤
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=

𝑟2
𝑟2
𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤
+ 1 − 𝑎) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎
𝐶
𝑎
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤
− 𝑎) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤ 𝐶 ≤
)}
𝐶
𝑎
𝑟2

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎

𝑟1
+1−𝑎
𝑐
𝑟2
= +∫ ∫
𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐 + ∫
𝑟2
𝑎
0
𝑟1
𝑎

= (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

∫

𝑟1 +𝑟2
−𝑎
𝑐

𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐

0

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ).
𝑎𝑟1

Case III. 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0}
= 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 – 𝐶 ≥ 0) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

= 𝑃𝑟 {((𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
)}
𝑎+𝐾

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
)) 𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎+𝐾

+ 𝑃𝑟 {((𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
)) 𝑎𝑛𝑑( 𝐶 ≥ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎+𝐾

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝐶 ≥ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎+𝐾
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
= 𝑟1 + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤
− 𝑎) 𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝐶 ≥ 𝑟1 )}
𝐶

= 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 } + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤

1

= 𝑟1 + ∫ ∫
𝑟1

𝑟1 +𝑟2
−𝑎
𝑐

0

1

𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐 = 𝑟1 + ∫ (
𝑟1

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
− 𝑎) 𝑑𝑐 = 𝑟1 + [(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 ) log(𝑐) − 𝑎𝑐]1𝑟1
𝑐

= 𝑟1 + 𝑎(𝑟1 − 1) − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ). Now take website 2’s perspective.
𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 0)}
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= 𝑃𝑟{𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 0)} =
= 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟1 – 𝐶) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤

= 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤

𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
)}
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑎+𝐾
𝑟2
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑎+𝐾
𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
𝑎+𝐾−1

(𝐶 ≤

𝑟2
)}
𝑎

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟2
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎+𝐾
𝑎
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤ 𝐶)}
𝑎+𝐾

Based on the proof in the previous case I have the following:
𝑟2
𝑟2
𝑟2
} + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝑎
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 { (𝐶 ≤
) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤ 𝐶)}
𝑎+𝐾

𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤

=

𝑟2
𝑟2
𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤
+ 1 − 𝑎) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 )}
𝑎
𝐶
𝑎
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤
− 𝑎) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤ 𝐶)}
𝐶
𝑟2

𝑟1 +𝑟2
−𝑎
𝑐

𝑟1
+1−𝑎
1
𝑐
𝑟2
= +∫ ∫
𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐 + ∫ ∫
𝑟2
𝑎
0
𝑟1 0

𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐

𝑎

= 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎. 𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ). The probabilities of being
active for the remaining six cases are as follows (the details of prove for these cases are
available in a longer version of Appendix):
-

if r1 > 1 and r2 > a, then φ1 = 1 and φ2 = 1.

-

if r1 > 1 and a-1 <r2 ≤ a, then φ1 = 1 and φ2 = 𝑟2 + 1 − 𝑎 − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 /𝑎).
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𝑎

-

if r1 > 1 and r2 ≤ a-1, then φ1 = 1 and φ2 = 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎−1).

-

if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 > a, then φ1 = 𝑟1 − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) and φ2 = 1.

-

if ar1 < r2, and r1 + r2 ≤ a, then φ1 = (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 ) − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 )
and
φ2 = (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )/𝑟2 ) + 𝑟2 /𝑎 − 𝑟1 .

-

if ar1 < r2, r1 + r2 > a, and r2 ≤ a, then
φ1 = 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎) and φ2 = 𝑟2 +

𝑟2
𝑎

−𝑎−

(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 /𝑎). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The first derivative of φi in Lemma 1 for all three cases
with respect to r1 and r2 is non-negative and with respect to a is non-positive. See Table
A1 for the derivative of φi for all cases. For Case I, as a ≥ 1,
other derivatives are 0. For Case II, I have the following:

𝜕𝜑2

𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑟1

𝜕𝑟2

and

𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑎

are negative and
𝑟1 + 𝑟2

= 𝑎 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

𝑎𝑟1

0 because r2 ≤ ar1 and r1 + r2 ≥ ar1 (I proved this inequality in Lemma 1). Also
𝑟1 + 𝑟2

𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
0,

𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑎

𝑎𝑟1

) > 0,

= 𝑟1 −

𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑟2

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎

𝑟1 + 𝑟2

= 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1 ) + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

< 0 and

𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑎

𝑎𝑟1

) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ) > 0,

𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑟1

𝑟

) − 𝑟2 >
1

𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑟2

=

𝑟1 + 𝑟2

= 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

𝑎𝑟1

)>

𝑟

= − 𝑎1 < 0 for the same reason. In Case III, the same

results hold as r2 < a, r1 < 1, and r2 ≤ ar1. The results hold for all remaining six cases as
well.
Table 4: The first derivatives of φi.
Case

𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑟1

𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑟2

𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑎

𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑟1

I

1

0

0

0

𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑟2

𝑙𝑜𝑔(

𝑎
)
𝑎−1

𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑎

−

𝑟2
𝑎2 − 𝑎
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𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
)−
𝑎𝑟1
𝑟1

II

III

𝑎 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) −

𝑟2
𝑟1

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
)
𝑎𝑟1

−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )

𝑟1 −

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎

𝑟1 − 1

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
)
𝑎𝑟1

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
)
𝑟2

−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )

𝑎
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( )
𝑟2

−

𝑟1
𝑎

𝑟2
−1
𝑎

Moreover φi for all nine cases with respect to r1 and r2 are continuous on the boundaries
of these cases, i.e., φ1 and φ2 for any neighbour cases, such as I and II or II and III, are the
same on their boundary. Therefore, over all cases, φi are non-decreasing in r1 and r2. 

PROOF OF THEOREM 1. I have already shown that NE has to be such that r1* ≤ 1, r2*
≤ a. The proof of theorem has the following steps:
1) No equilibrium exists in Case I when 1 ≤ a ≤ 2
2) No equilibrium exists in Case II when a > 2
3) No equilibrium exists when ar1 < r2, and r1 + r2 ≤ a
4) No equilibrium exists when ar1 < r2, r1 + r2 > a, and r2 ≤ a
5) At least one equilibrium exists in the feasible cases, i.e., Case II and III when 1 ≤ a ≤
2, and Case I and III when a > 2. The details of proof are as follows:
1) Next, I show that no equilibrium exists in Case I when 1 ≤ a ≤ 2. Assume there is an
equilibrium (r1*,r2*) with (a-1)r1* > r2*. Based on Lemma 1, the firm 1 and 2 payoff
functions are π1 = (w-r1*)r1* and π2 = (w-r2*)r2log(a/(a-1)), respectively. Note that both
payoff functions πi are concave in ri because
both are maximized at 𝑟𝑖 =

𝑤
2

𝜕 2 𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1

2

= −2 and

𝜕 2 𝜋2
𝜕𝑟2

𝜕𝜋

2

(set 𝜕𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑤−2𝑟𝑖 = 0). However when 𝑟𝑖∗ =
𝑖

𝑎

= −2𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑎−1), and
𝑤
2

, the

condition of (a-1)r1* > r2* is violated because 1 ≤ a ≤ 2. Therefore (r1*,r2*) cannot be an
equilibrium. As a result, Nash equilibrium cannot be in Case I.
2) First, if the equilibrium is on the boundary of Case I and II, then a = 2 (check the
F.O.C for the objective function of firm 1 and 2). When a increases beyond 2, the slope
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for the objective function of firm 2 is negative on the boundary with respect to r2, which
implies that the equilibrium can not be on the top of the boundary in Figure 1.
3) Next, I illustrate no equilibrium exists when ar1 < r2, and r1 + r2 ≤ a. In doing so, I
show that the assumed equilibrium in this case can never be a best response strategy for
firm 1.
Assume there is an equilibrium (r1*,r2*) when ar1* < r2*. Based on Lemma 1, the firm 2
payoff is (𝑤 − 𝑟2 )((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )/𝑟2 ) + 𝑟2 /𝑎 − 𝑟1 ). Note that
−

(3𝑟12 𝑟2 +2𝑟13 )𝑤+𝑟13 𝑟2

< 0, and

𝑟23 (𝑟1 +𝑟2 )2

𝜕 2 𝜋2
𝜕𝑟2 2

=

−2(𝑎+1) log(

𝑎+1
)
𝑎

𝑎

𝜕 3 𝜋2
𝜕𝑟2 3

=

< 0 at r2 = ar1. Therefore the

payoff function of firm 2 is concave in in this case. As r2* = BR (r1*) is in this case, the
F.O.C is

𝜕𝜋2
𝜕𝑟2

> 0 at r2 = ar1. Positive F.O.C at r2 = ar1 requires that w > r1(2a+1)
𝜕𝜋

(substitute r1 =r2/a in 𝜕𝑟 𝑖 ).
𝑖

Now take website 1’s perspective. Based on Lemma 1, the firm 1 payoff is φ1 = (𝑤 −
𝑟1 )((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 ) − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 )).

Note that

𝜕 3 𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1 3

=

(𝑟22 +2𝑟1 𝑟2 )𝑤+2𝑟22 𝑟1 +𝑟12 𝑟2
𝑟12 (𝑟1 +𝑟2 )2

> 0 and

𝜕 2 𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1 2

= −

𝑎2 𝑤+𝑟2 (2(𝑎+1) log(
(𝑎+1)𝑟2

at r1 = r2/a. Therefore, the payoff function of firm 1 is concave. Now
𝑟1 (𝑎 + 2)) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

𝑎+1

𝑎+1

𝑎

𝑎

) < (𝑟1 (𝑎 − 1)) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

𝑎+1
)−𝑎)
𝑎

𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1

<0

= (𝑤 −

) > 0 at r1 = r2/a as w > r1(2a+1). This is a

contradiction because r1* = BR (r2*) in this case, and

𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1

should be negative for any r1 >

r1* such as r1 = r2/a. Therefore no equilibrium exists when ar1 < r2, and r1 + r2 ≤ a.
4) Next Note that

𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1

= −𝑤𝑙𝑛(𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛(𝑎) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛(𝑟2 ) + 2𝑟1 𝑙𝑛(𝑟1 ) > 0 at r1 = a – r2,

and for r2 > ar1 as r1 = a – r2 < ar1. Now I show that no equilibrium exist when ar1 < r2,
r1 + r2 > a, and r2 ≤ a. In doing so, I show that the assumed equilibrium in this case can
never be a best response strategy for firm 1.

49

Assume there is an equilibrium (r1*,r2*) when ar1* < r2*. Based on Lemma 1, the firm 1
payoff is (𝑤 − 𝑟2 ) (𝑟2 +
Note that

𝜕 2 𝜋2
𝜕𝑟2 2

=−

𝑟2
𝑎

− 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 /𝑎)).

(𝑎𝑟2 −𝑎𝑟1 )𝑤−2𝑎𝑟2 2 log(𝑟2 )+(2𝑎 log(𝑎)−𝑎+2)𝑟2 2 −𝑎𝑟1 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟2 2

< 0. Therefore, the

payoff function of firm 2 is concave in this case. As r2* = BR (r1*) is in this case,

𝜕𝜋2
𝜕𝑟2

>

0 at r2 = ar1. Positive F.O.C at r2 = ar1 requires that 𝑤 > 2𝑎 − 𝑟1 +
−𝑟1 (𝑎𝑟1 −𝑎+𝑟1 )
𝑎
𝑎(𝑎−𝑟1 ) log(
)+𝑎−𝑟1 −𝑎𝑟1
𝑎−𝑟1

when r1 ≤ a/(a+1) and 𝑤 > (2𝑎 + 1)𝑟1 +

𝑎𝑟1 +𝑟1−𝑎
log(𝑟1)

when r1 >

a/(a+1).
Now take website 1’s perspective. Based on Lemma 1, the firm 1 payoff is φ1 = (𝑤 −
𝑟1 )(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎)).
As

𝜕 2 𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1

Now

2

= −

𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1

𝑤−2𝑟1 log(𝑟1 )−𝑟1
𝑟1

< 0 in this case, the payoff function of firm 1 is concave.

= −𝑤𝑙𝑛(𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛(𝑎) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛(𝑟2 ) + 2𝑟1 𝑙𝑛(𝑟1 ) + 𝑎 − 𝑟1 − 𝑎𝑟1 at r1 = r2/a is

positive because I have already shown that = −𝑤𝑙𝑛(𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛(𝑎) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛(𝑟2 ) +
2𝑟1 𝑙𝑛(𝑟1 ) > 0 and the conditions on w which are mentioned above. This is a
contradiction because r1* = BR (r2*), and

𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1

should be negative at any r1 > r1* such as

r1 = r2/a. Therefore there is no equilibrium when ar1 < r2, r1 + r2 > a, and r2 ≤ a.
5) I have already shown that no equilibrium exists outside Case I, II and III. Next, I show
its existence in these cases. I also assume if there is more than one reward level, which
generate the same amount of revenue for a firm in equation (1), the firm always prefers
the lowest one. Through doing this, firm can keep a higher saving for itself.
My proof for existence of equilibrium is based on applying results from Szidarovszky
(2008). I paraphrase Theorem 3 (p. 100) of Szidarovszky (2008) regarding the existence
of equilibrium:

Theorem 3: Suppose that, in game Γ, for all players:
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-

The strategy profile is a nonempty, convex, compact subset of a finite
dimensional Euclidean space;

-

The payoff function is continuous on the strategy profile;

-

The best response function is single valued.

Then the game Γ has at least one (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.

Theorem 3 in Szidarovszky (2008) indicates three sufficient conditions for the existence
of the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. I show that the game I study here satisfies the
above conditions.
First, based on Proposition 2, strategy profiles are a nonempty, convex, and compact set
for both firms. Second, as firms’ payoff functions are the product of continuous
functions, firms’ payoff functions are continuous. Finally, the firms’ best response
functions are singled-valued (see the assumption after equation 1). Consequently, the
game satisfies the above conditions. Therefore, it has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof of uniqueness will be shown later. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. The proof of Lemma has the following steps:
1) For all a, there exists a unique ŵa
2) If w = ŵa, then r1* + r2* = a, and if r1* + r2* = a then w = ŵa
3) If w < ŵ, then r1* + r2* < a, and if w > ŵa, then r1* + r2* > a
The details of proof are as follows:
1) System of equations (2) denotes the points on Line AB in Figure 1 where r1 + r2 = a
and a/(a+1) ≤ r1 ≤ 1. For showing the existence of ŵa, I compare the value of the first and
second equations of this system at two extreme values on Line AB in Figure 1, i.e., for r1
= a/(a+1) and r1 = 1. When r1 = a/(a+1), I have the following:
2𝑟2 +

𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
𝑎(2𝑎 + 1) 𝑎(2 + 𝑎)
𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
=
≥
= 2𝑟1 +
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎)
𝑎+1
𝑎+1
𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
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and when r1 = 1:
2𝑟2 +

𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
= 2(𝑎 − 1) ≤ 2 = 2𝑟1 +
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎)
𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )

Note that both equations are continuous functions of r1 and r2 over the above interval.
Therefore, the above inequalities guarantee the existence of ŵa based on the Fixed-point
Theorem.
Moreover, ŵa is unique as the first equation in System (2) is a strictly decreasing function
of r1 and the second equation of in System (2) is a strictly increasing function of r1. I can
check these finding by substitute r2 = a – r1 and take the first derivative with respect to r1
as follows:
𝜕 (2(𝑎 − 𝑟1 ) +

𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
)
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎 − 𝑟1 ) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎)
=
𝜕𝑟1

log(𝑟1 ) + 1
2𝑟2 [log(𝑎) − log(𝑎 − 𝑟1 )]2 − 𝑟1 log(𝑟1 )
−
<0
log(𝑎 − 𝑟1 ) − log(𝑎)
𝑟2 [log(𝑎) − log(𝑎 − 𝑟1 )]2
𝜕 (2𝑟1 +

−

𝑟1 (𝑎 − 𝑟1 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
)
𝑎𝑟1 − (𝑎 − 𝑟1 ) − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
=
𝜕𝑟1

(log(𝑟1 ) − 1)(𝑎 − 𝑟1 )2 + (3𝑎𝑟1 − 4𝑟1 log(𝑟1 ))𝑟1 − 2𝑟1 2 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (𝑟1 ) + 4𝑎𝑟1 2 log(𝑟1 ) − 2𝑎2 𝑟1 2
[𝑎 − 𝑟1 + 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) − 𝑎𝑟1 ]2

𝑟1 2 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (𝑟1 ) − 𝑎𝑟1 2 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (𝑟1 )
+
>0
[𝑎 − 𝑟1 + 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) − 𝑎𝑟1 ]2
Therefore, system (2) has only one unique solution for a ≤ 2. For a ≤ 2, it is
straightforward that there exists a unique ŵa. Note that in Theorem 1, part 1, I have
shown that 2 is maximized at 𝑟2 =
which derive the equation 3.

𝑤
2

. On the boundary of case I and III, 𝑟2 = 𝑎 − 1,
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2) Based on Lemmas 2 in Case II, 1 is concave and continuously differentiable and 2 is
continuously differentiable and

𝜕 3 𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1 3

< 0. Therefore, the best response functions should

satisfy the first order conditions for both firms’ payoff functions. If an equilibrium exists
such that r1* + r2* = a, it should be the solution of the system of equations (2) as this
system is F.O.C of payoff functions for firms.
Now assume w = ŵa. Solving the system of equations (2), I find r’1 and r’2, such that
r’1+r’2 =a. Moreover, r’1 and r’2 are the best strategy response of each other as both
satisfy the F.O.C of firm’ payoff functions. Therefore, (r’1, r’2) is an equilibrium.
3) Assume there is an equilibrium in Case III when w < ŵa. As w < ŵa, the F.O.C for
firm 2 payoff function at r2 = a – r1 is negative. Note that the payoff function of firm 2 is
concave. This implies that the best strategy profile of this firm for any r1 always
satisfying the following condition: r2*(r1) = a – r1. Therefore at equilibrium I have the
following: r2* < a – r1*. Based on the same logic, when w > ŵa, I can show that r2* > a –
r1*.



PROOF OF LEMMA 3. The results in Lemma 3 is immediate from Theorem 1, part 1.
Note that r1* cannot be higher than 1.



PROOF OF LEMMA 4. Based on Lemma 2, if w < ŵ, r1*+ r2* ≤ a. Based on Lemma 1,
firms’ payoff functions are:

1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1 )(𝑟1 + 𝑎(𝑟1 − 1) − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑛(𝑟1 ))
2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2 )(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑛(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛(𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛(𝑟2 )).
Checking the F.O.C for both firms, I have the following for ri = ri*, i = 1, 2:
𝑟1 +𝑟2

(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 ) (𝑟1 log (
(𝑤 − 2𝑟2 ) log (

𝑎𝑟1

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑟2

𝑟1 +𝑟2

) − 𝑟2 + 𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟1 𝑟2 log (
𝑟1 +𝑟2

) − 𝑟1 log (

𝑎𝑟1

𝑎𝑟1

)=0

) = 0 for r2 = r2*. 

53

PROOF OF LEMMA 5. Based on Lemma 2, if w > ŵa, r1*+ r2* > a. Based on Lemma 1,
firms’ payoff functions are:
𝑟 +𝑟

1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1 ) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 1𝑎𝑟 2 ) + 𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 ) and
1

𝑟 +𝑟

2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2 ) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 1𝑎𝑟 2 ) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 )).
1

Checking the F.O.C for both firms, I have the following for ri = ri*, i = 1, 2::
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 )(𝑟1 log(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟2 − 𝑎𝑟1 ) + 𝑟1 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − 𝑟2 log(𝑟1 )) = 0
𝑎

(𝑤 − 2𝑟2 ) (log ( )) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 + 𝑟1 log(𝑟1 ) = 0, for r2 = r2*.
𝑟
2

Note that in this case, an equilibrium may exists at r1* = 1, without satisfying the F.O.C
for firm 1 because r1 = 1 is a boundary for strategy set of the first firm and firm 1 payoff
function is not concave necessary.



PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. Based on System of equations (6) r1* and r2* are nondecreasing function of w. For a > 2, when w = ŵ, r1* = 1 and r2* = a – 1. Therefore,
when w > ŵ, r1* = 1. Then r2* can be derived from equation (7-2).



PROOF OF COROLLARY 2. Part a. In this case the equilibrium is in Case I. Based on
Lemma I and III, the results are immediate. Part b. In this case the equilibrium is in Case
III. Note that the r1* = 1, r2* = a is a limiting solution for System (6). As both firms pay
at the maximum cost of their active users, the probabilities of being active for both firms
are equal 1. The remaining results are immediate. 
PROOF OF UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM. Lemma 3 implies the uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium in Case I. for Case II and III, I paraphrase the following Theorem in
Chenault [6] as proof of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium:
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Theorem: If the following assumptions are satisfied, the game has a unique
Nash equilibrium:
-

Assumption 1 (continuity): The response functions are continuous;

-

Assumption 2 (boundedness): the choice set of an agent is bounded;

-

Assumption 3 (boundary conditions): if all other agents choose extreme
values it is not optimal for an agent to do likewise;

Assumption 4 (determinant condition): The determinate of the matrix of the derivative of
response functions minus strategy sets with respect to strategies is not zero.
This game is a continuous game, i.e., the payoff functions are continuously differentiable
over a bounded set in R2. Notice that the response functions are continuous as
(∂r1*(r2))/(∂r2) and (∂r2*(r1))/(∂r1) are continuously differentiable over Cases II and III,
respectively (system of equations in Theorem 1 and 2 specify these response functions).
Moreover, as I have shown in Proposition 2, the strategy set of players is bounded
(assumption 2). Defining any r1 > 1 and any r2 > a as extreme cases in assumption 3, I
have established in Proposition 2 that choosing these extremes is not an optimal decision
for agents (assumption 3).
To check whether assumption 4 holds, define v(r1,r2) = ψ(r1,r2) - (r1,r2) over strategy set,
where ψ(r1,r2) is the vector of best response functions for given r1 and r2. The equilibrium
is in Case II or III. Now assume the equilibrium is in Case II, i.e., w ≤ ŵa. Then, I have
the following:
𝜕𝜓1
𝜕𝑟2

−1
|𝑑𝜐(𝑟1 , 𝑟2 )| =

𝜕𝜓2
[ 𝜕𝑟1

−1

≠0
]

because
𝜕𝜓1
𝜕𝑟2
𝑟2 𝑤 + 𝑟1 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
=
𝑤 ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
<0

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
) − 𝑟1 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1

𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟 + 𝑟2
) + (𝑎 − 1)𝑟2 + 𝑟1 ) − (𝑟2 + 4𝑟1 )(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 1
) + 𝑟2 (3𝑟2 − 4(𝑎 − 1)𝑟1 ) − 4𝑎𝑟12
𝑎𝑟1
𝑎𝑟1
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and
𝑟 +𝑟
𝑟2 (𝑤 − (𝑟2 + 𝑟1 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 1𝑎𝑟 2 ) − 𝑟2 )
𝜕𝜓2
1
=
< 1.
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝜕𝑟1
𝑟1 𝑤 + 2𝑟2 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 𝑟 ) − 𝑟1 𝑟2
2

as w < r2 + 2r1. Consequently, the game satisfies all above assumptions and has a unique
Nash equilibrium. Now assume the equilibrium is in Case III, i.e., w > ŵa. Then, I have
the following:

|𝑑𝜐(𝑟1 , 𝑟2 )| =

−1

𝜕𝜓1
𝜕𝑟2

𝜕𝜓2
[ 𝜕𝑟1

−1

≠0
]

because
𝜕𝜓1
𝑟1 (𝑟1 − 𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
=
<0
𝜕𝑟2
𝑤(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝑟1 + 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )) − 𝑟1 (2𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟1 (2(𝑎 − 1)𝑟1 − 𝑎 − 𝑟2 )

and
(𝑤 − 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )
𝜕𝜓2
=
< 1.
𝑎
𝜕𝑟1
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑟 ) (𝑤 − 2𝑟2 ) + 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) + 𝑎 − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2
2

Consequently, the game satisfies all above assumptions and has a unique Nash
equilibrium.



PROOF OF COROLLARY 3.
Part a. Based on Lemma 1, for a > 2, the result is straightforward. For a ≤ 2, I have the
following:
𝑎𝑟1
𝑎𝑟1
𝑎𝑟1
𝑟2 − 1 − 𝑙𝑛 ( 𝑟2 )
𝜑1 − 𝜑2 = 𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛 ( ) =
.
1
𝑟2
𝑟2
Note that

𝑎𝑟1
𝑟2

𝑎𝑟

− 1 ≥ 𝑙𝑛 ( 𝑟 1 ) (this is because 𝑥 − 1 ≥ 𝑙𝑛(𝑥) as the function 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 −
2

𝜕𝑓

1 − 𝑙𝑛(𝑥) ≥ 0 for x ≥ 1 since f(1) = 0 and 𝜕𝑥 =

𝑥−1
𝑥

≥ 0). Therefore 𝜑1 − 𝜑2 ≥ 0.
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Part b. Based on Lemma 1, for a ≤ 2, the result is straightforward. There are three cases
for this proof: Assume r1*+ r2* ≤ a. Based on Lemma 1, firms’ payoff functions are

1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1 )(𝑟1 + 𝑎(𝑟1 − 1) − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑛(𝑟1 )) and
2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2 )(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑛(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛(𝑎. 𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑛(𝑟2 )).
Now check F.O.C for both firms:
𝑟1 +𝑟2

(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 ) (𝑟1 log (
(𝑤 − 2𝑟2 ) log (
As 𝑟1 log (

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1

𝑎𝑟1

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑟2

𝑟1 +𝑟2

) − 𝑟2 + 𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟1 𝑟2 log (
𝑟1 +𝑟2

) − 𝑟1 log (

𝑎𝑟1

𝑎𝑟1

) = 0 for r2 = r2*.
𝑟1 +𝑟2

) − 𝑟2 + 𝑎𝑟1, log (𝑟1𝑟+𝑟2) and log (
2

) = 0 for r1 = r1* and

𝑎𝑟1

) are positive, (𝑤 − 2𝑟1 ) and

(𝑤 − 2𝑟2 ) should be positive for r1 = r1* and r2 = r2*. Therefore r1* and r2* are less than
or equal w/2. Now assume r1*+ r2* > a and r1* < 1. Based on Lemma 1, firms’ payoff
functions are
𝑟 +𝑟

1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1 ) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 1𝑎𝑟 2 ) + 𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 ) and
1

𝑟 +𝑟

2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2 ) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2 ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( 1𝑎𝑟 2 ) + 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1 ) − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2 )).
1

Checking F.O.C for both firms:
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 )(𝑟1 log(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟2 − 𝑎𝑟1 ) + 𝑟1 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − 𝑟2 log(𝑟1 )) = 0 for r1 = r1*
𝑎

(𝑤 − 2𝑟2 ) (log ( )) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 + 𝑟1 log(𝑟1 ) = 0 for r2 = r2*.
𝑟
2

As (𝑟1 log(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟2 − 𝑎𝑟1 ) and −𝑟1 − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 + 𝑟1 log(𝑟1 ) are negative and (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 −
𝑎 − 𝑟2 log(𝑟1 )) are positive, (𝑤 − 2𝑟1 ) and (𝑤 − 2𝑟2 ) should be positive for r1 = r1* and
r2 = r2*. Therefore r1* and r2* are less than or equal w/2. Now assume r1*+ r2* > a and
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r1* = 1. Based on Lemma 2, w > ŵa and ŵa is the solution of following system of
equations:
𝑤
̂𝑎 = 2𝑟2
{𝑤
̂𝑎 = 2𝑟1
𝑟1 + 𝑟2 = 𝑎
Therefore w > ŵa = 2. Therefore r1* is less than or equal w/2. The proof in previous case
can be applied for r2* in this case.
Part c. In Theorem 1, I have shown that the game has Nash equilibrium in Cases I or II or
III. Based on Lemma 1, I also have shown that no user choses state PA in these cases.
These results conclude that, at equilibrium, no one will be active merely in the less
favourable firm. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. When I substitute a = 1 and r1 = r2 = r in System of
equations (2), it is simplified as:
𝑤
̂𝑎 = 2𝑟 +
𝑤
̂𝑎 = 2𝑟 +
{

𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
= 3𝑟
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
𝑟 2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
= 3𝑟
−𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)

2𝑟 = 1

Solving this results in 𝑤
̂𝑎 = 1.5. Now, consider a = 1 and r1 = r2 in System of equations 5
as follows:
{

(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 )(𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2) − 𝑟1 + 𝑟1 ) − 𝑟1 2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2) = 0
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2) − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2) = 0

This system can be simplified further as:
{

𝑤 − 3𝑟1 = 0
𝑤 − 3𝑟1 = 0

Which implies that r1* = r2* = w/3. Now, consider a = 1 and r1 = r2 in System of
equations 6 as follows:
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(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 )(𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) + 𝑟1 − 𝑟1 ) + 𝑟1 (𝑟1 + 𝑟1 − 1 − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 )) = 0
1
{
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 ) (𝑙𝑜𝑔 ( )) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟1 + 1 + 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) = 0
𝑟2
This system can be simplified further as:
{

(𝑤 − 3𝑟1 ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) + 2𝑟1 − 1 = 0
(𝑤 − 3𝑟1 ) 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 ) + 2𝑟1 − 1 = 0

which results in equation 8. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. When I substitute a = 2 and r1 = r2 = r in System of
equations (2), it is simplified as:
𝑤
̂𝑎 = 2𝑟 +

𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
= 2𝑟
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2)

𝑤
̂𝑎 = 2𝑟 +
{

𝑟 2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
= 2𝑟
𝑟 − 𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
2𝑟 = 2

Solving this results in 𝑤
̂𝑎 = 2. Now, consider a = 2 and r1 = r2 in System of equations 5 as
follows:
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1 )(−𝑟1 + 2𝑟1 ) = 0
{
0=0
This system can be simplified further as:
𝑤 − 2𝑟1 = 0
Which implies r1* = r2* = w/2. Now, consider a = 2. Part b is immediate from Corollary
1. 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.
Part a. Based on Proposition 1 and 2, it is straightforward that r1* is higher for
asymmetric case. r2* is also higher as it is less than 1 for the symmetric case, however it
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should be higher than 1 in asymmetric case, since r2* in asymmetric case is always
between a-1 and a.
Part b. Based on Proposition 1 and 2, at a = 1, φ1 = 2rlog(2) and 2r1 – 1 – 2r1log(r1) in
case II and III respectively. At a = 2, φ1 = r and 1 in case II and III respectively. Note
that in both cases, at a = 2, φ1 is higher.
Based on Proposition 1 and 2, at a = 1, φ2 = 2rlog(2) and 2r1 – 1 – 2r1log(r1) in case II
and III respectively. At a = 2, φ1 = r2log(2) and r2 – 1 + r2log(2) in case II and III
respectively. Note that in both cases, at a = 2, φ2 is smaller.
Part c. Decreasing 2 at a = 2 is straightforward. At a = 1, 1 = 4w2log(2)/9. At a = 2, 1
= w2/4. Therefore 1 decreases at a = 2. 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 5.
When a ≥ 2, based on Theorem 1, there are two cases as follows: First, based on Lemma
𝑤

3, if w ≤ ŵa (Case I), then 𝑟1∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ( 2 , 1) ≤

𝑤
2

= 𝑟2∗ . For the second case, if w > ŵa

(Case III), based on Lemma 2, r1* + r2* > a > 2. Based on Theorem 1, r1* ≤ 1.
Therefore, r2* > 1 > r1*. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 6A.
𝑟

2
Case I. I show that if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ (a+K−1)r1, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑟1 and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑎+𝑘−1

.In this case no one chooses to be active in firm 2 and passive firm 1 as follows:
When c ≤ r2 / a (i.e. r2-ac ≥ 0), state PA is preferable than being passive at both firms.
Also state PA is preferable than being active at both firms when c ≥ r1/K (r2-ac ≥ r1 + r2 ac - cK). As r2/a ≤ r1(a+K-1)/a ≤ r1 ≤ r1/K, there is no c, which satisfies above conditions.
Then, I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝑘)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −
𝑎𝐶, 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝑘)) ≥ 0}.
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Note for any A, B, C and D, if max(B,D) > C, then Pr{max(A,B) > max(C,D)} =
Pr{max(A,B) > D}. Therefore, I have: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 – 𝐶 ≥ 0) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥
0)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

)}. As r2 ≤ (a+K−1)r1, therefore r1 ≥ (r1 + r2)/(a +

K). Then I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 } =

𝑟1 . For firm 2, 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 0)} =
𝑃𝑟{𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥
𝑟1 – 𝐶) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
𝑟

2
Since r2 ≤ (a+K−1)r1, 𝑎+𝐾−1
≤

𝑟2

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

r2

) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
𝑎+K−1

r1 +r2
𝑎+K

)}.

. Now I have the following: 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤

𝑟

2
} = 𝑎+𝐾−1
.

𝑎+𝐾−1

Case II. In this case no one chooses to be active in one firm and be passive in the another
firm as follows: When c ≤ r2 / a (i.e. r2-ac ≥ 0), state PA is preferable than being passive
at both firms. Also state PA is preferable than being active at both firms when c ≥ r1/K
(r2-ac ≥ r1 + r2 - ac - cK). As r2/a ≤ r1/K, there is no c, which satisfies above conditions.
Using the same logic, state AP is never chosen. Then I have the following: 𝜑1 =
𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝑘)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶, 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0} =

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝑘

. For firm 2, 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −

𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0} =
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

. The probabilities of being active for the remaining four cases are as follows (the

details of prove for these cases are available in a longer version of Appendix):
𝑎

𝑟1

if (𝐾)r1 < r2 ≤ a , then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) =

-

if r1 ≤ K and a < r2, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) =

-

if r1 > K, r2 > a + K – 1 and r1 + r2 > a + K, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 1 .

-

if r1 > 1 and r2 ≤ a + K – 1, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 1 and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) =

PROOF OF LEMMA 6B.

𝐾

and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) =

𝑟2

-

𝑟1
𝐾

𝑎

.

and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 1 .

𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1

.
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Case III. I show that if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ (

𝑎+𝑘−1
𝐾

𝑟

2
)r1, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑟1 and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑎+𝐾−1
.

In this case no one choose to be active in firm 2 and passive in firm 1 as follows:
When c ≤ (r2 – r1) / (a-1) (i.e. r2-ac ≥ r1-c), state PA is preferable than state AP. Since r2 ≤
(

𝑎+𝑘−1
𝐾

)r1, c ≤ r1/K. Also state PA is preferable than being active at both firms when c ≥

r1/K. Therefore, there is no c, which satisfies above conditions. Then I have the
following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶, 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0}.
Therefore, I have: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 – 𝐶 ≥ 0) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)} =
𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

𝑟1 +𝑟2

𝑎+𝑘−1

)}. As r2 ≤ (
𝑎+𝐾

𝐾

)r1, therefore r1 ≥ (r1 + r2)/(a + K).

Then I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 } = 𝑟1 .

For firm 2,
𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑟1 +
𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟1 – 𝐶) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 +
𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1

≤

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

r2

) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤

𝑎+K−1

r1 +r2
𝑎+K

. Now I have the following: 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤

)}. Since r2 ≤ (

𝑟2

𝑎+𝑘−1

)r1,

𝐾

r

2
} = a+K−1
.

𝑎+𝐾−1

Case IV. Since r1 > 1, no one chooses state PP. Then I have the following: 𝜑1 =
𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶, 0)}
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 – 𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶}.
Therefore, I have: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 – 𝐶 ≥ 𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟2 −
𝑎𝐶)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 > 𝑟1 /𝐾) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤
𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤
𝑟2 −𝑟1
𝑎−1

. For firm 2,

𝑟1 +𝑟2

𝑟2 −𝑟1

)}. As r1 / K ≤
𝑎−1

𝑟2 −𝑟1
𝑎−1

, then I have the following:

)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤ 𝑟1 } + 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤
𝑎+𝐾

𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾

𝑟

} = 1 + 𝐾1 −
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𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑟1 – 𝐶} = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝐶 ≥
𝑟1 – 𝐶) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 – 𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟1 – 𝐶)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 > r1 /𝐾) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 >
K≤

r2 −r1
𝑎−1

, I have the following: 𝜑2 =

𝑟2 −𝑟1
𝑎−1

r2 −r1
𝑎−1

)}. As r1 /

. The probabilities of being active for the

remaining five cases are as follows (the details of prove for these cases are available in a
longer version of Appendix):
-

𝑎+𝐾−1

if (

𝑟2 −𝑟1
𝑎−1

𝐾

1

)r1 < r2 ≤ 𝑎r1, and r1 ≤ 1, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑟1 (1 + 𝐾) −

𝑎−1

and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) =

.
𝑟1

if 𝑎r1 < r2 ≤ a, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) =

-

if r1 ≤ K, r2 > r1 +a – 1 and r2 > a, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) =

-

if r1 > K, and r2 > a + K – 1, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 1 .

-

if r1 > 1, r2 ≤ a + K – 1, and (

𝐾

and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) =

𝑟2

-

𝑎+𝐾−1



𝑟2 −𝑟1

𝐾

𝑎

.
𝑟1
𝐾

and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 1 .

𝑟

2
)r1 > r2, then 𝜑1 ∗ (𝒓) = 1 and 𝜑2 ∗ (𝒓) = 𝑎+𝐾−1
.
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Chapter 3

3

Airline Switching Revenue with Price-Guarantees

Many airlines permit ticket holders to change the time of their flight by paying a
switching fee. For an airline, selecting a switching fee is an important strategic decision
for two reasons. Firstly, it is a supplementary but considerable revenue item for firms
with a narrow profit margin. Secondly, it significantly impacts their operational planning.
Knowing that a low or high fee could cause operational challenges, such as unsold
capacity or lost sales, the question that arises is what fee should be set for switching.
I model a single firm, which delivers two comparable services over two sequential
periods. The price of the service in the second period is lower and I deal with a
theoretical case where switching customers pay a switching fee, but get reimbursed the
price difference. This is an extension of the current airlines’ switching practice and
money-back guarantees, a common practice in many industries (such as consumer
electronics). I analyze the firm’s revenue function and derive the optimal switching rate
(proportion) between two periods.
I demonstrate that the uncertainty in switching behaviour of customers drives the firm’s
optimal switching policy. When this uncertainty increases, the firm should impose a
higher switching fee. Furthermore, I present that the optimal switching fee is increasing
in resource prices. Next, I numerically analyze the joint decisions of two service prices
and the switching fee. This analysis shows that the optimal switching fee is increasing in
the size of the low-price capacity.

3.1 Introduction
In recent years we have seen a growing trend of airline passengers demanding more
flexible travel arrangements. This may, in part, be a consequence of dynamic pricing,
where customers have come to expect daily or hourly airfare updates, and may also, in
part, be due to a general demand for greater consumer flexibility. This trend, however,
increases the firms’ uncertainty in capacity and resource planning. Given customers’
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willingness to change the service consumption time, firms aim to control these negative
impacts by imposing a switching or change fee. A second type of fee is the cancellation
fee, which is applied when a ticket holder decides to completely cancel the service. These
ancillary fees have recently provided a better opportunity for firms to collect higher
revenues. Switching fees provide more revenue than cancellation fees since customers
typically still derive some value from switching tickets.9 Notice that the current practice
is mainly focused on switching from ‘low’ to ‘high’ preference flights, where the
customer in addition has to pay the difference in fare.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the total ancillary revenue collected
from switching and cancellation fees for U.S. airlines has been growing over the past six
years (in '000): $915,231 (2007), $1,668,748 (2008), $2,373,019 (2009), $2,297,377
(2010), $2,380,157 (2011), $2,554,658 (2012).10 Since 2009, these ancillary revenues
have accounted for more than 3% of U.S. airlines’ revenue, and it is expected that this
percentage will continue to rise in the future.11 Furthermore, according to an article in the
Wall Street Journal, many airlines allegedly can barely survive without these fees, even
when they successfully operate at 99% capacity level.12 Despite the emerging importance
of ancillary revenue, its role as a source of revenue and its significance for airlines’
dynamic pricing has not yet been clarified in operations research and revenue
management literature. Moreover, as Gallego & Sahin (2010) point out, many firms are
not using ancillary fees properly and this is a problem not limited to the aviation industry.

9

URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204563304574318212311819146.html; accessed:
2015–8–8.
10

URL: www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/subject_areas/airline_information/reservation_
cancellation_change_fees/index.html; accessed 2013-05-01.
11

URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204563304574318212311819146.html;
accessed: 2015–8–8.
12

URL: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303296604577450581396602106; accessed:
2015–8–8.

65

Airlines have different policies for switching fees. For U.S. domestic flights, some
airlines, such as Jet Blue, Alaska and AirTran, do not charge their passengers for
switching; while others, such as Virgin America and Hawaiian Airlines, impose a
switching fee of around $100, and some others, such as US Airways and Delta, charge
even higher fees. This distinction in switching fees policies also exists in the case of
international flights. Unless these fares' impacts on optimal dynamic pricing are well
understood and the design of these fees is optimized, the prescriptions based on even
sophisticated revenue management systems may not be beneficial for firms. As
mentioned, under the current practice, the switching is generally from a low to a high
price flight where customers must, in addition, pay the fare difference.
Regarding the same flight (for a particular departure date, time and fare class), some
airlines such as Air Canada or American Airlines do offer fare guarantees, but mostly on
the same day of purchase. These fare guarantees are used by various price-tracking tools
to refund customers when prices drop. For example, Yapta.com and Tingo.com track the
prices before and after purchasing airline tickets and hotel bookings, respectively. As of
October 25th, 2013, Yapta and Tingo have reportedly reimbursed around $250,000,000
and $720,000, respectively.13 There is a similar price tracking tool in the auto rental
industry.14 If the secondary price drops more than the switching fee, these tools alert the
ticket holder and either provide a reimbursement or tell ticket holders exactly who to
contact and what to say to obtain the refund. The application of these tools highlights the
growing importance of managing switching revenues within different enterprises.
Moreover, these tools demonstrate that the customers' abilities to search for better rates
have been significantly improved.
I would like to highlight that the focus of this study is on the switching to a different
flight or date. In this case, most companies charge a change fee in addition to the fare

13
14

URLs: www.yapta.com and www.tingo.com; accessed 2013–9–9.

URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/your-money/autoslash-a-rate-sleuth-makes-rental-carcompanies-squirm-your-money.html; accessed: 2015–8–8.
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difference when customers want to switch to a different flight. What I analyze in this
paper is the effect of introducing the change fee and reimbursement of difference in fare
when customers switch to a lower priced flight. The reimbursement of difference in fare
is currently not a common airline industry practice. Our approach is, however, similar to
Gallego & Sahin (2010) who investigate the benefits of designing partial refundable fares
that do not exist currently: I am analyzing this issue to investigate the implications of
allowing for fare difference reimbursement. Since customers are price sensitive, I present
a hypothetical model that alleviates the burden for customers to change their flight.
Furthermore, the practice of price match guarantee has been deployed in many
industries, such as consumer electronics, which protects customers against price
fluctuations over a specific period of time. It is worthwhile to refer to some airlines that
offer restrictive versions of this service. For example, Jet Blue and IndiGo (India's largest
domestic airline as of September 2015) retains the difference in fare in a credit shell for
customers for a couple of months.15 American Airlines roll-overs ticket holders to a
lower fare if this fare was not offered at the time of original booking.16 In this essay, I
study a single-leg flight, not considering a return flight. Also, I do not include fare classes
where higher fares classes have right to switch, i.e., analysis is within one fare class.
I analyze the impact of switching fee on firms’ operating revenues and investigate how
and when imposing these fees is beneficial to firms. When the firm charges a relatively
low switching fee, this increases the rate of switching and creates more opportunities for
collecting revenue. In addition, the firm can collect more revenue indirectly by replacing
the switching ticket holders with waiting list customers during high-price periods. On the
other hand, while high switching fees would increase ancillary revenue, they also
constitute an opportunity cost to the firms. The higher the switching fee, the less

15

URLs: http://www.jetblue.com/travel-agents/lower-fare; http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/
india-business/Refund-blues-after-cancellation/articleshow/2199454.cms; http://www.firstpost.com/
business/spicejet-has-highest-load-factor-at-92-indigo-retains-a-third-of-market-in-august-2442248.html;
accessed 2015-10 -10.
16

URL: www.aa.com/i18n/agency/Booking_Ticketing/Reissue_Rollovers/rollover_lower_fare.jsp;
accessed 2013-10-25.

67

switching behaviour. This may lead to a demand shortage in low-price periods and,
ultimately lost sales due to capacity rationing in high-price periods. Therefore, net profits
may start to diminish if switching fees are high. This trade-off between ‘the cost of lost
demand and unsold capacity’ and ‘direct and indirect revenue from switching’ is the key
to understanding the firm's optimal switching fee strategy. Recognizing the growing
importance of these supplementary fees for firms, I aim to investigate the optimal
switching fees based on airlines' demands and operational factors. To the best of our
knowledge, this study is the first to consider revenue management analysis with the
presence of switching fee as a source of ancillary revenue for firms.
I consider a monopoly firm that sequentially delivers a high-price service and a low-price
service over two periods. The price gap between two periods triggers demand leakage,
which is based on demand sensitivity to price. In this study, I assume customers switch
from the high-price period to the low-price period. For example, when prices drop for a
flight, ticket holders compare the difference between the prices of the original (first)
ticket and the subsequent (secondary) ticket, plus the switching fee. If a ticket holder
decides to change the date and the price difference is acceptable based on his or her
criteria, he or she pays the fee. The cost of switching is added to the secondary ticket
price and increases the total expected cost of the ticket. I assume customers generally
decide to switch because they are price-sensitive. They track prices to find the best rate
(Gorin et al. 2012), since they are aware that firms are adjusting prices on everyday items
several times a day. In addition to this monetary incentive, in many situations, such as
illness, rescheduled meetings and family trips, passengers change their travel
arrangements without any monetary benefits. I consider all of these personal or carrier
obligations as non-monetary incentives. In contrast to the situation in this essay, I will
isolate time uncertainty as the different motivation behind switching fee in Essay 3, i.e.,
in Essay 2 the model captures those customers who change regardless of switching fee,
but in Essay 3, customers only change due to plan change. Investigating the impact both
incentives have on the behaviour of ticket holders as well as waiting list customers, I
analyze how a firm should design a switching fee to maximize total revenue over two
periods. With reference to switching fees, I later numerically illustrate how firms should
update markdown pricing strategies, as well.
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The main contributions of this paper are highlighted in the following points. Firstly, I
demonstrate that the uncertainty in switching behaviour of customers drives the firm’s
optimal switching policy. When this uncertainty increases, the firm should impose a
higher switching fee. Secondly, I present that the optimal switching fee is increasing in
resource prices. Thirdly, my numerical analysis demonstrates that by increasing the
capacity size of the low-price service, the firm can impose a higher switching fee and
collect more revenue. Finally, I observe that when a firm faces higher demands, it
imposes a lower switching rate on average, but on a larger switching ticket holder
population. This ultimately generates higher revenue for the firm.

3.2 Literature Review
There are some streams of research that relate to this work. The demand leakage and
fencing customers between market segments, by imposing a switching fee, have been
studied in literature (see Zhang & Bell (2012) and references therein). The switching fee
in this study can be seen as a time-based market segmentation mechanism in which a firm
differentiates customers based on their rights to change the time of their consumption.
A more closely related study that considers customers’ flexibility on consumption by
designing a partial refundable fee is Gallego & Sahin (2010) in which customers pay a
smaller up-front payment to have the right to cancel their tickets. The authors verify that
partially refundable tickets result in a higher consumer surplus than low-to-high pricing
based on non-refundable and fully refundable fares. Partially refundable fares are also
socially optimal. My article has the same motivation: paying a small fee to gain the right
on one aspect of the service consumption. However, compared with the previous study
where the customers pay the fee to have a right to cancel the consumption, in my model,
customers pay the fee to change the consumption time.
Many assumptions of my framework, such as the firm's sequentially decreasing pricing
policy, customers arrivals in the market, and resource capacity rating, follow Liu & Ryzin
(2008), and the related literature in capacity rationing, including Xie & Shugan (2001),
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and Nasiry & Popescu (2012). Alternatively, I consider two extensions: first, I allow the
capacity rationing over two resources with a distinct demand for both resources. Second,
I assume a stochastic switching behaviour for ticket holders.
In addition to switching and cancellation fees, airlines also collect revenue from add-on
services and auxiliary items such as luggage fees or onboard snacks and beverages
purchases (for a classification of ancillary services please check Vinod & Moore 2009).
The idea of generating supplementary revenue from these services/items has been
highlighted in revenue management literature. Two papers are motivated by charging
baggage fees: Allon et al. (2011) and Shulman & Gengu (2012). These studies consider
how a firm should offer an ancillary service (baggage delivery) along with the main
service. Although this study belongs to the ancillary revenue stream of research, it
differentiates itself from the above studies by focusing on ancillary fees, such as
switching fee and not add-on services or auxiliary items.

3.3 Model
A monopoly firm delivers two comparable services with corresponding capacities
(resources) Ci and corresponding prices pi, i = 1,2, where p1 ≥ p2. For example, consider
an airline operating weekly flights from Toronto to New York, where there is a ‘sale’
period (week) for flights in week 2. I normalize capacity size in the first period to 1, i.e.,
C1 =1, and consider demand to be continuous. The market sizes (potential demand) in
each period are distinct and both consist of a large customer population. The booking
system is sequential and planned over two booking periods such that the firm first
accommodates the demand of service 1 (in booking period 1), and then accommodates
the demand of service 2 (in booking period 2). This policy triggers demand leakage from
period 1 to period 2. Unmet demand leaves the market at the end of each period and the
service of resources 1 and 2 are delivered sequentially after the two booking periods. The
firm maximizes total revenue over two periods by choosing the switching fee at the
beginning of period 1.
The sequence of events is as follows: At the beginning of period 1, the firm announces p1
and the switching fee, ps. The firm observes the demand for resource 1, D1, and
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accommodates it fully when D1 ≤ 1, and partially when D1 > 1. At the beginning of period
2, the firm announces p2 and observes demand for resource 2, D2, plus a demand leakage
from market 1 to market 2. To focus mainly on the impact of switching customers on
firm’s revenue and to keep the analysis tractable, I assume the excess demand (waiting
list) of resource 1 and 2 leave the market at the end of each period.17 Notice that, I am
considering a deterministic demand setting in order to isolate the effect from the
switching fee, but one can consider it as an average or expected demand. Figure 5
demonstrates various demand streams and Figure 6 represents the sequence of events.

Figure 5: Demand streams in two booking periods
In this study, the demand leakage accounts for switching demand, Ds, which represents
the switching ticket holders; a portion of period 1 ticket holders who prefer to switch
from resource 1 to resource 2. The higher the fee, the lower the switching portion of
ticket holders between resource 1 and resource 2 (and vice versa). Also, I assume this
switching proportion can be random to capture the uncertainty associated with the
behaviour of switching customers. This uncertainty is generated from schedule changes
or other personal circumstances of ticket holders, especially business travelers.
Considering the two above assumptions, I denote switching rate (proportion) by Θ, which
is defined as follows:
Θ = 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) 𝜀

17

In addition to other extensions, in the third essay of this thesis, I will include the waiting list customers.
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where θ(ps) is a continuously differentiable from 0 to A and decreasing general function
and ε is a price independent random variable defined on the range [0,1], with cumulative
distribution function F(.) and the probability density function f(.)18. In addition, I assume,
𝑑2 𝜃
𝑑𝑝𝑠2

≤ 0, since most of switching customers are business travelers who are less sensitive

to switching rate variations at low values. In order to assure that positive switching
demand is possible for some range of ps, I require θ(A) = 0, i.e., A represents a critical
threshold of ps at which the switching rate vanishes, where 0 << A. A reasonable level for
A is p1 since any switching fee greater than p1 motivates ticket holders to forfeit their
ticket and join D2 without paying the switching fee.
θ(ps) denotes the switching rate between resource 1 and resource 2 without uncertainty. I
would like to highlight that the term ‘rate’ represents the ‘proportion’ of ticket holders. If
a switching customer successfully purchases a unit of capacity in market 2, he or she pays
p2 + ps and is reimbursed p1. Otherwise, the ticket holder keeps the original ticket. The
switching demand is defined by:
𝐷𝑠 = 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) 𝜀 min(1, 𝐷1 )

Figure 6: The sequence of events

18

I define ε to capture the uncertainty in switching behaviour using the setting in Petruzzi and Dada
[1999]. The multiplication implies the independence of monetary and non-monetary incentives as well.
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In this study, I assume that, when a resource is insufficient to satisfy demand, the limited
supply is rationed based on the first-come-first-served practice. Also, all switching
customers and original demands are arrived randomly during the booking period. The
accommodation level19, denoted by q, can be given by the ratio of available capacity in
period 2, C2, to the total demand in this period, 𝐷2 + 𝐷𝑠 , namely,
𝐶

𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐷 +𝜃(𝑝2 )𝜀𝐷 , 1) , 𝐷1 < 1
2
𝑠
1
𝑞(𝑝𝑠 ) = {
𝐶2
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐷 +𝜃(𝑝 )𝜀 , 1) , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
2

(1)

𝑠

Since C2 can be lower than the total demand in period 2, in the above equation, a
minimum function is considered to ensure 0 < q ≤ 1. Notice when D1 < 1, the total
demand in period 2 is 𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝜀𝐷1 , and when D1 ≥ 1, the total demand in this period is
𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝜀. The above formula is derived from these bases and consistent with the
definition of accommodation level in Liu and van Ryzin (2008).
There exists a relationship between the switching rate of period-1 customers, Θ, and the
accommodation level at period-2 resource, q. A lower switching rate indicates a higher
accommodation level for this resource (and vice versa). There exists a unique threshold
̂ 𝑞 , such that Ds + D2 = C2. In other words, when Θ ≤ Θ
̂ 𝑞 , q = 1 and all
on Θ, denoted by Θ
̂ 𝑞 , q < 1 and period 2 customers
period 2 customers are accommodated, and when Θ > Θ
̂ 𝑞 is solved for Θ based on the following equation:
face capacity rationing, Θ
0,
𝐶2 − 𝐷2
̂𝑞 =
Θ
,
𝐷1
{ 𝐶2 − 𝐷2 ,

𝑖𝑓 𝐶2 ≤ 𝐷2
𝑖𝑓 𝐷1 ≤ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷2 < 𝐶2
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

I assume there is no demand leakage from market 2 to market 1 since customers mostly
look forward to transferring their demand, and a service with a higher price would not be

19

Note that the term “accommodation level” is different from the common term in airline industry, “load
factor”. Load factor for a single flight can be calculated by dividing the number of passengers by the
number of seats. Accommodation level evaluates the operational success in terms of demand, and load
factor evaluates the operational success in terms of capacity.
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attractive, in general, to low-price customers. To focus on switching behaviour and to
keep the model parsimonious, I prevent leakage from the low-price period to the highprice period.
The total revenue for the firm is the original revenue for two resources plus the switching
revenue:
Π(𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝑝1 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1 ) + 𝑝2 𝐷2 𝑞(𝑝𝑠 ) + (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1 )Θ𝑞(𝑝𝑠 )

(2)

where q(ps) is given by equation (1). The first term in (2), p1 min (1, D1 ) , denotes the
revenue collected in period 1. The next two following terms in (2) denote revenues
collected in period 2, i.e., the second term, 𝑝2 𝐷2 𝑞(𝑝𝑠 ), represents the revenue from the
original demand for period 2, and the third term, (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1 )Θ𝑞(𝑝𝑠 ),
represents the revenue from switching customers. Notice that in (2), the capacity size of
resource 1, C1, is represented by number 1, and the capacity size of resource 2, C2, is
embedded in 𝑞(𝑝𝑠 ). Also, since demand of resource 1, D1, is deterministic, the minimum
function, 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1 ), is constant as well. I denote the optimal switching fee by 𝑝𝑠∗ .

3.4 Analysis of the Optimal Switching Rate in Symmetrical
Case
I first consider the symmetrical case, in which the sizes of two resources are constant
over time, i.e., C1  C 2  1 . Later, I relax this assumption and study the impact of
asymmetric capacities in two periods. I also assume D2 > D1. This assumption implies
that, since the price drops in the second period, the demand for the second period is
higher than the demand in the first period when the potential markets are independent and
equal in size. Next, I consider the firm’s optimal decision, 𝑝𝑠∗ .
Defining
𝑧=

1 − 𝐷2
𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

the accommodation level can be simplified as follows:
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1,

𝜀<𝑧

1
𝑞(𝑝𝑠 ) = {
,
𝐷2 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝜀

𝜀≥𝑧

The expected revenue can be formulated based on (1) for three cases:
• When D1 ≤ 1, and D2 ≤ 1, it be given by, namely:

𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )] = ∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢

0
1

+

∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢 + 𝑝2 𝐷2
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

(3)

The above equation depends on θ(ps), as well as f(.). The first integral represents a firm’s
expected revenue when the accommodation level is one, i.e., the available capacity in
period 2 is higher than total demand in this period. Also, the second integral represents a
firm’s expected revenue when the accommodation level is lower than one, i.e., the
available capacity in period 2 is lower than total demand in this period. Notice that the
terms inside the first integrals, (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) and

((𝑝𝑠 +𝑝2 −𝑝1 )𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢+𝑝2 𝐷2 )

, are

𝐷2 +𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

derived from equation (2). These terms represent firm’s revenue function in this equation
for un-capacitated and capacitated cases, respectively. In this case, the population of
switching customers is represented by 𝐷1 𝜃.
• When D1 ≤ 1, and D2 > 1, the expected revenue is given by:
𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )] = ∫

1 (𝑝
𝑠

0

+ 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢 + 𝑝2 𝐷2
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
1−𝐷2

Notice that, in this case, the accommodation level is always lower than 1. Also, 𝐷

1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

<

0, therefore, the first integral in (3) vanishes and the second integral in (3) is simplified as
presented above.
• When D1 > 1, and D2 > 1, the expected revenue is given by:

75

𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )] = ∫

1 (𝑝
𝑠

0

+ 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢 + 𝑝2 𝐷2
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

In this case, the population of switching customers is represented by 𝜃. Next, I study the
properties of optimal switching fee under stochastic switching behaviour.
Proposition 1 The optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠∗ , exists and is unique.
I would like to highlight that the existence and uniqueness of optimal switching fee hold
for all three cases of D1 and D2. Next, I present how to derive the optimal switching fee
for two following cases of D2, D2 ≤ 1, and D2 > 1.
Proposition 2A If 𝐷2 ≤ 1, the optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠∗ , is the solution to the following
equation:

[(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 −

𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )

+ 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )] ∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

𝑢𝑓(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢

0
1

+∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2
𝑢
(
) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) +
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

Proposition 2B If 𝐷2 > 1, the optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠∗ , is the solution to the following
equation:
1
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2
min(1, 𝐷1 )𝑢
∫ (
) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) +
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0
𝐷2 + min(1, 𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
𝐷2 + min(1, 𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
0

The optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠∗ , satisfies above equations, which depends on θ(ps), as well
as f(.). Next, I study the relationship between demand and the optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠∗ .
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Corollary 1 The optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠∗ , is increasing in D1 and D2.
When D1 increases, it generates a larger ticket-holder population for flight 1 and a larger
population of switching customers accordingly. Therefore, the firm can charge a higher
switching fee. When D2 increases, however, the switching customers have to compete for
flight 2 tickets with more flight 2 customers, thus intensifying the competition among
customers for this flight. Consequently, the firm can set a higher switching fee to
discourage customers to switch in order to decrease intensity of competition. In general,
Corollary 1 demonstrates that when facing higher demands, the firm allows a lower
switching rate on average, but on a larger switching ticket holder population. This
ultimately generates higher revenue for the firm. Next, I examine how the optimal
switching fee is affected by the original and markdown price, p1 and p2.
Proposition 3 The optimal switching fee is decreasing in markdown price p2 and
increasing in original price p1.
When the price of a resource increases, switching customers should pay a higher fee for
switching from this resource to another resource. This can be addressed by a higher cost
of losing customers for a more pricy resource. However, as the markdown price goes up,
they pay a lower switching fee, since the price gap between the two resources goes down.
Notice that one may argue that switching to a more valuable resource should be more
costly for customers. Proposition 3, however, does not support this argument. Next, I
examine how the optimal switching fee is affected by size of resources.
Proposition 4 The optimal switching fee is decreasing in C1 (or C2).
Notice that I normalize the capacity C1 and C2 to 1. By increasing the capacity size,
which is the unit of analysis, D1 and D2 will be lower. In the next section, I numerically
analyze this result further.
In this study, I analyze how a firm should manage its revenue when facing a stochastic
switching rate with a capacity constraint. One may wonder, under a more simplified and
classic scenario of a deterministic switching rate without capacity constraint, which
switching fee maximizes a firm’s total revenue. For this case, define, 𝑝𝑠𝐷𝑈 , the optimal
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switching fee which maximizes solely deterministic and un-capacitated revenue, given
by:
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝐷1
Note that, under a deterministic and un-capacitated case, the first and the second terms of
a firm’s revenue function, given by (2), are constant and independent of a switching fee.
Next, I study the properties of this optimal switching fee and the relationship between
optimal switching prices under different scenarios.
Proposition 5A 𝑝𝑠∗ ≥ 𝑝𝑠𝐷𝑈 .
Proposition 5B The asymptotic limits of the optimal switching fee with respect to
demand is given by 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑝𝑠∗ = 𝑝𝑠𝐷𝑈 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝑝𝑠∗ = 𝐴.
𝐷2 →0

𝐷2 →∞

The limited available resources, as well as the uncertainty in ticket holders’ switching
behaviours, drive the firm to impose a higher switching fee. Therefore, the optimal
switching fee in the stochastic and capacitated case is greater than the deterministic and
un-capacitated case. Next, I study the value of the optimal switching fee when the
demand in the second period (D2) increases to the highest point or decreases to the lowest
point. Proposition 5 simplifies the previous results for the extreme cases of D2. Notice
that when D2 approaches zero, there is no limit on capacity allocation. Moreover, the
uncertainty in switching behaviour becomes less critical for the firm. Therefore, the
stochastic capacitated problem can be simplified to the deterministic un-capacitated case.
I would like to highlight that Proposition 5 is in agreement with Corollary 1. When
demand goes to infinity, the firm can impose the highest possible fee; however, the
optimal switching fee never goes higher than A, since imposing any price higher than A
does not generate extra benefit for the firm.
In Proposition 5, I compare the optimal switching fee for a deterministic un-capacitated
case with a stochastic capacitated case. This result makes one wonder what happens in
the other two remaining cases, i.e., deterministic capacitated case and stochastic un-
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capacitated case? Under the stochastic un-capacitated case, the firm’s revenue function
given by (2) can be simplified as:
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝐷1 𝜀
Notice that the firm's expected revenue is given by:
1

∫ (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝐷1
0

which is equal to the firm’s revenue under a deterministic un-capacitated case. Now,
consider a deterministic capacitated case. When 𝑞(𝑝𝑠 ) = 1, the firm's revenue function
is:
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )min(1, 𝐷1 )
and when 𝑞(𝑝𝑠 ) < 1, the firm's revenue function is:
𝑝2 +

(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )min(1, 𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )
𝐷2 + min(1, 𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

Note that the denominator of the ratio in the above function is decreasing in switching
fee, and the numerator of the ratio represents the firm’s revenue function under a
deterministic un-capacitated case. This implies that the optimal switching fee under a
deterministic capacitated case is higher than the optimal switching fee under a
deterministic un-capacitated case. Considering all four cases, the optimal switching fee is
increasing in uncertainty of switching behaviour only for a capacitated case, while,
ceteris paribus, this fee is always higher under a capacitated case versus an uncapacitated case.

3.5 Pricing with Switching Fees - Numerical Illustration
In this section, I study two cases as follows. In the first example, I numerically find the
optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠∗ , for a specific problem. Then I extend my findings by analyzing
how, for the same problem, the firm should make decisions that jointly treat its
markdown pricing policy p2 (given the original price p1), and the switching fee, ps.

79

3.5.1 Example 1: Optimal Switching Fee
In the first analysis, I assume the ticket prices in the first and the second periods, p1 and
p2, are exogenous (p1 and p2 can also be seen as the optimal prices to Equation (2)
without including switching revenues). Also, I assume demand in each period is given
by: Di  500  pi , for i  1, 2 .
The sequence of analysis is as follows: Given C1 , C2 , p1, and p2, the firm selects the
optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠∗ , to maximize its revenue, which is specified by Equation (2). I
study two scenarios for ε: (1) a deterministic case in which ε = 0.5 and (2) and extreme
stochastic case in which ε follows a Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.5. Note that, in both
cases, E(ε) = 0.5, to analyze the impact of uncertainty in switching behaviour of ticket
holders.
With respect to the switching rate, I consider the following:
𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) = 0.8 − 0.0025 𝑝𝑠 .
Notice that in the above setting, when the switching fee is zero, the expected switching
rate is E(ε) 𝜃(0) = 0.5 × 0.8 = 0.4. Also, for a high switching fee (for example above
$300), the expected switching rate is negligible. The choice of the above coefficients
depends on these bases. In this analysis, I also study the impact of the size of capacity on
joint pricing decisions for specific values of C1 and C2 . The following analysis reports
on 17 cases, spanned by
(𝐶1 , 𝐶2 ) ∈
(50, 50), (100, 100), (200, 200), (300, 300), (400, 400), (500, 500), (50, 450), (100, 400),
{
}.
(200, 300), (300, 200), (400, 100), (450, 50), (250, 100), (250, 400), (100, 250), (400, 250), (250, 250)

The magnitudes of C1 and C2 belong to the range [50, 500], and the ratios of C1 and C2
belong to [1/9, 9], which covers a sufficiently wide range of possible values of C1 and C2.
I find this selection of parameters to be sufficient for analyzing the firm's switching fee
pricing decision, 𝑝𝑠∗ , based on (2). Notice that the first six cases demonstrate a symmetric
case; the second six cases demonstrate a situation in which the sum of capacities equals
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500; the next four cases represent a situation in which one capacity is 250 and the second
is at a relatively low or a high level; and the last case represents a centre point. The
results of the 17 cases are summarized in Table 6.
I observe that the numerical example also demonstrates some of the results discussed
previously. For example, consistent with Proposition 1, a unique optimal switching fee
exists for all 17 cases. Moreover, as mentioned in Proposition 5, the optimal switching
fee never goes lower than the optimal switching fee under deterministic and uncapacitated case. Notice that the firm’s revenue under the deterministic and uncapacitated case is:
Table 5: Optimal switching fee for two cases of ε: left (ε = 0.5) and right (ε follows a
Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.5).

Π(𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝑝𝑠 (0.8 − 0.0025 𝑝𝑠 )𝐷1
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which is maximized at 𝑝𝑠∗𝐷𝑈 = 160. Besides, as discussed by Proposition 3, the optimal
switching fee is increasing in markdown price p2 and original price p1. Finally, the
optimal switching fee is decreasing in size of capacity. I also observe the following
results:
First, I find that, in most cases, the firm sets the switching fee higher than the price
difference ( Dp = p1 - p2 ) between two periods. The only exception is when the size of the
first resource is extremely low and the size of the second resource is extremely high.
Such pricing policy prevents customers from switching solely for monetary incentive.
When ticket holders switch, however, for non-monetary reasons, monetary incentives still
paly a role in the switching behavoiur. These results show that, in most cases, switching
cutomers pay significantly higher prices in total (p2 + ps) than the original ticket price, p1.
I also observe that the switching fee increases as the uncertainty in the switching
behaviour (standard deviation of ε) increases. The firm sets a higher switching fee to
offset the cost of uncertainty in customer behaviour. Note that this result is partially
discussed in Proposition 3A. Finally, the firm’s expected revenue significantly depends
on the switching fee (Figure 7). Changing the switching fee can lead to approximately
10% variation in the firm’s expected revenue. This impact is more significant when
capacity is adequate.
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Figure 7: Firm's expected revenue, E(π), left (ε = 0.5) and right (ε follows a Bernoulli
distribution with p = 0.5).

3.5.2 Example 2: Joint Optimal Switching Fee and Markdown Price
To focus better on the dynamics between original prices and switching fee, in this
numerical example, I consider an endogenous demand setting for the markdown resource.
I assume the ticket price in the first period, p1, is exogenous; p1 can also be seen as the
optimal price to Equation (2) considering the first period exclusively.
The sequence of analysis is as follows: Given C1, C2, and p1, the firm selects the optimal


price of the second resource, p 2 , and switching fee, p s , to maximize its revenue, which is
specified by Equation (2). Notice that updating the price of the second period, p2 , also
changes the demand in the second period, D2. I analyze the firm's joint pricing decisions

 p , p  based on (2). The results of the 17 cases are summarized in Table 7. I observe

s


2

the following results:
First, in some case the switching fee increases as the uncertainty in the switching
behaviour (standard deviation of ε) increases. This result is different from Corollary 2. To
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hedge against uncertainty in customer behaviour in these cases, the firm allocates more
resources to the original demand of the second resource by setting a lower markdown
price, and allocates fewer resources to switching customers by setting a higher switching
fee. Note that in this scenario, the firm benefits from a stable demand (D2) to deal with
the unstable demand (𝜃).
Also, I notice that a higher capacity size results in a lower price p2 , which is intuitive; a
more available resource should be priced lower in the market, and a less available
resource priced higher. Next, I realize that the switching fee decreases in C2 and increases
in C2. These findings are also intuitive and consistent with previous findings.
Table 7: Optimal pricing for two cases of ε: left (ε = 0.5) and right (ε follows a
Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.5).

Finally, I observe that the optimal switching fee is lower when it is set jointly with the
markdown price. When the firm updates only switching fees, it cannot generate extra
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revenue from the original demand of the second resource and, therefore, must deal solely
with switching customers in order to generate similar revenues. These dynamics push the
firm to impose a higher switching fee.

3.6 Discussion
This study focuses on the benefits of managing revenues from switching customers, a
phenomenon having recently becomes very significant for many industries such as
airlines. As discussed, managing ancillary revenue not only supports a firm with a narrow
profit margin, but also could improve customer relationship through providing more
options for their consumption. Many industries, such as consumer electronic retail,
provide money-back guarantees to customers, even over future dates (for a certain time
frame). This practice is used as a marketing tool to generate higher sales.20 In this study, I
consider a similar scenario in which a hypothetical airline might want to use marketing
tool as a marketing strategy to attract price-sensitive customers. The proposed case has
already been implemented by some airlines. As airlines are exposed to various marketing
and pricing strategies, we would not be surprised to see airlines also offering priceguarantees across dates and flights. This study contributes by highlighting some of the
operational aspects to take into consideration for these marketing and pricing strategies.
I considered a monopoly firm that sequentially announces prices over two periods. The
customers track prices and this behaviour triggers demand leakage between two periods.
The firm seeks to find the optimal switching rate, but the existence of original demand
complicates the analysis for the firm. It is not clear whether the firm should allow a low
or a high accommodation rate for switching customers. I demonstrate that the uncertainty
in switching behaviour of its customers drives the firm’s optimal switching policy. When
this uncertainty increases, the firm should impose a higher switching fee. Moreover, the
optimal switching fee is increasing in the price of resource.

20

URL: http://www.nytimes.com/allbusiness/AB4353479_primary.html; accessed 2015–10–10.
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The managerial insights are that firms could generate higher revenues by segmenting the
market and designing ancillary fees for each segment separately. For example, business
travelers have a higher switching rate for non-monetary reasons than do other passengers.
Airlines can assess their prices according to their estimate of the likelihood that
customers from each market segment will change itinerary. The market can also be
segmented based on seasons or geographic regions, and so on. Firms predicting the
behavior of customers should forecast customer reaction to ancillary fees, as well—even
more critical because firms need to take into consideration long-term market competition.
A strict pricing policy regarding switching and cancelation might send customers to a
competitor. This may partly explain why some airlines, such as Southwest Airlines, have
been successful in acquiring higher market shares by designing more suitable ancillary
fees for customers.21
Finally, I would like to emphasize that firms should not follow pricing strategies that submaximize their ancillary revenues. Although some airlines are reportedly more successful
in generating higher ancillary revenues, these revenues should be considered as a portion
of total revenue structure and be managed for a higher total profit and market
performance.
This study on change fees can be extended to answer future research questions. For
example, how are the results affected by differences between duopoly and monopoly
markets? What if customers partially behave strategically? Many ex-ante asymmetric
firms occasionally adjust these fares to position themselves advantageously in market
competitions. Combining data sets from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
future studies could investigate under which scenarios modifying ancillary fares would be
detrimental or beneficial to firms. An extension can also consider multiple fare classes
where higher fare classes have no switching fee. This is similar to Gallego and Sahin
(2010) where they consider non-refundable, partial refundable and full refundable tickets.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that the change fees also generate revenue for the price

21

URL: http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/08/20/southwests-expanding-internationalservice-will-lift-its-growth-in-the-coming-years; Accessed 201–10–10.
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tracking industries, such as Yapta. Future research might explore how airlines should
manage their relationship with these parties, and how the revenue that is generated
through these services should be shared with these price-tracking parties.
I would like to highlight some of the other industries for which this model and results
might apply. For example, banks or cellphone providers experience an identical problem
in managing their switching revenues when homeowners decide to change their mortgage
plans or when cellphone users change their mobile plans. I would like to highlight that
above industries does not have similar capacity contrints discussed here for airline, but
the results extend to these industries since I consider the non-capacitatated case as well.
In all of these cases, firms should impose an appropriate fee to find the best allocation of
their limited resources to different streams of demand, keeping in mind that the related
ancillary revenues should be collected to maximize their total profit.

3.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
The total revenue is given by equation (2) is a function of D1 and D2. There are there
cases as follows:
-

Case I (D1 ≤ 1 and D2 ≤ 1) In this case, the expected revenue is given by:

𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )] = ∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢

0
1

+

∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

((𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢 + 𝑝2 𝐷2 )
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

Deriving the first derivative of above function with respect to ps and using Leibniz
integral rule, I have the following results:
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1−𝐷2

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )
= [(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 ) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )] ∫
𝑢𝑓(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢
𝜕𝑝𝑠
0
1

+∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2
𝑢
(
) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) +
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

=0

where 𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 ) is the derivative of 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) with respect to ps. (Considering
𝑑
𝑑𝜃

𝑏(𝜃)

(∫𝑎(𝜃) 𝑓(𝑥, 𝜃) 𝑑𝑥) format for Leibniz integral rule, for the first integral, for

example, I have the following terms:
1−𝐷2

𝑥 = 𝑢, 𝜃 = 𝑝𝑠 , 𝑎(𝜃) = 0, 𝑏(𝜃) = 𝐷

1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

, 𝑓(𝑥, 𝜃) = (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢𝑓(𝑢). I

use similar analogy for next Leibniz integral rule calculations.

-

Case II (D1 ≤ 1 and D2 > 1) In this case, the expected revenue is given by:
1

((𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢 + 𝑝2 𝐷2 )
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )] = ∫
0

Deriving the first derivative of above function with respect to ps and using Leibniz
integral rule, I have the following results:
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

-

1

= ∫0 (𝐷

𝐷1 𝑢

2 +𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) +

(𝑝𝑠 −𝑝1 )𝜃′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2
𝐷2 +𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0.

Case III (D1 > 1 and D2 > 1) In this case, the expected revenue is given by:
1

𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )] = ∫
0

((𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢 + 𝑝2 𝐷2 )
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
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Deriving the first derivative of above function with respect to ps and using Leibniz
integral rule, I have the following results:
1
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝑢
=∫ (
) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) +
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0
𝜕𝑝𝑠
𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
0 𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

The three above cases are summarized in Proposition 2. 

Proof of Proposition 1
I assume if there is more than one switching fee, which generates the same amount of
revenue for a firm in equation (2), the firm always prefers the lowest one. Through doing
this, the firm can motivates more customers to purchase a ticket.
Considering the results in Proposition 2, I calculate the limits of the first derivative of the
expected revenue with respect to ps, when it goes to zero and infinity. Based on
Proposition 2, when D2 > 1,
1
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝑢
=∫ (
) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) +
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝜕𝑝𝑠
𝐷2 + min(1, 𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
0 𝐷2 + min(1, 𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

=0

Note that:
𝑙𝑖𝑚

𝑝𝑠 →0

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

> 0 since 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) > 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 ) < 0. Also, 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠 →0

since 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) = 0. As

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]

𝑝𝑠 →𝐴

least a ps, such that

𝑝𝑠 →0

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

𝜕𝑝𝑠

𝑝𝑠 →𝐴

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

<0

is a continuous function, this implies that there exist at

= 0.

𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) is non-negative and decreasing in ps and 𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 ) is non-positive and decreasing in
ps. Therefore, (𝐷

𝑢𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

2 +min(1,𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

) is decreasing in ps since the first derivative of this ratio
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with respect to is (

𝑢𝜃′ (𝑝𝑠 )(𝐷2 +min(1,𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢(1−𝑢))
(𝐷2 +𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1,𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠

)𝑢)2

𝑢(𝑝𝑠 −𝑝1 )𝜃′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2
)
2
2 +min(1,𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢)

) ≤ 0. Also, ((𝐷

is

decreasing in ps, since the numerator of the ratio, 𝑢(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2 , is increasing in
absolute value in ps, but the denominator of the ratio, (𝐷2 + min(1, 𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢)2, is
1

decreasing in ps. Therefore, ∫0 (𝐷

𝑢

2 +min(1,𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠

) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) + 𝐷
)𝑢

(𝑝𝑠 −𝑝1 )𝜃′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2

2 +min(1,𝐷1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

also decreasing in ps. This implies that there is a unique ps, such that

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 is

= 0.

When D2 ≤ 1,
1−𝐷2

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )
= [(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 ) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )] ∫
𝑢𝑓(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢
𝜕𝑝𝑠
0
1

+∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2
𝑢
)
(
) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 +
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

=0

Note that:
𝑙𝑖𝑚

𝑝𝑠 →0

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

> 0 since 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) > 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 ) < 0. Also, 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠 →0

𝑝𝑠 →0

𝑝𝑠 →𝐴

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

since 𝑙𝑖𝑚 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) = 0. Notice that the first integral is zero when 𝑝𝑠 → 𝐴. As the

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]

𝑝𝑠 →𝐴

is a continuous function, this implies that there exist at least a ps, such that

In previous case, I have already shown that the second integral in

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

<0

𝜕𝑝𝑠

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

= 0.

is decreasing

in ps. Now I will show that the first integral is decreasing in ps as well.

𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) is non-negative and decreasing in ps and 𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 ) is non-positive and decreasing in
1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

ps. Therefore, ∫0

𝑢𝑓(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢 and [(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 ) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )] are decreasing in ps.
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𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )

As a result, [(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 −

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

+ 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )] ∫0

This implies that there is a unique ps, such that

𝑢𝑓(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢 is also decreasing in ps.

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

= 0. 

Proof of Corollary 1
Based on Proposition 2, in a general case, 𝑝𝑠∗ is given by:

[(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 −

𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )

+ 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )] ∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

𝑢𝑓(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢

0
1

+∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2
𝑢
(
) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) +
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

In this equation, 𝑝𝑠∗ is an implicit function of D2. Lets call the above integral as 𝑅 ′ . Notive

that the optimal switching fee is the solution of the implicit function 𝑅 ′ , i.e., 𝑅 ′ = 0.
Using implicit differentiation, the derivative of this function with respect to D2 is given
by:
𝜕𝑅 ′
𝜕𝐷
= − 2′
𝜕𝑅
𝑑 𝐷2
𝜕𝑝𝑠
𝑑𝑝𝑠∗

𝜕𝑅 ′ 𝑑𝐷2

[Proof of above equation. We have 𝑅 ′ (𝑝𝑠∗ , 𝐷2 ) = 0. Therefore, 𝜕𝐷

2

𝜕𝑅 ′

𝜕𝑅 ′

𝑑𝑝𝑠∗

2

𝑠

2

𝑑𝐷2

𝜕𝑅 ′ 𝑑𝑝∗

+ 𝜕𝑝∗ 𝑑𝐷𝑠 = 0,
𝑠

2

which simples to: 𝜕𝐷 + 𝜕𝑝∗ 𝑑𝐷 = 0].
Using Leibniz integral rule, I have the following results:
𝜕𝑅 ′
1 − 𝐷2
1 − 𝐷2
1 − 𝐷2
=(
)(
)𝑓(
) [(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )(1 − 𝐷2 ) − 𝑝2 𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕 𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )
1

+ ∫ 1−𝐷2 ((𝐷
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

𝑢

3
2 +𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢)

) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )(𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢) + (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2 − (𝑝𝑠 −

𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢)𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 > 0.
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𝜕𝑅 ′

𝑑𝑝∗

𝑠

2

Now, Based on Proposition 1, 𝜕𝑝 < 0. Therefore, 𝑑𝐷𝑠 > 0.
For the same logic, I have the following:
𝜕𝑅 ′
1 − 𝐷2
𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )(1 − 𝐷2 )
1 − 𝐷2
=(
)(
)𝑓(
) [(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )(1 − 𝐷2 ) − 𝑝2 𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )]
2
)
𝜕𝐷1
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )
𝐷
𝜃(𝑝
1
𝑠
(𝐷 𝜃(𝑝 ))
1

𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
3
2 +𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢)

1

+ ∫ 1−𝐷2 ((𝐷
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

𝑠

) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )(𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢)(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )(𝐷2 − 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢))𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 > 0.
𝜕𝑅 ′

𝑑𝑝∗

𝑠

1

Now, Based on Proposition 1, 𝜕𝑝 < 0. Therefore, 𝑑𝐷𝑠 > 0. 

Proof of Proposition 5
The deterministic and un-capacitated switching revenue is given by:
𝑅 𝑈𝐶 = (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝐷1
Therefore,

𝜕𝑅 𝑈𝐶
𝜕𝑝𝑠

= (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃′ (𝑝𝑠 ) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) and 𝑝𝑠𝐷𝑈 is the solution for this

equation:
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃′ (𝑝𝑠 ) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) = 0
Notice that (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃′ (𝑝𝑠 ) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) is decreasing in 𝑝𝑠 since the second derivative
with respect to 𝑝𝑠 is negative i.e.,
2𝜃′ (𝑝𝑠 ) + (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 )𝜃′′ (𝑝𝑠 ) < 0
This implies that 𝑝𝑠𝐷𝑈 is the unique solution for the deterministic and un-capacitated
switching revenue. Now, given that:
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

= [(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 −

𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

+ 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )] ∫0

1

𝑢𝑓(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢 + ∫ 1−𝐷2 (𝐷
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

𝑢

2 +𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

)
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Therefore, 𝑙𝑖𝑚

𝐷→0

𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠 )]
𝜕𝑝𝑠

= 𝑝𝑠𝐷𝑈 . Since,

𝑑𝑝𝑠∗

> 0 based on Corollary 1, i.e., optimal

𝑑𝐷

switching fee is increasing in demand, therefore, 𝑝𝑠∗ > 𝑝𝑠∗𝐷𝑈 . 
.

Proof of Proposition 3
Based on Proposition 2, in the general case, 𝑝𝑠∗ is given by:

[(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 −

𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )

+ 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )] ∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

𝑢𝑓(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢

0
1

+∫

1−𝐷2
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1 )𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2
𝑢
(
) (𝜃(𝑝𝑠 ) +
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

In this equation, 𝑝𝑠∗ is an implicit function of p1. Lets call the above integral as 𝑅 ′ . Using

implicit differentiation, the derivative of this function with respect to D2 is given by:
𝜕𝑅 ′
𝜕𝑝
𝑑𝑝𝑠∗
= − 1′
𝜕𝑅
𝑑 𝑝1
𝜕𝑝𝑠
Using Leibniz integral rule, I have the following results:
𝜕𝑅 ′
𝜕𝑝1

1−𝐷2

=

)
−𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 ) ∫0𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠 𝑢𝑓(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢

1

+ ∫ 1−𝐷2 (𝐷
𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )

𝜃′ (𝑝𝑠 )𝐷2

2 +𝐷1 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 )𝑢

𝜕𝑅 ′

𝜕𝑅 ′

𝑠

1

) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 > 0.

Now, Based on Proposition 1, 𝜕𝑝 < 0. Therefore, 𝜕𝑝 > 0.
For the same logic, I have the following:
𝜕𝑅 ′
𝜕𝑝2

1−𝐷2
)

= −𝜃 ′ (𝑝𝑠 ) ∫0𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠 𝑢𝑓(𝑢) 𝑑𝑢 < 0.
𝜕𝑅 ′

𝑑𝑝∗

𝑠

1

Now, Based on Proposition 1, 𝜕𝑝 < 0. Therefore, 𝑑𝐷𝑠 < 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
I normalize the capacity C1 and C2 to 1. Therefore, by increasing the capacity, I have a
lower demand in equation (2). Based on Corollary 1, the optimal switching fee is
decreasing in size of capacities. 
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Chapter 4

4

Managing Change Revenue with Presence of TimeUncertain Customers

4.1 Introduction
According to a recent survey by the travel website Airfarewatchdog of more than 6,100
travelers, 38% of respondents picked the change and cancellation fee when asked to name
the fee they most hated.22 Many travel weblogs and consumer review websites advise
passengers on how to avoid paying these fees by carefully planning their travels ahead of
time or by purchasing protective travel insurances. Despite all of these efforts by
consumers to prevent extra charges, based on the latest data from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics,23 the airlines’ revenue generated in the first quarter of 2015 from
cancellation and change fees increased more than 21% over the revenue generated during
the same period in 2012.
Firms gain incremental profit from charging change fees. Customers, however, respond
strategically to change fees; that is, they are not certain about their future travel plans and
they consider the risk and associated costs of having to make changes in their travel
plans. Most of the change and cancellation fees are generated from ticket holders affected
by external factors, such as personal matters, business meetings, illness, and so on.24 In
contrast to the situation in Essay 2, I isolate time uncertainty as the different motivation
behind switching fee in this essay, i.e., in Essay 2 the model captures those customers

22

URL: http://www.latimes.com/travel/la-fi-mo-most-hated-passenger-charge-bag-fees-20140124story.html#axzz2s0EyY6er; accessed 2015-09-09.
23

URL: www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/subject_areas/airline_information/reservation_
cancellation_change_fees/index.html; accessed 2015-08-08.
24

URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204563304574318212311819146.html;
accessed: 2015–8–8.
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who change regardless of switching fee, but in Essay 3, customers only change due to
plan change. Consider a traveler flying from Atlanta to Paris, who can purchase her ticket
early and pay a lower airfare of $1,000, but she may still be uncertain about her future
travel plan if she purchases her ticket early. She speculates that the ticket price will
increase to $1,400 later. Furthermore, she anticipates that there is a 25% chance her travel
plan will change in the future. When her uncertainty materializes close to the travel date,
she may have to pay a change fee of $300 to rebook her ticket based on her final travel
schedule. Although she receives a discount from purchasing early, her expected cost from
purchasing early is 0.75 × $1,000 + 0.25 × ($1,000 + $400 + $300) = $1,175.
In this chapter, I study the following research questions: What are the effects of imposing
a change fees on travelers’ early purchase incentives? Although a higher change fee
might discourage customers from purchasing tickets early, how can change fees be
beneficial for the airline? How should airlines set the base ticket prices for flights after
imposing a change fee? I explore how a firm should manage change fees and service
prices to maximize revenue.
I consider a monopolistic firm that offers two sequential services, Service 1 and Service
2, over two periods. For example, consider the previous Atlanta to Paris flight, with a
Friday departure and a Saturday departure. On Monday, only the Friday flight is available
for purchase, but on Wednesday, both Friday and Saturday flights are available for
purchase. The firm allows customers to change their initial service choice by paying a
change fee; for example, a customer who bought the Friday flight on the Monday might
on Wednesday change for the Saturday flight by paying a change fee (in addition to any
incremental mark-up premium). In this paper, I investigate how the firm should maximize
its revenue by selecting the best change fee. Customers are heterogeneous with respect to
their willingness to pay for the service. Moreover, they should decide whether to
purchase Service 1 early at a lower price or wait for Service 2 to prevent paying the
change fee. However, they have type uncertainty; that is, at the beginning, they are not
certain whether they will need Service 1 or Service 2. I model type uncertainty as the
proportion of customers who will experience a change in demand from Service 1 to
Service 2. Customers consider their type uncertainty, service price, premium mark-up
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price and change fee when deciding to buy early or late. Without imposing any
distributional assumptions, I demonstrate how a revenue-maximizing firm should select
the change fee and how it should set the service price and the change fee jointly. I would
like to highlight that I am looking at a single-leg flight, not considering a case with a
return flight in this essay. Also, I do not consider a contingent plan depending on the
customer’s eventually realized time preference since airlines do not consider these plans
in practice. This might be in contrast with models in economics and organization theory
where firms provides different pricing plans based on customers’ realized types.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, I find that when customers are
“almost” certain about their types in the future, low-valuations customers might also
purchase the service, but if their type changes, they will not pay the change fee and markup premium for Service 2. Second, when customers are not “very certain” about their
types, I observe that only high-valuation customers purchase Service 1 in the first period.
These results suggest that, in this case, the firm should select a relatively low change fee
and incentivize all customers to purchase in period 1. This result may seem
counterintuitive, but is anecdotally consistent with policies of industries that have
comparatively small or negligible change fees, such as car rental (where customers more
frequently change their travel plans). Third, although one might expect that by increasing
the change fee the demand for Service 1 shrinks, I show that increasing the change fee up
to a certain level leads to higher revenues for the firm. Finally, I demonstrate that when
the firm sets the service price and the change fee simultaneously, the optimal service
price is decreasing in the type uncertainty of customers. However, the optimal change fee
is actually increasing in the type uncertainty of customers.

4.2 Literature Review
In this section, I provide a review of relevant literature in strategic behaviour, valuation
uncertainty and ancillary revenues in operations management and management science.
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This work contributes to both the strategic customer behaviour research and
type/valuation uncertainty literature by studying the interplay between customers’
strategic waiting decision and their type uncertainty. The literature that considers
strategic customers includes Aviv and Pazgal (2008), Elmaghraby et al. (2008), Zhang
and Cooper (2008), Su and Zhang (2008), and Cachon and Swinney (2009). These papers
consider strategic waiting behaviour, but not valuation uncertainty. Cachon and Swinney
(2009) show that retailers should order less when dealing with strategic consumers than
with myopic customers. Su and Zhang (2008) study how various supply chain contracts
can achieve quantity and price commitments. Considering two types of pricing strategies
including a contingent markdown policy and preannounced fixed-discount policy, Aviv
and Pazgal (2008) find out that a fixed-discount policy, in general, outperforms
contingent pricing under strategic customer behaviour. Contrary to these studies, in this
chapter, I consider consumers are not perfectly aware of their type. This uncertainty is an
integral part of my model and is generated specifically by external factors, not firms’
pricing decisions.
Customers’ strategic delay in purchasing due to valuation uncertainty is studied in the
revenue management literature. Ozer and Phillips (2012) state that, when a customer
plans to buy a ticket (for instance, for an art event that will take place in the next few
months), she may not even be certain about her future personal situation, such as health,
family issues, or mood. Anderson and Wilson (2003) indicate that use of revenue
management without consideration of strategic customer behaviour results in
significantly reduced revenues. Xie and Shugan (2001) and Dana (1998) analyze advance
purchase discounts to motivate customers purchasing early. Other studies consider selling
capacity options; for example, Gallego and Sahin (2010), Yu, Kapuscinski and Ahn
(2005). These papers demonstrate that selling capacity options can improve revenues
significantly over advance purchase discounts. Moreover, advance selling will be
deployed only when capacity is not very scarce. Koenigsberg, Muller, and Vicassim
(2008) prove that offering a last-minute discount is beneficial when customers are
uncertain about whether such deals will be offered. Moreover, optimal prices should
increase over the two periods. Savva and Papanastasiou (2014) develop a model
integrating uncertainty in quality, where users wait reviews of others. They demonstrate
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that this social learning interaction increases the ﬁrm's ex ante expected proﬁt. Dilme and
Li (2014) consider a profit-maximizing monopolist seller with K identical goods to sell
before a deadline. At each point of time, the seller posts a price and the quantity available
but cannot commit to future offers. Over time, potential buyers with different reservation
values enter the market. They show that prices decline smoothly over the time period
between sales and jump up immediately after a transaction occurs. This chapter
incorporates the results of some of these studies. However, I explicitly investigate how
firms should manage ancillary revenues dealing with time-uncertain customers.
Motivated by applications from apparel retailing, Liu and van Ryzin (2008) study a seller
who deliberately under-stocks a product to create a shortage risk for customers. In their
model, the seller pre-announces a single-markdown pricing policy over two periods: a
premium in period 1 and a discounted price in period 2. As a result, under-stocking
motivates high-valuation customers to purchase early at a premium price. Similar to this
study, customers are heterogeneous with respect to their willingness to pay and are
present at the store from the beginning all at once. Under these assumptions, authors
present that with a sufficient large number of high-valuation customers in the market, it is
optimal for the firm to have a rationing policy, otherwise, the firm should serve all
customers at the discounted price. In this chapter, I consider two resources and an
opportunity for customers to change between two resources by paying an ancillary fee.
Moreover, in my setting, as presented by Gallego and Sahin (2010), an early discounted
price is offered by airlines to motivate customers to purchase early.
Gallego and Sahin (2010) consider the case in which valuation for a service is not fully
realized until the end of the selling season. They consider a two-period model in which
customers can purchase partially refundable tickets; that is, paying a fixed fee in period 1
provides buyers the right to purchase the service at a lower price than the spot price in
period 2. Gallego and Sahin (2010) highlight that partially refundable fares can be viewed
as real options. In other words, purchasing a partially refundable fare pays buyers back
when the realized valuations in period 2 are exceeding the spot price. Furthermore,
Gallego and Sahin (2010) present that partially refundable fares are social optimal and
significantly improve firms’ expected revenue over current pricing strategies, which are
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mainly based on refundable and nonrefundable fares. My research differs in that I
consider two services, and customers in this study have type uncertainty with respect to
these services. I introduce a change fee that provides ticket holders the right to change
their service. The change fee also gives an opportunity for firms to increase their revenue
over a best pricing strategy, which is solely based on main service optimal pricing.

4.3 Model Description
A revenue-maximizing firm introduces a Service 1 (S1) in period 1, and Service 2 (S2) in
period 2. Both services have a base price of p. Only S1 is available for purchase in period
1. In period 2, both S1 and S2 are available for purchase and the firm allows customers
who have bought S1 to change to service S2 by paying a change fee, ps. Both services are
delivered sequentially after period 2. For example, consider an airline selling tickets on
Monday and Wednesday for an Atlanta to Paris flight, with a Friday departure and a
Saturday departure. On Monday customers can only buy airfare for a Friday departure,
while on Wednesday customers can buy airfare for both Friday and Saturday departures.
The firm charges an incremental mark-up premium Δp in period 2, Δp ≥ 0. The premium
is applied to both S1 and S2 and represents the “cost” for offering services closer to the
delivery date. The base price is exogenous in this chapter and I assume the firm is
committed to the above pricing policy.
The market consists of time-uncertain customers who originally seek service S1.
However, in period 1, they are uncertain if they ultimately will need S1 or S2. In period
2, they realize their true types. Here, I refer to type as to which service (S1 or S2) is
needed by customers. Customers’ willingness-to-pay (or valuation) v for the service is
distributed independently and identically with cumulative distribution function F(v),
defined over the range [0, V], where V > p + Δp. In period 1, a customer chooses to either
purchase S1 (ticket holders), or wait until period 2 to realize her type (waiting customer).
The type of a customer follows a Bernoulli distribution with probability θ, where θ
represents the probability that a customer no longer demands S1 but instead demands S2
in period 2. This segment of customers with type change in period 2 represents those who
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request a change in their travel dates because of personal or business matters. As a result,
a customer expects to keep valuing S1 as before with probability 1 – θ. I consider a
stylized setting in which all consumers have the same θ. Although one may consider that
consumers may have different θ, here we can view θ as an average probability across all
consumers. In period 2, all customers (ticket holders and waiting customers) realize their
true types, and are divided into two groups based on their realized types. I assume θ, F(v),
and Δp are common knowledge to both firm and customers from the beginning. I would
like to highlight that in period 1, customers are aware that if their type will be changed in
period 2, the firm will offer S2 in period 2.
I consider a market that consists of a large customer population. All customers arrive at
the beginning of period 1 and they have unit demand. I assume there is no limit on the
service capacities for S1 and S2. In the ensuing analysis in this chapter, I normalize the
size of market to 1. I would like to note the normalization of total potential demand does
not change the conclusion of this chapter and it is not contrary to the above assumption
that customers have unit demand; it only brings convenience in model development.
Customers take into consideration service prices, premium, change fee, and the
uncertainty associated with their type change when deciding to buy S1 in period 1, to
wait until period 2 and buy S1 or S2 (depending on their realized type), or not to buy at
all. I would like to highlight that in this essay, I consider cases where θ ≤ 0.5, this is, the
primary focus of this study is S1 customers (not on S2 customers) and switching from S1
to S2 and customers who are primary interested in S2 are not part of the model. A
broader model would include a self-selection between two flights. Also, the firm can
offer S2 to in period 1, but since θ ≤ 0.5, no customer is interested in buying S2 early.
The firm seeks to maximize revenues by choosing the best change fee, while the
customers maximize their expected utilities by choosing to buy S1 in period 1, waiting
until period 2 to buy either S1 or S2, or not buying at all. The sequence of events is as
follows: in period 1, the firm offers S1, and announces the service price p, the change fee
ps, and the premium Δp. After which customers choose to either purchase the S1 or wait
until period 2 to realize their type. In period 2, the firm offers both S1 and S2 and
changes the service price to p + Δp for both services. All customers realize their “true”
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type and act as follows: a ticket holder with type change pays the change fee and
purchases S2 (or possibly simply forfeits her sunk cost p for S1 and leave), but a ticket
holder without type change keeps her original purchase S1. A waiting customer can
purchase S1 or S2 based on her type without paying the change fee (but at the marked-up
price p + Δp). See Figure 8 for the sequence of events.

Figure 8: Sequence of events

A customer compares her expected payoff from purchasing S1 in period 1 and following
scenarios against her expected utility from waiting for more certainty through purchasing
in period 2. Note that when the type of a ticket holder changes in period 2, her utility is v
– p – Δp – ps if she changes to Service 2, and it is – p if she doesn’t change. In this case,
if her valuation for service 2 is not high enough––that is, when v < Δp + ps––her not
purchasing of Service 2 and leaving the market generate a higher utility because paying
extra change and premium fees are too costly for her. The group with low valuation (v <
Δp + ps) represents buyers without change option (BWOO) who might purchase S1 in
period 1 in the hope of keeping their original types. If their types, however, change in
period 2, they leave the market and lose their tickets. On the other hand, when a customer
has a high valuation––that is, when v ≥ Δp + ps––she ultimately purchase S1 or S2 based
on her type and never leaves the market. This group represents buyers with change option
(BWO).

102

A customer purchases S1 in the first period if v – p ≥ 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ max (v – p –
Δp – ps, – p) ≥ v – p – Δp. The first condition simply indicates that the customer’s
valuation should be higher than the service price. The second condition represents a
strategic customer who purchases the service if she expects a higher utility from
purchasing S1 early in period 1 rather than waiting until period 2. See Figure 9 for more
details regarding customer’s decision tree.
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Figure 9: Two-Period decision model

The firm’s expected net revenue is given by:
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝜃(𝑝 + 𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑝) + 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝜃𝑝 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑝)
+ 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝜃(𝑝 + ∆𝑝) + (1 − 𝜃)(𝑝 + ∆𝑝))

= 𝜙𝐵𝑊 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝑝) + 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝑝 + ∆𝑝)

(1)

where 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 is the probability of being a buyer with change option, 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 𝑂 is the
probability of being a buyer without change option, and 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑝𝑠 ) is the probability of
being a waiting customer. All these probabilities are dependent on the change fee. Notice
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that, on average, a buyer with change option pays 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝), a buyer without change
option pays 𝑝, and a waiting customer pays 𝑝 + ∆𝑝.
Next, I present how customers with heterogeneous willingness-to-pay in the market react
to different levels of change fees set by the firm. In general, I expect that customers with
high valuation purchase early and those with lower valuations wait until they realize their
valuation. I will show that there are two scenarios based on the proportion of customers
Δ𝑝

Δ𝑝

with type change: a low θ case, when 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝, and a high θ case, when 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝. I will
present that firm’s revenue function has different formats in these two cases and will
formally summarize the mathematical details for two cases in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2,
respectively.

4.3.1 High Probability of Type Change
First, I study the case where customers have a high chance of type change; that is, when θ
Δ𝑝

is high (𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝). Given a change fee, I investigate how customers act differently based
on their valuations. In general, I expect that, in this case, customers are more willing to
wait than the low θ case. I formally summarize customers’ reactions to change fees in the
following proposition.
Δ𝑝

Proposition 1 When 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝, a customer in period 1 acts as follows:
-

Case I: if v > p + θ (Δp + ps) and ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, then she buys in period 1
(purchase in period 1).

-

Case II: if v > Δp + p and ps > Δp (1 – θ) / θ, then she waits until period 2 (purchase
in period 2).

-

Case III: otherwise, she leaves the market (no purchase).
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Figure 10: Numerical illustrations of customers’ decisions based on different change
fees, for θ = 0.4, p = $1000, Δp = $200 (left) and Δp = $400 (right)

Proposition 1 states that when θ is high, there are three types of customers in the market:
non-buyers, waiting customers and buyers with option. In this case, since there is a high
chance for changing customers’ type in period 2, no one buys without change option in
period 1. Moreover, high-valuation customers still wait until period 2 if ps is high as in ps
> Δp (1 – θ) / θ, and they buy in period 1 if ps is low as in ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ. Also, all
buying customers behave in the same way: either all of them purchase S1 early when the
change fee is low or all of them wait when the change fee is high. Therefore, no potential
customer purchases S1 without change the fee option. Figure 10 presents the numerical
illustrations of customer decisions based on different change fees, for θ = 0.4, p = $1000,
Δp = $200 (left) and Δp = $400 (right).
To illustrate Proposition 1, consider our example of a traveler flying from Atlanta to
Paris. Assume that she anticipates the chance of her travel plan changing to be greater
Δ𝑝

400

than Δ𝑝+𝑝 = 400+1000 ≃ 0.286. For example, assume there is 40% chance her travel plan
change in future, i.e., θ = 0.4. In this case, according to Proposition 1, when ps = 0, she
purchases her ticket in period 1 when v > p + Δp θ = 1000 + 400 × 0.4 = 1160.
Otherwise, she leaves the market. In general, there are two cases over ps as follows:
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First, when ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ = 400 × 0.6 / 0.4 = 600, she buys early in period 1 if v > p
+ θ (Δp + ps) = 1160 + 0.4 ps, and leaves the market otherwise. For example, when ps =
300, if v > 1160 + 0.4 × 300 = 1280, she buys S1 early in period 1. Second, when ps > Δp
(1 – θ) / θ = 600, she does not buy S1 early, but rather waits if v > p + Δp = 1400, and
leaves the market otherwise.
The firm anticipates the strategic customers’ behaviour with respect to their type
uncertainty, and maximizes its total revenue by choosing the best change fee. I defined
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) as the ﬁrm’s revenue in terms of ps in (1). The firm’s revenue can be expressed in

terms of ps for high θ case as follows:

Δ𝑝

Lemma 1 When 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝, the firm’s expected revenue is given by,
(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)))
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = {
(𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + ∆𝑝))

𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑠 ≤

∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)

𝜃

𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

For the high θ case, the revenue function is continuous; however, there are two regions
over ps. I would like to highlight that 𝑝𝑠∗ ≤ 𝑝. This is because if the firm set the change
fee higher than the service price, canceling S1 and purchasing S2 generates higher
utilities for ticket holders with type change. For any θ < 0.5, there are low and high type
Δ𝑝

change cases, that is, θ can be lower or higher than Δ𝑝+𝑝. Notice that, at extreme case
Δ𝑝

where θ = 0.5, there should not be a high type change case. This implies that Δ𝑝+𝑝 ≤ 0.5,
which simples to Δp ≤ p. Therefore, with respect to Δp and p, I consider the premium
price is not higher that the service price. This result is reasonable since it is very rare that
the firm increase the service price by more than 100%. One might wonder, when the
proportion of customers with type change is high, can the firm get benefit from this high
rate of type change by setting a high change fee. I will analyze this case in Corollary 1.
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Δ𝑝

Corollary 1 when 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝, firms should set the change fee such that ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ,
to induce all potential customers purchase early.
Corollary 1 states that, when a high proportion of customers change from S1 to S2, the
firm should never set a high change fee. Notice that in the high θ case, when ps is high, as
in ps > Δp (1 – θ) / θ, the revenue function is independent of ps. This implies that it is
never beneficial for the firm to set a change fee higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ for the high θ
case.
In addition, a high change fee will force all buyers to wait, generating no benefit for the
firm. Customers react to the firm’s policy of setting a high change fee until the second
period to avoid paying the change fee. Therefore, it is not beneficial for the firm to set a
high change fee and risk provoking customer speculation. Gaining more revenue by
reducing the change fee might seem counterintuitive but proves beneficial when a high
proportion of customers make a change. This result is anecdotally consistent with the
current practice in the auto rental industry, where a significant proportion of customers
never show up.25
Referring back to the flight from Atlanta to Paris, let us assume two cases where
travelers’ valuations are uniformly distributed between 0 and 2500 and between 0 and
3000, respectively. Furthermore, for both above cases, consider two values of θ = 0.3
(dashed line) and θ = 0.7 (dotted line), where p = $1000, Δp = $400. Figure 11 present
the firm’s expected revenue for two above cases. Interestingly, in both figures, I observe
that a firm can generate high revenues by imposing a low change fee when the proportion
of customers with type change is high. Moreover, the firm’s expected revenue increases
in the proportion of high-value customers. Finally, these results suggest that change fees
significantly impact a firm’s expected revenue. For example, when travelers’ valuations
are uniformly distributed between 0 and 2500 and θ = 0.3, selecting a wrong change fee
might leads to more than 15% revenue loss.

25

URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/your-money/autoslash-a-rate-sleuth-makes-rental-carcompanies-squirm-your-money.html; accessed: 2015–8–8.
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Figure 11: Firm’s expected revenue for θ = 0.3 (dashed line) and θ = 0.7 (dotted
line), p = $1000, Δp = $400, v is uniformly distributed between 0 and 2500 (left) and
between 0 and 3000 (right)

A special case is when θ = 0. Based on Lemma 1, the firm’s expected revenue is given
by:
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝑝 (1 − 𝐹(𝑝))
which is independent of ps and represents the revenue of the monopolistic firm posting
price p for the service. The revenue functions introduced in this study are extensions to
this classical and popular revenue management setting in pricing and supply chaincontracting problems. Let PM be the optimal monopolistic service price for a single
service. In this section, I consider that the service price p is an exogenous parameter. In
Section 4.4, however, I consider p as a decision factor and investigate how the firm
should set the service price and the change fee together. Next, I present how to derive the
optimal change fee for high θ case. First, I define ls as the solution of 𝑝𝑠 to the following
equation:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)

(2)
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Note that the optimal change fee cannot be inside the second region of change fee in
Lemma 1.
Δ𝑝

Proposition 2 If 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝, then the optimal change fee, 𝑝𝑠∗ , is found as follows:

𝑝𝑠∗

=

0

𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑠 ≤ 0

𝑙𝑠

𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑙𝑠 ≤

∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)
{
𝜃

∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)

𝜃

𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Proposition 2 indicates how a revenue-maximizing firm sets the optimal change fee when
time-uncertain and heterogeneous customers present in the market for high θ case.
Proposition 2 defines a specific change fee, 𝑙𝑠 , given by solution of (2). This proposition
states that, depending on the proportion of customers with type change, the optimal
change fee should be equal to the solution of (2), the specific change fee, 𝑙𝑠 , when it is
within the lower region of change fee in Proposition 1, i.e., 0 ≤ 𝑙𝑠 ≤

∆𝑝(1−𝜃)

𝜃

. When ls is

outside the lower region of change fee in Proposition 1, the optimal change fee is equal to
the boundary of the region which is closer to ls. This result holds for the general
customers willingness-to-pay distribution, F(v).
I would like to highlight that the focus of the foregoing analysis is on the change fee, ps,
and the mark-up premium, Δp, is fixed. Similar to the change fee, firm can also select the
mark-up premium endogenously as a decision factor (I will consider the base service
price, p, in Section 4.4 as a decision factor as well). I demonstrate that the firm always
selects the change fee from the first case of Lemma 1 and we observe the change fee, ps,
is always with the mark-up premium, Δp, in the firm’s revenue function. I will show in
Lemma 2 that this is also the case for the low probability type change case, i.e., in low
probability type change case, I will demonstrate that the firm always selects the change
fee from the first and the second cases of Lemma 2 and the change fee is always with the
mark-up premium in the firm’s revenue function for this case as well. This implies that
the sum of the change fee and the markup price creates the optimal solution. There,
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however, there is no unique pair of optimal change fee and the mark-up premium that
maximize the firm’s revenue; that is, there are more than one pair of optimal change fee
and the mark-up premium that maximize firms’ revenue, but the optimal sum of the
change fee and the mark-up premium, as the solution, is fixed and unique for all of these
pairs.

4.3.2 Low Probability of Type Change
Δ𝑝

Next, I present the case in which the change rate is low (𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝). Given a change fee, I
investigate how customers act differently based on their valuations. In general, I expect
that, in low θ case, customers are more willing to buy S1 early than the high θ case. I
formally summarize customers’ reactions to change fees in the following proposition.

Δ𝑝

Proposition 3 When 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝, a customer in period 1 acts as follows:
-

Case I: if v > p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps ≤ p / (1 – θ) – Δp, then she buys (with option) in
period 1 (purchase period 1).

-

Case II: if v > Δp + ps, and p / (1 – θ) – Δp < ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, then she buys (with
option) in period 1 (purchase period 1).

-

Case III: if p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp + ps, and p / (1 – θ) – Δp < ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, then
she buys (without option) in period 1 (purchase period 1).

-

Case IV: if p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ, and Δp (1 – θ) / θ < ps, then she buys (without
option) in period 1 (purchase period 1).

-

Case V: if v > Δp / θ, and Δp (1 – θ) / θ < ps, then she waits until period 2 (purchase
period 2).

-

Case VI: otherwise, she leaves the market (no purchase).
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Figure 12: Numerical illustrations of customers’ decisions based on different change
fees, for θ = 0.15, p = $1000, Δp = $200 (left) and Δp = $400 (right)
Δ𝑝

When the probability of type change is low, 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝, based on Proposition 3, there are
four different cases of customers in the market: waiting customers, buyers without option,
buyers with option, and non-buyers. Interestingly, Proposition 3 states that, when the
change fee is higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ, then customers with high valuations (v > Δp / θ)
never buy in period 1 but instead wait until period 2, but customers with lower valuations
(p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ) buy without option in period 1. Figure 12 presents the numerical
illustrations of customer decisions based on different change fees, for θ = 0.15, p =
$1000, Δp = $200 (left) and Δp = $400 (right).
Existence of high-valuation waiting customers with low-valuation buyers in period 1 may
seem counterintuitive. Notice that, in this case, the change fees are high. Therefore, it is
less risky for high-valuation customers to wait and not pay a high change fee, knowing
that waiting until period 2 can still generate high utilities for them even after they pay the
premium in period 2. In other words, waiting until period 2 and paying the premium fee
rather than a change fee generates higher utilities for high-valuation customers.
Low-valuation customers in period 1 do not have the benefit of generating high utilities
from waiting, because their valuations are not high enough to cover the premium in
period 2. They purchase without option in period 1 as they count on a low chance of
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changing their type. However, they are aware that, if their type changes in period 2, they
should leave the market. Proposition 3 also states that when the change fee is low, no one
waits in period 1, high-valuation customers buy with option in period 1, and lowvaluation customers leave the market.
To illustrate Proposition 3, consider again our example of a traveler flying from Atlanta
Δ𝑝

to Paris when θ < Δ𝑝+𝑝 ≃ 0.29. In this case, according to Figure 12, when ps = 0, she
purchases her ticket in period 1 when v > p + Δp θ = 1000 + 400 × 0.25 = 1100.
Otherwise, she leaves the market. In general, there are three cases of ps as follows: First,
when ps ≤ p / (1 – θ) – Δp = 1000 / 0.75 – 400 = 933, she buys early in period 1 if v > p +
θ (Δp + ps) = 1100 + 0.25 ps, and leaves the market otherwise. For example, when ps =
300, if v > 1100 + 0.25 × 300 = 1175, she buys S1 early in period 1. I would like to
highlight that, in my analysis, I consider the possibility of having a change higher than
the service price. In practice, firm never charge a change fee higher than the service price
since all ticket holders with type change can directly purchase S2 at lower price without
paying the change fee.
Second, when p / (1 – θ) – Δp < ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, (that is when 933 < ps ≤ 1200), she
purchases her ticket in period 1 when v > p / (1 – θ) = 1333. Note that if v ≤ ps + Δp = ps
+ 400, she buys as a BWOO and when v > ps + 400, she buys as a BWO. When v < p / (1 –
θ) = 1333, she leaves the market.
Third, when ps > 1200, if v ≤ p / (1 – θ) = 1333, then she leaves the market, and if 1333
<v ≤ Δp / θ = 1600, she buys as a BWOO, and if v > 1600, she waits in period 1.
Notice that in both low θ case and high θ case (discussed in Section 4.3.1), no customers
with valuation lower than p + θ Δp consider the service, even in the absence of a change
fee. Also, in both cases, when the change fee is low, customers only consider the service
if their valuation is greater than the expected price in period 2, i.e., v > p + θ (Δp + ps).
When the change fee is high, they consider the service only when v > p / (1 – θ) for the
low θ case. However, this threshold on customer valuation is independent of θ for high θ
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case. When the change fee is high, they consider the service when v > Δp + p for the
high θ case.
The firm anticipates the strategic customers’ behaviour with respect to their time
uncertainty, and maximizes its total revenue (original and ancillary revenue) by choosing
the best change fee. I defined 𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) as the ﬁrm’s revenue in terms of ps in (1). The firm’s
revenue can be expressed in terms of ps for low θ case as follows:
Δ𝑝

Lemma 2 When 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝, the firms expected revenue is given by,
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 )
(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)))

𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑠 ≤

𝑝
= (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝑝 (𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (1 − 𝜃))
∆𝑝
∆𝑝
𝑝
(𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹 ( )) + 𝑝 (𝐹 ( ) − 𝐹 (
))
𝜃
𝜃
1−𝜃
{

𝑖𝑓

𝑝
− ∆𝑝
1−𝜃

𝑝
∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)
− ∆𝑝 ≤ 𝑝𝑠 ≤
1−𝜃
𝜃

𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

For the low θ case, the revenue function is continuous; however, there are three regions
over ps for low θ case. Next, I show how to derive the optimal change fee. First, similar to
high θ case, I define ls as the solution of 𝑝𝑠 in equation (2) as follows:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)

and us as the solution of 𝑝𝑠 to the following equation:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)
= 𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝
𝑓(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)

(3)

One may consider ls and us as two specific change fees, a lower change fee, and a higher
change fee, respectively. Note that the optimal change fee cannot be inside the third
region of change fee in Lemma 2. Next, I provide an explicit condition on the optimal
change fee solution for the low θ case.
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Δ𝑝

Corollary 2 For the low θ case, 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝, the optimal change fee, 𝑝𝑠∗ , is found as
follows:
– If p ≤ PM (1 – θ), 𝑝𝑠∗ , is given by:
𝑝
1−𝜃

𝑝𝑠∗ =

− ∆𝑝

𝑢𝑠

𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑢𝑠 ≤

∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)
{

𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑠 ≤ 0

𝜃

∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)

𝜃

𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

– If p > PM (1 – θ), 𝑝𝑠∗ , is given by:

𝑝𝑠∗ =

0

𝑖𝑓 𝑙 𝑠 ≤ 0

𝑙𝑠

𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑙𝑠 ≤
𝑝

{1 − 𝜃

− ∆𝑝

𝑝
1−𝜃

− ∆𝑝

𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Corollary 2 indicates how a revenue-maximizing firm sets the optimal change fee when
time-uncertain and heterogeneous customers present in the market for the low θ case.
Corollary 2 defines a threshold on the service price and states that when the service price
is lower than this threshold, as in p ≤ PM (1 – θ), the optimal change fee should be higher
𝑝

than its corresponding threshold, as in 1−𝜃 − ∆𝑝 ≤ 𝑝𝑠∗ . We can consider 𝑢𝑠 as a specific
higher change fee given by solution of (3) and it should be within the second regions of
change fee in Lemma 2, that is, 1−𝑝𝜃 − ∆𝑝 ≤ 𝑢𝑠 ≤ ∆𝑝(1−𝜃)
. In this case, when us is outside the
𝜃
second region of change fee in Lemma 2, the optimal change fee is equal to the boundary
of the region which is closer to us. Corollary 2 also states that when the service price is
higher than above threshold, as in p > PM (1 – θ), the optimal change fee should be lower
𝑝

than its corresponding threshold, as in 1−𝜃 − ∆𝑝 > 𝑝𝑠∗ . We can consider 𝑙𝑠 as a specific
lower change fee given by solution of (2) and it should be within the first regions of
𝑝

change fee in Lemma 2, that is, 0 ≤ 𝑙𝑠 ≤ 1−𝜃 − ∆𝑝. In this case, when ls is outside the
lower region of change fee in Lemma 2, the optimal change fee is equal to the boundary
of the region which is closer to ls. This result holds for the general customers willingnessto-pay distribution, F(v). Finally Corollary 2 states that, the firm should balance between
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service price and change fee, and should not set both at high levels or low levels
simultaneously.
I would like to investigate what is the value of the optimal change fee if the service price
is set at the optimal monopolistic service price, i.e., p = PM. As I discussed, this
represents a case in which no customers demand change (θ = 0) or in which the firm
maximizes its main and ancillary revenues separately for technical or operational issues. I
will present based on Corollary 2, the optimal change fee lies within the lower cases of
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. I observe that the firm should never set a very high change fee
when the service price is equal to the optimal monopolistic service price. The results hold
for both high and low θ cases; that is, If p = PM, then 𝑝𝑠∗ = 𝑙𝑠 . Notice that when 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑙𝑠 ,
based on Propositions 1 and 3, only true buyers purchase the service in period 1. I will
later present whether the introduction of the change fee impacts on the service price and
how, in this case, the firm should maximize the total revenue jointly based on service
price and change fee.
Corollary 3 The optimal change fee is decreasing in p, θ and Δp.
Corollary 3 extends the results of Corollary 2 and states that by increasing the service
price or the premium, the firm should select a lower change fee. Moreover, the firm
should set a lower change fee when the population of customers with type grows. In the
next section, I analyze how the firm should select the service price in conjunction with
the change fee.

4.4 The Firm’s Joint Service Pricing and Change Fee
Decision
In this section, I study how the firm should maximize its revenue by simultaneously
selecting the change fee and the service price. Define (p*, ps*) as the set of optimal
service price and the change fee that maximizes the total revenue for the firm. First, I
show how to derive (p*, ps*) given PM, θ and Δp, and then I analyze the properties of this
set.
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Lemma 3 If Δp ≤ PM, the set of optimal service price and change fee, (p*, ps*), is not
unique. This set satisfies the following condition:
p* = PM + (ps*+ Δp)(1 – θ).
When the premium is lower than the optimal monopolistic service price, and the firm
selects both the service price and the change fee, the optimal service price should be set
higher than the optimal monopolistic service price; that is, p* ≥ PM. Notice that, in this
case, ps* is selected at its low value in Corollary 2, i.e., 𝑝𝑠∗ = 𝑙𝑠 . Having both the
premium and the optimal change fee at levels lower than their corresponding thresholds
motivates the firm to set the service price higher than the optimal monopolistic service
price.
Moreover, Lemma 3 indicates that there are multiple optimal change fees as well as the
service prices. Although none of these solutions (joint optimal change fees and service
prices) are dominated by other solutions, the firm might select a specific solution based
on other factors in the market. For example, an extremely high change fee or a service
price might encourage customers to stay in the market (even though it does not affect
their expected utilities). In this case, the firm may eliminate these extreme rates from the
set of possible optimal service prices and change fees. Finally, I would like to highlight
that, when the premium is lower than the optimal monopolistic service price, all ticket
holders are true buyers and no conditional buyers stay in the market. Next, I study the
case in which the premium is higher than the optimal monopolistic service price.
Lemma 4 If Δp > PM, the set of optimal service price and change fee, (p*, ps*), is unique
and can be found as follows:
p* = PM (1 – θ), and ps* =0.

When the premium is higher than the optimal monopolistic service price, and the firm
selects its service price and change fee together, the optimal service price should be set
lower than the optimal monopolistic service price, i.e., p* ≤ PM. Moreover, the firm
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should allow all ticket holders to freely change between S1 and S2 if they want to do so.
This is because the premium is extremely high and the firm cannot impose either high
change fees or high service price. Note that, the high premium in period 2, motivates
more customers to purchase early. Moreover, contrary to the low premium case, there are
buyers without change option in the market, as well.
Corollary 4 Keeping all other factors the same, the optimal service price increases in PM
and decreases in θ, and the optimal change fee decreases in PM and increasing in θ.
Corollary 4 outlines how the joint optimal service price and change fee vary based on the
optimal monopolistic service price as well as the proportion of customers with type
change. Interestingly, Corollary 4 suggests a different result than Corollary 3 with respect
to the change fee: When the firm simultaneously selects both rates, a larger population of
customers with type change motivates the firm to impose higher change fees.
I numerically analyze the set of optimal service price and change fee, (p*, ps*), for a case
in which v is uniformly distributed between 0 and V. A higher V implies a higher
proportion of high-valuation customers. In our example of the traveller from Atlanta to
Paris, Δp = 400. The following analysis reports on eight cases, spanned by:
(250, 0.2), (500, 0.2), (1000, 0.2), (1500, 0.2), (2000, 0.2),
(𝑉, 𝜃) ∈ {
}
(250, 0.8), (500, 0.8), (1000, 0.8), (1500, 0.8), (2000, 0.8)

The numerical results are summarized in Table 6. I highlight the following trends with
respect to the set of optimal service price and change fee. First, I observe that when the
firm sets service price and change fee together, both fees are increasing in V. This is an
intuitive result. Firm can charge higher fees when there are a higher proportion of highvaluation customers in the market.
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Table 6: The set of optimal service price/change fee for different V and θ.
V

(p*, ps*)
Δp = 400

250

500

1000

1500

2000

0.2

(100, 0)

(200, 0)

(410, 50)*

(870, 250)*

(870, 250)*

0.8

(25, 0)

(50, 0)

(390, 50)*

(640, 50)*

(640, 50)*

θ

Also, I notice that the optimal service price and the optimal change fee are decreasing in
θ. As I discussed, when the risk of type change increases, customers are less willing to
buy early to prevent paying the change fee. Furthermore, the service price can be higher
or lower than the premium, however, the optimal change fee is always lower than the
premium. When the proportion of high-valuation customers increases, the optimal change
fee will be close to the premium.
Next, the sum of the service price and the change fee in most cases are less than V/2,
except when V is very high and θ is very low. When there are many high-valuation
customers in the market, the firm can charge high change fees, especially when there is a
low chance of the type change. Notice that the optimal service price and the change fee
are increasing at a rate higher than V.
Finally, I numerically analyze the impact of the markdown premium on the optimal
service price and the change fee. Assume v is uniformly distributed between 0 and 2500.
I compare two cases of Δp = 400 and Δp = 800 and consider a full range of θ. The results
are presented in Figure 13. I observe that the optimal service price is decreasing in Δp.
Interestingly, the optimal change fee is decreasing in Δp for low values of θ and
increasing in Δp for high values of θ.
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Figure 13: Numerical illustrations of optimal service price (left) and change fees
(right) for different θ, V = 2500, Δp = $400 (solid line) and Δp = $800 (dashed line).

4.5 Discussion
In this study, I consider a monopolistic firm that generates ancillary revenues by allowing
customers with type uncertainty to change between services offered by the firm.
Although the firm maximizes revenue by imposing optimal ancillary fares, strategic
customers maximize utilities by responding to these fares. Knowing that the introduction
of an ancillary fee might distract customers from purchasing the Service 1, I investigate
how the firm should introduce such a fee in this study. Also, it is not clear whether the
firm should modify its pricing policy after charging its customers a change fee. I derive
analytically each market player’s best reaction to the other to prescribe the characteristics
of firm/customer interaction equilibrium.
My results in Chapter 4 suggest that the firm should consider the change fee in its pricing
policy and receive benefits from this fee. Although imposing the change fee might
distract customers away from purchasing early, I find that it is beneficial for the firm to
increase the change fee up to a threshold. I show that this threshold is a function of the
level of customer uncertainty, the optimal monopolistic price and the variability of the
price. Increasing the change fee beyond that threshold is, however, harmful for the firm,
and the firm should be very thoughtful in this regard.
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Ancillary fees do more than simply add to the profit margin; many industries, such as
airlines, face massive expansion in demand in many regions of the world, requiring huge
investment in different sections of the business. This trend requires access to additional
monetary resources for strategic business expansions. However, based on a report by
Brian Pearce, IATA's Chief Economist, the aviation industry’s average 1990-2012 global
net profit margin was 0.0%.26 Furthermore, as he addresses in the report, airline investors
earned almost nothing in the past. This challenge highlights that having an extra source of
revenue is critical not only for the short term but also for the healthy financial future of
these industries.
The customer uncertainty level plays an important role in how the firm should design a
change fee. This result indicates that when this uncertainty is very high, the firm should
never set a high change fee. This is anecdotally consistent with the current practice in the
auto rental industry, where the change fees are minimal.27 As I discussed, a high change
fee will force all buyers to wait, generating no benefit for the firm.
The optimal monopolistic service, PM, also has a significant impact on the change fee.
When firm jointly selects the service price and the change fee, it is never optimal for the
firm to impose a high change fee. The variability of the service price is also critical to the
design of the change fee. I find that it is harmful for the firm to set a high change fee
when customers face a huge premium. This suggests that, although the firm should
exploit the ancillary revenue, it should design change fees wisely, along with other fees.
A tradeoff between all fees is necessary when customers face multiple fees. Finally, I
demonstrate that when the firm sets the service price and the change fee simultaneously,
the optimal service price (with change fee) is increasing in the optimal monopolistic
service price and decreasing in the proportion of customers with type change; however,

26

URL: https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Aviation-Advocacy-Economics-2013July.pdf; accessed 2015-09-09.
27

URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/your-money/autoslash-a-rate-sleuth-makes-rental-carcompanies-squirm-your-money.html; accessed: 2015–8–8.
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the optimal change fee is decreasing in the optimal monopolistic service price and
increasing in the proportion of customers with type change.
Notice that, in this chapter, the revenue function has 𝑥 (1 − 𝐹(𝑥)) structure. The
𝑥 (1 − 𝐹(𝑥)) represents the revenue of a service provider selling a product at price x.
There has been a stream of literature regarding the unimodality of this revenue function
configuration. A well-known result is that, if F is increasing generalized failure rate
(IGFR), the revenue function is unimodal (Lariviere 2006). For an IGFR F, the price
elasticity of demand is weakly increasing for all x such that 𝐹(𝑥) < 1. Many distributions
such as Uniform, Normal and Weibull are IGFR. Please refer to Mihai and Prakash
(2013) for a thorough summary of the necessary conditions to ensure the unimodality of
the revenue function. As they highlight it, having the IGFR property is tremendously
valuable in supply chain and revenue management literature.
This is one of the first studies to explicitly explore the effects of change fee in revenue
management. Some firms have started to realize the importance of ancillary revenue as a
reliable source––especially as global market competition continuously increases and
profit margins tighten. I hope this study addresses some of the calls from practitioners to
take into account this new source of revenue in their analyses and contributes to the
literature, which has long advocated beneficial revenue management models.

4.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Δ𝑝

This proposition corresponds to high θ case, i.e., 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝. In part A, part B, and part C
of this proof, I analyze the necessary conditions for three cases in which a customer
leaves the market in period 1, waits in period 1, and buys in period 1, respectively.
Part A: This case presents two scenarios in which a customer leaves the market: First, v ≤
p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, and second if v ≤ Δp + p, and ps > Δp (1 – θ) / θ.
I study these two scenarios respectively.
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Scenario A1: consider v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ: I add a condition to
this scenario and analyze all possibilities for this condition.
A11: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps: A customer purchases in period 1 under this scenario if
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting,
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies
to p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ. Notice that in this case since v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps ≤ p /
(1 – θ) – Δp, thus, v ≤ p + θ (Δp + p / (1 – θ) – Δp) ≤ p + θ (p / (1 – θ)) ≤ p / (1 – θ) which
contradicts p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ condition above. Therefore, no one choose to purchase
early in this situation.
A customer waits in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from waiting in
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < v – p – Δp, which simplifies to v > Δp / θ > Δp / (Δp / (Δp + p)
> Δp + p, which contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps above. Therefore, no one chooses to wait in this
scenario. As a results, all customers in this case leave the market.

A12: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this situation if
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting,
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > v – p
– Δp, which simplifies to p + θ (Δp + ps) < v, which contradicts v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps)
condition above. Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in this situation.
A customer waits in period 1 under this scenario if the expected utility from waiting in
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) < v – p – Δp, which says v > p + Δp. Notice, however,
based on the above case, v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps) < p + θ (Δp + Δp (1 – θ) / θ) < p + Δp, which
Δ𝑝

contradicts an assumption of Proposition 1, which is 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝. Therefore, no one
chooses to wait early in this situation. As a results, all customers in this case leave the
market.
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Scenario A2: Now, consider the second scenario for waiting, i.e., v ≤ Δp + p, and ps > Δp
(1 – θ) / θ. I add a condition to this scenario and analyze all possibilities for this
condition.
A21: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps: A customer purchases in period 1 under this situation if
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting,
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies
to p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ. The first condition p / (1 – θ) < v can be written as follows by
substituting the lower bound of θ: p / (1 – Δp / (Δp + p)) < v, which is p +Δp < v. This
contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps condition above. Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in
this scenario.
A customer waits in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from waiting in
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < v – p – Δp. The first condition contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps condition
above. Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in this situation. As a results, all
customers in this case leave the market.

A22: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. In this case, a customer buys early when (1 – θ)(v – p) +
Δ𝑝

θ (v – p – Δp – ps) ≥ v – p – Δp, which implies that 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝. This contradicts the
condition in the above case. Also, since v ≤ Δp + p, no one waits in period 2, therefore, in
this case, all customers leave the market in period 1.

Part B: This case presents a scenario in which a customer waits in period 1 in the market:
v > Δp / θ, and ps > Δp (1 – θ) / θ. I add a condition to this scenario and analyze all
possibilities for this condition.
B1: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps: A customer purchases in period 1 under this scenario if (1
– θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies to p /
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(1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ. Notice that in this condition contradicts v > Δp / θ, and ps > Δp (1 –
θ) / θ condition above. Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in this situation.
A customer leaves in period 1 under this scenario if the expected utility from leaving in
period 1 is greater than purchasing and waiting in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp < 0 and (1 –
θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < 0, which simplifies to v < p / (1 – θ) < p / (1 – Δp / (Δp + p)) < Δp +
p, which contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps above. Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in this
situation. As a results, all customers in this case leave the market.

B2: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. In this case, a customer buys early when (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ
Δ𝑝

(v – p – Δp – ps) ≥ v – p – Δp, which implies that 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝. This contradicts the condition
in the above case. Also since v ≤ Δp + p, no one waits in period 2; consequently, in this
case, no customer leaves the market in period 1. As a results, all customers in this case
wait in period 1.

Part C: This case considers when a customer buys in period 1, that is, if the expected
utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting, i.e., (1 – θ)(v
– p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > v – p – Δp, which
simplifies to p + θ (Δp + ps) < v and ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ. Note that theses conditions
complete the conditions in previous cases. 

Proof of Lemma 1
The firm’s objective function is given by:
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝑝) + 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝑝 + ∆𝑝)
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Δ𝑝

For 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝, based on Proposition 1, when ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, customers are buy the
service early if v > p + θ (Δp + ps) (Case I), or leave the market otherwise (Case III).
Notice that, there are no buyers without change option in this case.
Therefore, we have the following:
𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 0, 𝜙𝐵𝑊 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

and the firm’s expected revenue is simplified to:
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 0 + 0
= (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)))

Δ𝑝

For 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝, based on Proposition 1, when Δp (1 – θ) / θ < ps, customers are either leave
the market (Case III) or wait in period 1 (Case II) if v > Δp + p. Again, there are no
buyers without change option in this case.
Therefore, we have the following:
𝜙𝐵𝑊 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 0, 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + ∆𝑝)

and the firm’s expected revenue is simplified to:
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = 0 + 0 + (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + ∆𝑝))(𝑝 + ∆𝑝)
= (𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + ∆𝑝)). 

Proof of Corollary 1
Δ𝑝

Based on Lemma 1, for 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝, when Δp (1 – θ) / θ < ps,
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = (𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + ∆𝑝))
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Notice that, in this case, the firm’s revenue function is independent of change fee. This
implies that any change fee higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ is dominated by ps = Δp (1 – θ) / θ.
Therefore, the change fee should never be higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ. 

Proof of Proposition 2
First, based on Corollary 1, a firm never sets a change fee higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ.
Therefore, based on Lemma 1, the firm’s expected revenue is given by:
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)))

I assume F is IGFR, therefore, the firm’s expected revenue is unimodal. Checking the
F.O.C. with respect to ps , I have the following:
𝜃 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) + 𝜃 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (−𝑓 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) = 0
which simplifies to equation (2) as follows:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)

I labeled the solution of (2) with respect to change fee as ls. Therefore, ls is the optimal
change fee since it satisfies the F.O.C. for the firm’s expected revenue. Note that when ls
is negative, since the firm’s expected revenue is unimodal, the optimal change fee is zero.
Furthermore, when ls is greater than Δp (1 – θ) / θ, the optimal change fee is Δp (1 – θ) /
θ, because the firm’s expected revenue is unimodal. 

Proof of Proposition 3
Δ𝑝

This proposition corresponds to the low θ case, i.e., 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝. In part A, part B, and part
C of this proof, I analyze the necessary conditions for three cases in which a customer
leaves the market in period 1, waits in period 1, and buys in period 1, respectively.
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Part A: This case presents two situations in which a customer leaves the market: First, if v
≤ p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps ≤ p / (1 – θ) – Δp , or if v ≤ p / (1 – θ), and ps > p / (1 – θ) – Δp.
A1: I first consider v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps ≤ p / (1 – θ) – Δp: I add a condition to this
scenario and analyze this situation under all possibilities.
A11: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this situation if
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting,
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies
to p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ. Notice that in this case, since v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps ≤ p /
(1 – θ) – Δp, therefore, v ≤ p + θ (Δp + p / (1 – θ) – Δp) ≤ p + θ (p / (1 – θ)) ≤ p / (1 – θ)
which contradicts p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ condition above. Therefore, no one chooses to
purchase early in this scenario.
A customer waits in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from waiting in
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < v – p – Δp, which simplifies to v > Δp / θ > Δp / (Δp / (Δp + p)
> Δp + p, which contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps above. Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in
this situation. As a results, all customers in this case leave the market.

A12: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this scenario if
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting,
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > v – p
– Δp, which simplifies to p + θ (Δp + ps) < v, which contradicts v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps)
condition above. Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in this situation.
A customer waits in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from waiting in
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and
Δ𝑝

(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) < v – p – Δp, which sets a condition on θ, 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝.
Δ𝑝

Notice, however, this contradicts an assumption of Proposition 1, which is 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝.
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Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in this scenario. As a results, all customers in this
case leave the market.

A2: Now, consider the second situation, i.e., v ≤ p / (1 – θ), and ps > p / (1 – θ) – Δp:
I add a condition to this situation and analyze this scenario under all possibilities for this
condition.
A21: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this situation if
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting,
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies
to p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ. This contradicts v ≤ p / (1 – θ) condition above. Therefore, no
one chooses to purchase early in this situation.
A customer wait in period 1 under this scenario if the expected utility from waiting in
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < v – p – Δp, which simplifies to v > Δp / θ > Δp / (Δp / (Δp + p)
> Δp + p, which contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps. Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in this
situation. As a results, all customers in this case leave the market.

A22: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. In this case, v > Δp + ps > Δp + p / (1 – θ) – Δp > p / (1
– θ) which contradicts v ≤ p / (1 – θ) condition in case 1B. Therefore, v cannot be greater
than Δp + ps and the second condition (v > Δp + ps) does not exist.
Summarizing all different scenarios, in above cases all customers leave the market in
period 1.

Part B: Next consider a situation in which a customer waits in period 1 in the market: v >
Δp / θ, and ps > Δp (1 – θ) / θ. I add a condition to this scenario and analyze this situation
under all possibilities.
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B1: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this situation if (1
– θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies to p /
(1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ. This contradicts v > Δp / θ, and ps > Δp (1 – θ) / θ condition above.
Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in this scenario.
A customer leaves in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from leaving in
period 1 is greater than purchasing and waiting in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp < 0 and (1 –
θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < 0, which simplifies to v < p / (1 – θ) < p / (1 – Δp / (Δp + p)) < Δp +
p, which contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps above. Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in this
situation. As a results, all customers in this case leave the market.

B2: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this scenario if (1
– θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > v – p – Δp,
Δ𝑝

which simplifies to 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝. Notice, however, this contradicts an assumption of
Δ𝑝

Proposition 1, which is 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝. Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in this
situation.
A customer leaves in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from leaving in
period 1 is greater than purchasing and waiting in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp < 0 and (1 –
θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < 0, which contradicts v > Δp + ps above. Therefore, no one chooses
to leave in this scenario. As a results, all customers in this case wait in period 1.

Part C: Next, consider a situation in which a customer buys early in period 1. There are
two cases here: First, I have the following: A customer purchases in period 1 under this
situation if the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater
than waiting, i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp,
which simplifies to p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ.
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Second, a customer purchases in period 1 under this scenario if the expected utility from
purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting, i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v
– p – Δp – ps) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies
to p + θ (Δp + ps) < v and ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ. 

Proof of Lemma 2
The firm’s objective function is given by:
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝑝) + 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑝𝑠 )(𝑝 + ∆𝑝)
Δ𝑝

For 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝, based on Proposition 3, when ps ≤ p/ (1 – θ) – Δp, customers are buy the
service early with change option if v > p + θ (Δp + ps) (Case I), or leave the market
otherwise (Case VI). Notice that, there are no waiting customers and buyers without
change option in this case.
Therefore, we have the following:
𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 0, 𝜙𝐵𝑊 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

and the firm’s expected revenue is simplified to:
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 0 + 0
= (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)))

Δ𝑝

Now, for 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝, based on Proposition 3, when – Δp + p / (1 – θ) < ps ≤ Δp / θ – Δp,
customers are either leave the market when v ≤ p/ (1 – θ) (Case VI) or buy with change
option when Δp + ps < v (Case II) or without change option p/ (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp + ps (Case
III) in period 1. Notice that, there are no waiting customers in this case.
Therefore, we have the following:
𝑝

𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 0, 𝜙𝐵𝑊 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝), 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (1−𝜃)
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and the firm’s expected revenue is simplified to:
𝑝
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝑝 (𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
)) + 0
1−𝜃
𝑝
= (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝑝 (𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
))
1−𝜃

Δ𝑝

Now, for 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝, based on Proposition 3, when – Δp + p / (1 – θ) ≤ ps, customers are
either leave the market when v ≤ p/ (1 – θ) (Case VI) or wait when Δp / θ < v (Case V) or
buy without change option p/ (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ (Case IV) in period 1. Notice that, there
are no buyers with change option in this case.
Therefore, we have the following:
∆𝑝

∆𝑝

𝑝

𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 1 − 𝐹 ( 𝜃 ), 𝜙𝐵𝑊 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 0, 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 𝑂 (𝑝𝑠 ) = 𝐹 ( 𝜃 ) − 𝐹 (1−𝜃)

and the firm’s expected revenue is simplified to:
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = (𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹 (

∆𝑝

∆𝑝
𝑝
)) + 𝑝 (𝐹 ( ) − 𝐹 (
)) + 0
𝜃
𝜃
1−𝜃

∆𝑝
∆𝑝
𝑝
= (𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹 ( )) + 𝑝 (𝐹 ( ) − 𝐹 (
)) . 
𝜃
𝜃
1−𝜃

Proof of Corollary 2
First, the optimal monopolistic service price, PM, maximizes the classical expected
revenue for a seller with a single resource: 𝑝(1 − 𝐹(𝑝)). Since F is IGFR, 𝑝(1 − 𝐹(𝑝)) is
unimodal and PM satisfies the F.O.C. with respect to service price as follows:
(1 − 𝐹(𝑝)) − 𝑝𝑓(𝑝) = 0

which can be rearranged to:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝)
=𝑝
𝑓(𝑝)
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Second, I focus on my study of a firm with two resources, which maximizes its expected
revenue based on the change fee. I would like to highlight that based on Lemma 2, a firm
never sets a change fee higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ. This is because the firm’s expected
revenue is independent of change fee when Δp (1 – θ) / θ < ps. Therefore, the optimal
change fee should be within the first region of change fee when ps ≤ p/ (1 – θ) – Δp (low
change fee case), or the second region of change fee when – Δp + p / (1 – θ) < ps ≤ Δp / θ
– Δp (high change fee case).

In low change fee case, based on Lemma 2, the expected revenue is given by:
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

I assume F is IGFR, therefore, the firm’s expected revenue is unimodal. Checking the
F.O.C. with respect to ps, I have the following:
𝜃 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) + 𝜃 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (−𝑓 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) = 0
which simplifies to equation (2) as follows:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)

I labeled the solution of (2) with respect to change fee as ls. Therefore, ls is the optimal
change fee when it is within the low change fee case since it satisfies the F.O.C. for the
firm’s expected revenue in this case.

In high change fee case, based on Lemma 2, the expected revenue is given by:

132

𝑝
𝜋(𝑝𝑠 ) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝑝 (𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
))
1−𝜃
𝑝
𝑝
= (1 − 𝜃) (
) (1 − 𝐹 (
)) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)(1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
1−𝜃
1−𝜃

Notice that the first part of objective function is independent of change fee. I assume F is
IGFR, therefore, the firm’s expected revenue is unimodal in this case, as well. Checking
the F.O.C. with respect to ps, I have the following:
𝜃 (1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) (−𝑓(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) = 0
which simplifies to equation (3) as follows:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)

I labeled the solution of (3) with respect to change fee as us. Therefore, us is the optimal
change fee when it is within the high change fee case since it satisfies the F.O.C. for the
firm’s expected revenue in this case.
Now, I would like to investigate under which scenarios the optimal change fee lies within
the low change fee case and within the high change fee case. Notice that the boundary of
two cases are at – Δp + p / (1 – θ) = ps. Also, the slope of the firm’s objective function is
the same for both change fee cases and is given by:
𝜃 (1 − 𝐹 (

𝑝
1−𝜃

)) + 𝜃 (

𝑝

1−𝜃

𝑝

) (−𝑓 (

1−𝜃

))

Therefore, whenever this slope is negative, since objective functions in both change fee
cases are IGFR, the optimal change fee should be within the low change fee case and
whenever this slope is positive, the optimal change fee should be within the high change
fee case. Notice that, however, if we substitute x = p/ (1 – θ) the slope of the firm’s
objective function has the following structure:
𝜃(1 − 𝐹(𝑥)) + 𝜃𝑥 (−𝑓(𝑥))
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and for x = PM, we have
𝜃(1 − 𝐹(𝑃M )) + 𝜃𝑃M (−𝑓(𝑃M )) = 0
since, as we discussed above, PM satisfies the following F.O.C. condition.
(1 − 𝐹(𝑝)) − 𝑝𝑓(𝑝) = 0

This implies that whenever p/ (1 – θ) is less that or equal to PM, the slope of the firm’s
objective function at – Δp + p / (1 – θ) = ps is negative, and the optimal change fee lies
within the low change fee case. On the other hand, whenever p/ (1 – θ) is higher PM, the
slope of the firm’s objective function at – Δp + p / (1 – θ) = ps is positive, and the optimal
change fee lies within the high change fee case.
When ls (or us) are outside their region of change fee in Propositions 1 (or 3), the optimal
change fee is equal to the boundary of the region that is closer to ls (or us) since I assume
customers’ valuation follows an IGFR distribution. 

Proof of Corollary 3
The optimal monopolistic service price, PM, satisfies the following condition:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝)
=𝑝
𝑓(𝑝)

Now consider the low and high change fee regions for low θ case, which are discussed in
Corollary 2. The optimal change fees in both cases satisfy their corresponding optimality
conditions:
For low change fee case:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

and for the high change fee case:
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1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)
= 𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝
𝑓(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)

This implies that based on Corollary 2, either we have: 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) = PM, or 𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝 =
PM. Since PM is constant, it is immediate that the optimal change fee is decreasing in p,
Δp and θ. 

Proof of Lemma 3 and 4
Δ𝑝

Part A: First, I show that if 𝜃 ≤ Δ𝑝+𝑝, then the optimal service price should be one of two
Δ𝑝

following service prices: 𝑝 and 𝑝 and if 𝜃 > Δ𝑝+𝑝, then the optimal service price is 𝑝.
Consider two cases for analyzing service price as follows: Δp / θ – Δp < ps (high case)
and ps ≤ Δp / θ – Δp (low case).

For the low case ps ≤ Δp / θ – Δp, when (ps + Δp) (1 – θ) > p, Based on Lemma 2, I
have:
𝑝
𝜋(𝑝) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) 𝐹̅ (𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) + 𝑝 (𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
)) =
1−𝜃
𝑝

= (1 − 𝜃) (

1−𝜃

) (1 − 𝐹 (

𝑝
1−𝜃

)) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

Taking the F.O.C. with respect to p, I have:
𝑝
𝑝
)) − 𝑝 (𝑓 (
)) = 0
(1 − 𝐹 (
1−𝜃
1−𝜃

which is rearranged to:
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𝑝
1−𝐹(
)
1−𝜃 = 𝑝
𝑝
1−𝜃
𝑓(
)
1−𝜃

I label the solution for the optimal price in above formula as 𝑝.
Now, for the low case ps ≤ Δp / θ – Δp, where (ps + Δp) (1 – θ) < p, based on Lemma 1
and Lemma 2, I have:
𝜋(𝑝) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) 𝐹̅ (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

Based on the condition of unimodality discussed in Lariviere (2006), the optimal service
price should satisfy the following conditions:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

We label the solution for the optimal price in above formula as 𝑝, which should be
feasible in above region.

Now, consider the high service price case Δp / θ – Δp < ps. When (ps + Δp) (1 – θ) > p,
based on Lemma 2, I have:
𝑝
𝜋(𝑝) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) 𝐹̅ (𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) + 𝑝 (𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
))
1−𝜃

which is the same revenue function discussed in previous case. Therefore, the service fee
is 𝑝. Now, when (ps + Δp) (1 – θ) < p,
𝜋(𝑝) = (𝑝 + ∆𝑝) 𝐹̅ (𝑝 + ∆𝑝)

However, since ps never satisfy this condition based on Corollary 1, we can ignore this
case.

Part B: I present that if ps ≤ PM – Δp, then 𝑝∗ = 𝑢, and if ps > PM – Δp, then 𝑝∗ = 𝑙.
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The optimal monopolistic service price, PM, satisfies the following condition:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝)
=𝑝
𝑓(𝑝)

and any customer with valuation lower than PM leaves the market and any customer with
valuation higher than PM purchases the service.
Consider two cases of discussed in Part A as follows: Δp / θ – Δp < ps and ps ≤ Δp / θ –
Δp. The optimal service price in both cases, satisfy their optimality conditions:
For the low case:
𝑝
1−𝐹(
)
1−𝜃 = 𝑝
𝑝
1−𝜃
𝑓(
)
1−𝜃

and for the high case:
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))

Notice that at the boundary of two cases, i.e., (ps + Δp) (1 – θ) < p, I have ps + Δp = v.
This implies that whenever ps + Δp < PM, the optimal change fee lies within the lower
case since PM demonstrates the same optimality structure, otherwise it lies within the
higher case.

Part C: Based on part A and Part B, I have the following:
if p ≤ PM (1 – θ), 𝑝𝑠∗ = 𝑢𝑠 , otherwise, 𝑝𝑠∗ = 𝑙𝑠 .
If ps ≤ PM – Δp, 𝑝∗ = 𝑝, otherwise 𝑝∗ = 𝑝.
Let’s assume, the joint optimal decision is inside the second region of low θ case.
Therefore, based on Part B:
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𝑝
𝜃𝑝
𝑝
)
+ (1 − 𝐹 (
)) 𝜃 = 0
1−𝜃 1−𝜃
1−𝜃

−𝑓 (

However, I have shown that in Corollary 2 the slope at the boundary for two regions of
change fee satisfies the same condition and should be equal to zero as follows:
𝑝
𝜃𝑝
𝑝
)
+ (1 − 𝐹 (
)) 𝜃 = 0
1−𝜃 1−𝜃
1−𝜃

−𝑓 (

This implies that the joint optimal decision is not inside the second region of the low θ
case. Therefore, the joint optimal decision only can be inside the first region of the low θ
case or the first region of the high θ case. This summarized to:
𝑝∗ = 𝑝 and 𝑝𝑠∗ = 𝑝𝑠 . Based on conditions of optimality in Part B, Lemma 1 and Lemma
2, I have two necessary conditions corresponding the first region of the low θ case and
the first region of the high θ case as follows:
PM = p* + (ps* + Δp)(1 – θ).
PM = p*/(1 – θ).
Now, I will specify when the joint optimal decision should be inside the first region of
the low θ case or when it should be inside the first region of the high θ case. The
boundary of two cases can be specified as:
p = PM (1 – θ) and ps = PM – Δp.
Therefore, when PM > Δp, ps = 0. Knowing that p = (0 + Δp)(1 – θ), and p = PM (1 – θ),
therefore, on the boundary, Δp = PM. The results discussed in Lemma 3 and 4 are
immediate from above conditions. 
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Proof of Corollary 4
Based on Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, the optimal service price is increasing in PM since p*
is either
p* = PM + (ps*+ Δp)(1 – θ).
or
p* = PM (1 – θ), and ps* =0.

It is also immediate that p* decreasing in θ. Furthermore, based on the results in Lemma
3 and Lemma 4, the optimal change fee is decreasing in PM and increasing in θ. 
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Chapter 5

5

Conclusion

Many firms and organizations have allegedly optimized their core business function.
However, they are constantly under extreme pressure, driven by external factors, to
protect their narrow profit margins. For instance, while many airlines faces government
taxes, fee and safety costs required by regulation, they cannot financially survive even
when they successfully operate at 99% capacity level. Their need for supplemental and
reliable revenues calls for performance optimization beyond the core business functions.
The primary purpose of my dissertation has been to investigate the revenue management
and pricing decisions of customer-based strategies that generate extra revenue for firms.
Motivated by applications from online social media and the airline industry, over three
different studies, I focused on the following research questions in this dissertation: How
can firms effectively use customer-based pricing strategies to boost revenues? The results
generated from this thesis lead to optimizing the performance beyond the core business
functions.
Three different model frameworks were developed in three chapters. In Chapter 2, I
investigated the revenue sharing strategies of online social media and showed how these
strategies shape the contribution levels of online users. I proposed a stylized model in
which two online social media firms compete in the market by offering rewards to online
users. Each firm could choose to be either generous in revenue sharing or save more for
itself. The game consists of two steps: first, the OSMs announce their rewards for active
users and, second, users choose their level of contribution with respect to each OSM and
based on their preferences. I derived the revenue function for the firms and presented the
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
In Chapter 3, I studied the switching behaviour of ticket holders in the aviation industry. I
modelled a monopoly firm that sequentially announces prices over two periods for two
identical resources. The customers track prices, and this behaviour triggers demand
leakage between two resources when the price drops. The firm seeks to manage the
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uncertain switching behaviour by setting the best change fee. In general, low change fees
attract more customers to a service, but high change fees generate more revenue per
switching ticketholder. It was not clear whether the firm should accommodate a low or
high population of switching customers, as both resources have their own source of
demand. I demonstrated that the uncertainty in switching behaviour of customers drove
the firm’s optimal switching policy.
In Chapter 4, I extended the model I introduced in Chapter 3 to include strategic
customers with type uncertainty. I considered a monopolistic firm that generates ancillary
revenues by allowing customers with valuation uncertainty to change between services
offered by the firm. While the firm maximizes revenue by imposing optimal change fees,
strategic customers maximize their utilities by responding to these fares. Knowing that
the introduction of a change fee by firms can discourage customers from purchasing the
service early, I investigated how the firm should impose such a fee. I analytically derived
each market player’s best reaction in order to prescribe the characteristics of
firm/customer interaction equilibrium.
My results suggest that firms can benefit from imposing a change fee. Although imposing
the change fee might discourage customers from purchasing early, I found that it is
beneficial for the firm to increase the change fee up to a threshold. I proved that this
threshold is a function of the level of customer uncertainty, the optimal monopolistic
price, and the variability of the price. Increasing the change fee beyond that threshold is,
however, harmful for the firm, and the firm should be very thoughtful in this regard.

5.1 Managerial Insights
The results in this dissertation provide many useful insights for industries interested in
developing new customer-based initiatives to boost their revenues. Specifically, I studied
two types of customer-based pricing strategies: revenue sharing programs in online social
networks and change fees in airlines. First, I provide some insight into the revenuesharing programs.
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5.1.1 Revenue Sharing programs
I investigated revenue-sharing programs of online social media and showed how these
programs shape the contribution levels of online users. Firms have two opposing
strategies in dealing with active online users; they can either save advertising revenue or
share it. I studied the trade-off between these two strategies. My results indicated that, in
any asymmetric completion, users always select the more favourable firm whenever they
decide to work exclusively for one firm. As I discussed, these results are consistent with
observed online evidence. For example, all online celebrities opened their accounts with
YouTube in the early stages of the medium's introduction. Moreover, some of my results
are even observable for OSMs who do not compete based on revenue sharing programs.
An example includes the ongoing challenge of Google+ to compete with Facebook.
Many social media connoisseurs were highly optimistic about Google+ when it first
emerged (and even used it exclusively) but over time realized that they should reopen
their Facebook accounts
These results indicate that a firm entering an online competition should investigate how
online users position its online community relative to a competitor one. Even when there
is a significant asymmetry between two firms, both firms should be aware of the fact that
a market share still exists for the less favourable firm (or niche player). As I discussed,
this explains why a large number of small websites now co-exist with dominant websites
such as Facebook and YouTube.
These results also make significant suggestions for small players in the market. A firm
considered to be less favourable in the market could better position itself in online
competition if it continuously improved the users’ perspective of its online community.
For example, although the popularity of iTunes makes it a favourable service for artists,
downloads from iTunes are readily available on an iPod (or other device), allowing fans
easier access to music. These results suggest that small social media firms can compete
with a dominant firm in the market by providing users with a service that has a higher
utility.
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In addition to market perception, the revenue generated by users’ contributions also has a
significant impact on the outcome of online competition. Firms should have a clear
assessment of true user contribution. As I discussed, if users’ contributions easily
generate revenue, then both less favourable and dominant firms share high rewards and
earn higher net revenues, as well. However, the more favourable firm can better exploit
its advantage in this case by sharing a lower reward. On the other hand, when the
monetary impact of contributions is too small, both firms follow a parsimonious strategy
in sharing rewards. These results imply a bilateral relationship between the monetary
values of users’ contributions and the rewards they receive; if users demand high
rewards, they should deliver rewarding contributions. For example, some mediastreaming websites make substantial payments because the type or level of contributions
delivered by their users helps to promote the website, which is in the best interest of the
website as well as the advertising business.
I have also found that, in order for firms to be successful, it is critical for them to strike
the right balance between saving and sharing their revenues with active users. I observe
that, at equilibrium, firms keep at least half of the marginal revenues for themselves and
never share more than half of this incremental revenue with their active users. Moreover,
when the asymmetry between two firms increases considerably, it might be optimal for
the less favourable firm to completely shut down its rewards program. A higher level of
asymmetry not only adversely affects the less favourable firm, but it can also generate
monetary challenges for the more favourable firm, especially when the difference
between the two firms is insignificant originally.
In the digital world, the monetary impact of the contributions is too small. As previously
discussed, the less favourable firms can compete with a dominant firm in the market by
improving user perspective of its online community. When the monetary rewards are
insignificant, this strategy is even more beneficial for the less favourable firm. My
findings suggest that, in this case, the less favourable firm can generate higher revenues
and, as a result, the firm can share higher rewards with active users. This trend has been
observed recently in the ongoing competition between a dominant firm, YouTube, and a
smaller online music service, Spotify. As Spotify’s user base continues to grow, the firm
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pays increasingly higher reward levels to the artists who use its platform. Next, I
summarize my findings regarding ancillary fees.

5.1.2 Ancillary Revenue
In this thesis, I focused on the benefits of managing revenues from switching customers.
As I discussed, ancillary fees have recently become very significant for many industries,
such as airlines. Managing ancillary revenue supports a firm with a narrow profit margin
to boost its revenue. For example, Airlines will allegedly need to raise funds to invest in
34,000 new aircraft for expansion ahead for emerging markets until 2030.28 Collecting
ancillary fees can financially support airlines for this market expansion which requires
$4.5 trillion investment. Furthermore, ancillary revenue improves customer relationship
through providing more options. Many industries, such as consumer electronics retail,
provide money-back guarantees to customers far into the future (for a limited time). This
practice is used as a marketing tool in generating higher sales. In Chapter 3, I considered
that a hypothetical airline which might want to use this as a marketing strategy to attract
price-sensitive customers. The proposed case has already been implemented by some
airlines. As airlines are exposed to various marketing and pricing strategies, I would not
be surprised to see airlines also offering price guarantees across dates and flights. This
paper has contributed by highlighting some of the operational aspects of these marketing
and pricing strategies to take into consideration.
This thesis provides the managerial insights for firms to generate higher revenues by
segmenting the market and designing ancillary fees for each segment separately. For
example, for non-monetary reasons business travelers have a higher switching rate than
other passengers. Airlines, for instance, should have a good estimate of the likelihood of
a customer from each market segment changing her itinerary and should assess their
prices accordingly. The market can also be segmented based on seasons, geographic
regions, and so on. In addition to predicting the behaviour of customers, firms should

28

URL: https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Aviation-Advocacy-Economics-2013July.pdf; accessed: 2015–8–8.
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forecast their reactions to ancillary fees. This is even more critical because firms need to
take into consideration long-term market competition, as well. A strict pricing policy
regarding switching and cancelation might send customers away to a competitor. This
could partly explain why some carriers, such as Southwest Airlines, have been successful
in acquiring higher market shares by designing more suitable ancillary fees for
customers. Finally, I would like to emphasize that firms should not follow pricing
strategies that sub-maximize their ancillary revenues. Although some airlines are
reportedly more successful in generating higher ancillary revenues, these revenues should
be considered as a portion of the total revenue structure and be managed for a higher total
profit and market performance.
I would like to highlight some other industries to which my model and results might
apply. For example, banks or cellphone providers experience an identical problem in
managing their switching revenues when homeowners decide to change their mortgage
plans or when cellphone users change their mobile plans. In all of these cases, firms
should impose an appropriate fee to find the best allocation of their limited resources to
different streams of demand, knowing that the related ancillary revenues should be
collected to maximize their total profit.
In Chapter 5, I considered customer uncertainty in dealing with a future booking. As
discussed, this uncertainty plays an important role in how the firm should design a
change fee. This finding indicates that when this uncertainty is very high, firms should
never set a high change fee. This is anecdotally consistent with what is the current
practice in the auto rental industry, in which the change fees are minimal.29 As I
discussed, a high change fee forces all potential buyers to wait, and this generates no
benefit from change fees for the firm.
I made a connection between my results and models studying a single seller in the
market. As discussed, the original price of a service, which is captured in my model

29

URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/your-money/autoslash-a-rate-sleuth-makes-rental-carcompanies-squirm-your-money.html; accessed: 2015–8–8.
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through the optimal monopolistic service, PM, also has significant impact on the change
fee. A higher service price represents a more premium market. My results suggest that
when the service price and the change fee are set simultaneously, it is never optimal for
the firm to impose a high change fee. Finally, the variability of the service price is also
critical to the design of the change fee. I find that it is harmful for the firm to set a high
change fee when customers face a huge premium. This suggests that, although firms
should exploit ancillary revenue, they should design change fees wisely and along with
other fees. A tradeoff between fees is necessary when customers should pay multiple
fees. Finally, I demonstrated that when the firm selects the service price and the change
fee simultaneously, the optimal service price (with change fee) increases in the optimal
monopolistic service price and decreases in the proportion of switching customers;
however, the optimal change fee decreases in the optimal monopolistic service price and
increases in the proportion of switching customers.
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